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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation critically reconsiders the dichotomy drawn in modern 
philosophy between faith and reason, especially as formalized by the German Idealists. 
The latter, I suggest, continue to influence how the philosophy of religion is conceived 
and what it is considered to be capable of accomplishing. Though originally used to 
reconcile religious faith with the philosophical reason that had animated forceful 
skepticism, this dichotomy also underscores a tension between the conceptualization of a 
rational public good and private religious values within pluralistic societies. I focus on 
the efforts of Kant, Hegel, and F.W.J. Schelling to develop a philosophy of religion that 
distinguished philosophical reason and religious faith as distinct sources of theory while 
nevertheless establishing meaningful dialogue between each. 
The first chapter surveys Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophy of religion and argues 
that they struggled to maintain the otherness of religious faith relative to philosophical 
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interpretation. The subsequent chapters each focus on a period of Schelling’s intellectual 
development—his early criticisms of Kant, his mature rejection of German Idealism’s 
subjective metaphysics, and his late philosophy of religion—as he developed an 
alternative philosophical approach to religion. This provides a means of exploring the 
challenges that a philosophy of religion must navigate to move beyond the problematic 
opposition of faith and reason. 
I conclude by considering the university as a promising context for reformulating 
this problematic dichotomy central to the philosophy of religion. The professional 
division of faculties embodies the abstract delineation of faith and reason and indicates 
the social and political dimension of such academic efforts. I argue that Schelling’s 
contributions to the philosophy of religion point to the idea of the university as a vital 
framework for both reconsidering the opposition of faith and reason and moving beyond 
this schema in order to conceptualize effectively the contemporary conflicts between 
rational and religious authority within pluralistic societies. 
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List of Abbreviations 
Key works that are mentioned frequently or have lengthy titles have been abbreviated. In 
most cases, abbreviations will cause no difficulty for the reader looking to identify the 
source being cited. In the case of some sources cited with high frequency, the reader may 
potentially become confused by abbreviations; the following list will clarify any potential 
confusion. 
 Abbreviated Title    Full Title 
Hegel 
LPR    Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion in 3 Vols 
Positivity   The Positivity of the Christian Religion 
Kant 
RwBMR   Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
Schelling 
Of the I   Of the I as the Principle of Philosophy or on the 
Unconditional in Human Knowledge 
Letters    Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism 
Philosophy of Mythology Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of  
Mythology and Revelation 
System   System of Transcendental Idealism 
Treatise   Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in the Science 
of Knowledge 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern Philosophy and the Problematization of Religion 
 
 
 
I. The Place of Religion in the Academic Conception of Philosophy. 
The challenges of maintaining a pluralistic society make it necessary for politicians, 
citizens, and scholars to pay frequent attention to diverse religious traditions and 
competing ideological identities. The academy alone cannot fully meet the intellectual 
demands of a pluralistic society through mere research, but it plays a significant role in 
addressing the multitude of related public concerns by defining the intellectual structures 
that help to frame a social order. No one discipline can complete such a task, though it is 
important to identify a discipline which specifically addresses this need. Unfortunately, 
the field best suited for this task, the philosophy of religion, combines two academic 
fields which are notoriously difficult to define. This difficulty engenders multiple notions 
of what the field is—apologetics, comparative theology, a psychological critique of 
religious thought, etc.1—and leaves it with no settled identity. The discipline touches on 
an essential need, and a core task of the academy, without presenting a clear scope or 
singular goal. 
                                                 
1 Various twentieth century debates between prominent atheists and theists—such as those between 
Copleston and Russell, Flew and Warren, Flew and Craig—could suggest that the field disguises 
apologetics as philosophy; Hick’s God Has Many Names and Huston Smith’s Forgotten Truth (esp. 
epilogue) use comparative theology to present religions as diverse manifestations of one fundamental 
reality; Freud’s The Future of an Illusion and Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity present religion as a 
psychological projection. As this partial list demonstrates, the diverse implications suggested by 
“philosophy of religion” vary to the point of including antithetical projects. 
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Philosophy of religion faces a further challenge in that many members of secular 
polities view religion primarily as an interruption into public life that disrupts the 
functioning of modern society. In fact, religious and secular groups typically agree that 
religious values and goals disrupt contemporary society and disagree primarily on what 
value to attribute to this intrusion. As the distinction between the sacred and secular, 
central to modern Western politics, has been associated with the division of private and 
public spheres, many debates in contemporary society share an assumption that religion 
should exist publically only as a carefully defined absence.2 This conception intensifies 
the confusion surrounding what the philosophy of religion is and what it should 
accomplish, and thus seemingly dismisses the need for such a discipline before its 
possibilities are even outlined. 
Despite its ambiguous status, the discipline can identify and analyze a theoretical 
core shared by the diverse issues related to the place of religion in modern society. Even 
staunchly secular societies have vested interests in the various ideas and practices 
associated with the sacred; they thus need to approach religion as something that exceeds 
the category of private belief. The dichotomy of the sacred and secular can be 
overstated,3 yet contemporary problems demonstrate the importance of such a division: 
                                                 
2 Such a definition proves far more complex than has been typically acknowledged in secular cultures. 
Whelan’s “Governmental Attempts to Define Religion” nicely summarizes some of the multiple efforts 
needed to effectively define religion, and places these efforts in the context of practical concerns—in 
Whelan’s case, taxation—that are not always immediately evident in studies dealing with religion as an 
abstraction. 
3 Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane informs this point, but the current study proceeds independently of 
Eliade’s far-reaching claim that we live in a desacralized cosmos (p.17). This allows Eliade’s claim, which 
describes “secular” motivations equally as well as the “religious” goal, to suggest the shared motivations 
behind both theological and philosophical criticism of modern society: “Religious man’s desire to live in 
the sacred is in fact equivalent to his desire to take up his abode in objective reality, not let himself be 
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issues of cultural identity, educational obligations, and parental rights in light of different 
religious beliefs all revolve around particular views of the limits of secular authority and 
individual religious freedom.4 The mass of related legal and political debates that treat 
religion’s public place demonstrate the difficulty of navigating uncertain borders between 
conceptual realms in the absence of an abstract framework. 
Western philosophical conceptions of religion typically intensify, rather than 
address, the confusion surrounding the role of religion between the poles of individual 
liberty and public good. Distinctions between the sacred and the secular necessarily 
introduce a degree of rivalry, but modern Western thought is marked by a perceived 
antagonism between sacred and secular pursuits. Nowhere is this antagonism clearer than 
in widespread distinctions drawn between religious faith and secular reason, represented 
in the academy by theology and philosophy. While the normal functioning of a university 
leads most scholars to dismiss any emphatic declarations of such an opposition, the 
foundational assumption that the fields employ competing methods remains largely 
unchallenged. As every discipline defines itself in part by what it excludes, philosophy 
misunderstands itself by misrepresenting the religious theory it takes as one of its others. 
Consequently, this adversarial stance engenders rather than addresses cultural and 
political problems by hiding the complex role religion plays within contemporary culture. 
                                                                                                                                                 
paralyzed by the never-ceasing relativity subjective experiences, to live in a real and effective world, and 
not in an illusion (p.28).” 
4 Several legal cases illustrate the extensive reach of issues related to religious freedom; religious 
exemption for otherwise prohibited practices (Employment Division v. Smith), free exercise (Sherbert v. 
Verner), taxation (Mueller v. Allen), compulsory education and state funding (Agostini v. Felton, 
Wisconsin v. Yoder), and parental care (Prince v. Massachusetts) all demonstrate the continual need to 
negotiate the border between secular and sacred. These cases also show that many public issues pertaining 
to religion involve the borders delineating the mainstream from sub-cultures. This in turn suggests that the 
religious beliefs of the majority simply may be disguised as secular values rather than truly be as absent as 
thought. 
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Contrary to its self-understanding as following an a priori universal method, modern 
philosophy starts with, rather than arrives at, the marginalization of religious thought. 
A. Multiple Problems with a Shared Center: Contemporary society often assumes 
that reason and science oppose one another, though rarely is this assumption explicit. 
Outside of academic faculties, few people are likely to consider traditional philosophical 
arguments, let alone the abstract relation between philosophical and religious 
frameworks. Within universities, faculties already embody and seldom question the 
assumed relation between the two frameworks. Indeed, success within an academic field 
requires that one not bring such framing issues to the fore. Nevertheless, the absence of 
explicit debate illustrates only that multiple perspectives assume this basic relationship so 
thoroughly that deliberations often seem unnecessary. Multiple issues and debates in 
contemporary culture, when considered simultaneously, reveal that an abstract opposition 
serves as the shared core of the diverse and divisive issues regarding religion’s place 
within society. 
Academic ways of distinguishing philosophy and religion exercise greater influence 
over common opinion than is typically acknowledged. Even though the average citizen 
likely ignores the intricacies of the long-established debates related to this topic, their 
education frames their views of what religion can mean and how it should be engaged 
and tolerated. Thus, the institutions that form the citizens needed by the modern secular 
state reinforce specific assumptions about the religious by embodying particular relations 
between reason, science, and faith. Liberal arts rhetoric rarely notes such institutional 
bias, but a lack of immediate recognition does not demonstrate the lack of influence. Two 
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broad clusters of contemporary debates show the subtle significance of defining the 
relation between philosophical and religious thought beyond esoteric academic 
disputations. 
First, various debates regarding whether modern science explains, disproves, or 
discredits religion manifest a long-standing distinction drawn between faith and reason as 
distinct modes of knowing. Theologians and philosophers in all eras have developed and 
employed divisions made along roughly the same lines; modern views amplify this 
perceived difference as empirical sciences seemingly have removed all limits ascribed to 
human knowledge under previous schematizations. This has led to far-reaching claims 
that the empirical sciences have displaced, and occasionally attempted to replace, 
religious thinking. As the philosophical interpretation of modern scientific advances 
challenge religious understandings of the nature and goal of human society, some 
conservative voices and devoted practitioners began to invoke religious authority against 
unchecked rationality.5 The categorical distinction that separates faith and reason, 
however, seldom attracts criticism. 
While decidedly more complex, the rise of fundamentalist political groups also 
reveals the pervasive belief that philosophical reason and religious faith oppose each 
other. Religious identity unites and divides communities, often with no respect to 
political borders and the civic demands made of modern citizens. While religious groups 
do not unanimously judge modern secularism as opposed to their sense of identity and 
                                                 
5 Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, for example, responds to the academic version of this 
broad trend. The challenge to modern scientific perspectives has a strong presence within universities, even 
as it avoids direct association with the specifically religious critiques of modernity and modern science. 
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well-being, fundamentalist groups across various denominations and throughout the 
globe emphatically voice a shared frustration that contemporary social structures 
seemingly marginalize or disrespect their religious values.6 Multiple economic and 
political factors must be considered in order to contextualize fully such views and to 
criticize the conflict between secular and fundamentalist groups. This would take this 
study far off its intended track.7 Nevertheless, this rhetorical appeal—to religious values 
threatened by secular forces foreign to a group’s identity—shows that fundamentalism 
repeats the general assumption of ardent secularists: both groups work from the shared 
view that faith and knowledge are opposing types of mindfulness that ground different 
social visions. 
This work focuses on the abstract opposition drawn by philosophers between reason 
and faith, rather than on the specific manifestations of this assumption in discussions 
about education, taxation, minority rights, etc. While losing some immediate relevance 
for practically addressing pressing issues, this approach helps to expose alternative ways 
of envisioning and challenging such problems that prove persistent and recurrent. The 
abstract conceptions of reason, faith, religion, and philosophy—especially as inherited 
                                                 
6 Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ speech illustrates this sentiment and suggests the political efficacy of addressing it: 
“Now, I don't have to tell you that this puts us in opposition to, or at least out of step with, a prevailing 
attitude of many who have turned to a modern-day secularism, discarding the tried and time-tested values 
upon which our very civilization is based. No matter how well intentioned, their value system is radically 
different from that of most Americans. And while they proclaim that they're freeing us from superstitions of 
the past, they've taken upon themselves the job of superintending us by government rule and regulation 
(“Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals.” 8 March 1983. 
Accessed on 9 August, 2013: http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/ronaldreaganevilempire.htm).” 
7 Keddie’s “Secularism & Its Discontents” provides a useful survey of fundamentalism as a global 
phenomenon. She emphasizes the changing perception of “secularization” and the diversity of global 
religion, often overlooked by staunch secularists, that led to “the rise of New Religious politics since 1970 
[which] is in part a reaction to strong and sometime resented secular measures, accompanied by a rise in 
government centralization and increasing encroachment in many spheres of life (p.29).” 
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and crystallized by Kant and Hegel—shape modern discussions regarding the relation 
between religious, political, and social institutions. The influence of these two 
philosophers pervades so many methodological approaches and disciplines that their 
systems serve as controlling limits of modern academic theory and the conceptualization 
of religion. The philosophy of religion developed by each of these figures helped to 
frame the issue adopted here as a problematic, and thus they will be the initial focus that 
will serve as a transition between these introductory comments and the main focus of the 
work as a whole, an interpretive engagement with the works of F.W.J. Schelling. 
Schelling, during a career that lasted from the final years of the eighteenth to the 
middle of the nineteenth century, pushed post Kantian philosophy to theosophical, 
religious, and mythical considerations that forced him to completely reframe the 
philosophy of religion. As the problematic that is central to this work encapsulates 
multiple concrete issues, such a theoretical alternative is more important than 
exhaustively analyzing each of the particular problems that relate to this tension between 
modern philosophy and religious thought and practice. Subsequent chapters present 
Schelling’s mature philosophical thought as a critique of Kantian and Hegelian 
philosophy of religion, as well as a useful addition to attempts, like those of Cassirer and 
Durkheim, to push Western philosophy of religion out of its deeply-entrenched 
Enlightenment assumptions. Such assumptions prove persistent as they are caught up in 
the ideal of modern liberal democracy itself. It is, therefore, unsurprising that even after a 
dramatic growth of interest in his thought, Schelling’s mature thought has been 
underutilized as a philosophy of religion. Even for many sympathetic readers, from the 
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perspective of modern philosophy, Schelling’s late work seems incoherently “religious” 
and “metaphysical.” This has contributed to an unfortunate neglect of his contributions to 
delineating the boundaries and possibilities of the philosophy of religion.8 
B. Methodological Challenges: The current approach raises two procedural 
problems that require comment before continuing. First: while following the conventions 
of a study in intellectual history, the central interest of this work is not confined to tracing 
the various historical influences that shaped Schelling’s development and his reception 
by subsequent theorists. Rather, this study functions as a philosophy of history as well as 
a history of philosophy, a dual function that requires brief comment. Second: this work 
assumes that philosophy indicates a singular tradition or entity, or at least that it 
meaningfully can be criticized as a unified entity despite the significant diversity of 
schools and traditions grouped together under the term. Thus, in addition to clarifying the 
basic approach of this study, this section must specify how philosophy meaningfully 
qualifies as a unified tradition that can be engaged with a generalized critique. 
As a history of philosophy, this study assumes the standard narrative of the 
development and influence of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy as its point of departure. 
Typically, histories of modern philosophy present Kant as addressing the split between 
philosophical empiricism and rationalism and determining the limits of rational 
                                                 
8 Heine’s consideration of Schelling presented his later philosophy of religion as mystical confusions: 
“Here philosophy ceases with Schelling, and poetry—I may say folly—commences (Religion and 
Philosophy in Germany. p.152).” Tillich (“Schelling und die Anfänge des existentialistischen Protestes”) 
and Marcel (Schelling fut-il un précurseur de la philosophie de l’existence?”) explored the ways in which 
Schelling’s work anticipated and influenced the existentialist philosophies of the twentieth century. White 
combined these arguments and characterized Schelling as having reached a vista from which he could 
foresee existentialism, yet ultimately regressed to classical metaphysics (Schelling: An Introduction to the 
System of Freedom. pp.1-2, 188-91). 
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investigation so that modern philosophy could be preserved as a university science in the 
face of radical skepticism.9 Hegel subsequently reintroduced speculative philosophical 
themes and developed an absolute idealism that stretched well beyond Kantian limits.10 
Post-Kantian idealism, prominently influenced by Hegel, shared with the critical 
philosophy a desire to preserve a theoretical place for human freedom within a world 
increasingly understood as mechanistic. As Hegel’s influence diminished, various neo-
Kantian projects presented philosophy as a scientific, epistemic, and empirically sound 
discipline in the manner dominant within universities throughout the twentieth century.11 
This characterization marginalizes the philosophy of religion and reinforces the seeming 
opposition of reason and religious faith. 
A simple inventory of the philosophical movements that developed during this era 
exposes the severe limitations of this standard narrative. The influential Romantic, 
Idealist, and Marxist traditions all emerged during this period. Amidst their various 
disagreements about the character and goal of philosophy, each of these perspectives 
                                                 
9 Copleston summarized this view: “On the one hand he was faced by the scientific conception of the 
world, with the physical universe of Copernicus, Kepler and Newton, as subject to mechanical causality 
and determined in its motions. On the other hand he was faced by the rational creature who can understand 
the physical world, set over against it, so to speak, as subject to object, who is conscious of moral 
obligation and of freedom, and who sees in the world the expression of rational purpose. […] The question 
is, therefore, how can the two points of view, the scientific and the moral, be harmonized without denying 
either of them (A History of Philosophy, Volume IV, p.55-6).” Kenny also presents Kant’s driving concern 
as grounding a scientific philosophy (A New History of Western Philosophy, pp.101-6). 
10 Bertrand Russell concluded his brief survey of Kant: “Kant’s inconsistencies were such as to make it 
inevitable that philosophers who were influenced by him should develop rapidly either in the empirical or 
in the absolutist direction; it was, in fact, in the latter direction that German philosophy moved until after 
the death of Hegel (A History of Western Philosophy, p.718). 
11 Köhnke attempted to identify exactly when this conception took root: “The epoch of modern 
philosophy—and that means the epoch in which it became within the university a mere ‘branch of 
learning’, a learned discipline besides the others, and itself abandoned all claim to be in any respect 
anything more—dates from March 1852 [and the revival of Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische 
Kritik] (The Rise of Neo-Kantianism, p.79).” Following the decline of Hegelianism, the dangers of being 
associated with materialism or pantheism led to a humble, narrow view of the discipline (ibid, p.91). 
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appraised religion differently and approached the relation of faith and reason with distinct 
assumptions. Contemporaneously, an influx of Eastern religious and philosophical texts 
gave rise to comparative religious studies that challenged the perceived boundaries of 
philosophy.12 With greater access to other worldviews—views that could not be fully 
integrated with or reduced to Western philosophy—the tradition no longer could claim 
universality without willfully ignoring the contingent aspects of its own development; 
strengthening the marginalization and problematization of the philosophy of religion. 
Any attempt to further understand the history of philosophy during this era and beyond 
will further expose the insufficiency of the standard narrative. Since this standard 
narrative reinforces the assumption that philosophy is a universal a priori science, such 
efforts inherently contribute to a criticism of modern assumptions about the nature of 
philosophy and religion and their role in human culture. 
Subsequent philosophers undoubtedly have inherited their views regarding the 
discipline’s possibilities and goals from Kant and Hegel. The unmatched influence of 
these two figures over the field accounts for the relative neglect of the diverse 
philosophical options of this era within standard historical surveys. This emphasis on 
their work wrongly supports the views that philosophy represents a science of universal 
reason. The same problems addressed by the works of Kant and Hegel also occupied their 
peers, many of whom developed systems and standpoints that suggest alternative 
                                                 
12 Schopenhauer offered perhaps the most direct acknowledgment of the importance of “the Vedas, access 
to which, opened up to us through the Upanishads, is in my eyes the preeminent greatness that this young 
century has to show over earlier ones (The World as Will and Presentation. p.13).” So long as multiple 
internally coherent systems exist, no singular interpretation can ignore its contested standing. By ignoring 
other world traditions, modern philosophy effectively isolated itself from significant challenges to its self-
perception. 
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philosophies of religion. While their rhetoric suggests that their final systems are timeless 
(Kant’s work as a priori, Hegel’s as the result of a speculative history reconstructed 
through a necessary logical dialectic), professional philosophers must not ignore the 
historical context and the contingencies of the critical reception of these systems. Insofar 
as philosophy is viewed as a science following necessary and systematic rules, critiques 
must begin within the limits of these assumptions, but need not confine themselves 
entirely within them. 
The emphasis that has been placed on the a priori in philosophy engenders a view of 
the philosopher as autonomous relative to other academic disciplines, university 
obligations, and social concerns. Otherwise free, the philosopher supposedly is limited 
only by reason and the received textual canon. The inheritance of this canon indicates the 
historicity, contingency, and thus freedom driving the development of philosophy rather 
than exclusively a priori and universally valid (and universally binding) argumentation. 
Because of this freedom, the Kantian and Hegelian systems do not constitute a rigid and 
unchallengeable frame, even though their influence serves as a necessary entry point into 
the philosophy of religion that Schelling developed through direct critique of their work. 
His alternative perspective remains viable as a way to negotiate the limits that the textual 
tradition seems to impose through rhetoric of a priori and necessary reason. Philosophy is 
not isolated from its social influence and consequences; challenging the rhetoric of an 
unbiased and autonomous perspective clarifies the role such perspectives play in their 
culture rather than relinquish their significance. 
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This work challenges this mistaken theoretical separation of philosophy from its 
historical developments and institutions within the discipline’s self-understanding. An 
emphasis on the field as autonomous can fuel a counterproductive antagonism toward 
religious thought which gets conceptualized primarily as an external imposition. The 
following history of philosophy implies, and ultimately serves as, a philosophy of history: 
through an investigation of Schelling’s critique of Kant and Hegel, particularly in his late 
positive philosophy, this work presents a philosophy of religion that approaches religion 
and philosophy as offering distinct types of theory whose mutual engagement must be 
actively considered in order to understand intellectual progress in history. Schelling 
constitutes a viable alternative to Enlightenment understandings of philosophy precisely 
because he contributed to the progression from Kantian to Hegelian philosophy before 
exposing internal reasons to move in a different direction. He can be presented, therefore, 
both apart from the standard narrative and yet as a part of the narrative itself. As he 
rejected the Kantian and Hegelian views of religion on precisely the same point critiqued 
here, his work is especially appealing. 
The history of philosophy suppresses divergent traditions in order to present 
philosophy as a single entity. In practice, various sub-fields of philosophy do not form a 
single discipline with a unified set of assumptions: democratic political theory does not 
employ the same methods as the philosophy of mathematics or phenomenology. 
Likewise, obvious differences exist between analytic and continental traditions, both 
stylistically and in the authors and texts that each perspective grants preeminent 
importance. While the variety of philosophical schools and movements casts reasonable 
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doubt over sweeping claims applied across sub-fields, intellectual history requires that a 
philosophical text retains meaning through time and across traditions. If context fully 
determined a text’s meaning, there would be no way to trace meaning through the 
overwhelming multitude of disconnected ideas. As historical narrative forcibly reduces 
major differences into a singular continuum of a generic tradition, it seems incapable of 
uncovering critiques applicable beyond specific perspectives. 
When applied as a singular label covering a great diversity of traditions and eras, 
“philosophy” serves as a problematic pedagogical concession. Certainly no single thing 
“philosophy” exists if one means a perfect overlapping of various historical traditions, 
professional identities, and disciplinary practices. The coherent identity of the discipline 
cannot be delineated if its full range is wholly considered: a great variety of scholars 
teach antithetical methods, focus on diverse topics and authors, and serve conflicting 
agendas through their work. However, philosophical rhetoric always implies a unified 
tradition, even if no specific practice fits that tradition perfectly. Even the act of 
identifying the multiplicity of philosophical perspectives requires a standpoint from 
which diversity can be appraised. To further criticize any specific manner of thinking, 
one must establish a standard that must be distinct from the perspective being defended 
(lest philosophical argument become simple dogmatism). Thus, a general standard of 
how argument works must be established to mark an “arena” and establish rules of 
debate. In this sense, philosophy serves as a standard for critique across multiple distinct 
perspectives. There are multiple conceptions of what philosophy is, but each view shares 
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some aspect of this unifying, totalizing assumption. It is in this spirit that I refer to 
“philosophy.” 
The reductive tendency of intellectual history, so long as it is openly recognized, 
invites further exploration of otherwise overwhelming breadth of ideas by mapping the 
complexities of various philosophical positions as a continuous territory which can be 
made comprehensible. Such narratives offer more clarity than that provided by attending 
to the diffuse reality of intellectual culture. While there are several reasons to value an 
extensively researched presentation of another era of thought in its full complexity, this 
tendency can be over-indulged to the point of negating the narrative order needed to 
allow a critical engagement with a tradition. The current study does not seek to recreate a 
series of transmissions and challenges issued between scholars and generations through 
its survey of the immediate context of Schelling’s career. Rather than trace such intricate 
influences, this contextual survey is used to portray a specific problem and use that 
problem to find underutilized resources within Schelling’s work. 
C. Defining Modern Philosophy: A perfect and exhaustive definition of modern 
philosophy is not possible; there are too many divergent traditions for any one 
characterization to prove universally applicable. Yet while the central problematic of this 
work may seem to suggest otherwise, such an exhaustive definition is not strictly needed. 
The outer limits of what is accepted as philosophy, more than the specific views that each 
faction considers its unique purview, indicate what the discipline shares across diffuse 
schools and traditions. Even while adopting different views of what constitutes the 
essential core of the discipline, modern philosophers typically indicate similar limits 
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beyond which thought ceases to be philosophical. Even philosophical movements that 
self-consciously present themselves as alternatives to a normative view must use that 
norm as the frame through which their view comes into focus. The following “definition” 
of modern philosophy is not intended as a representation of a view all modern 
philosophers explicitly adopt; rather it indicates the common assumption which provides 
the basis for adjudicating between claims made by such alternatives. 
Criticisms of modernity typically emphasize modern philosophy’s goal as the 
delineation of an a priori, universal, and radically autonomous science. Achieving a truly 
autonomous philosophy proved to be a massive undertaking that required diverse 
intellectual projects and a radical and thorough reconceptualization of both the individual 
and society. Gillespie, tracing modernity back to the via moderna of twelfth century 
nominalism, neatly captures the radical implications of the rhetoric of autonomous self-
determination: 
To understand oneself as new is also to understand oneself as self-originating, as free 
and creative in a radical sense, not merely as determined by a tradition or governed by 
fate or providence. To be modern is to be self-liberating and self-making, and thus not 
merely to be in a history or tradition but to make history. […] Being modern at its core 
is thus something titanic, something Promethean [The Theological Origins of 
Modernity. p.2]. 
 
This rhetoric of autonomous self-determination has served as a normative view for both 
modern philosophers13 and critics of modernity.14 It was used to delineate boundaries of 
                                                 
13 See Heine. Religion and Philosophy in Germany. pp.60-1. 
14 The influential Löwith-Blumenberg debate revolved around the autonomy of modernity. Löwith's basic 
argument was “that modern thought has a fundamentally false consciousness of itself. While claiming to be 
an expression of authentically human rationality, modern thought relating to history in fact derives its 
fundamental pattern of interpretation—that of direction toward a future goal or fulfillment—from theology, 
from the very dogmas that the Enlightenment and its 19th-century “historicist” heirs were concerned, if not 
to deny, at least to bracket off from their explanatory endeavors (as summarized by Wallace. “Progress, 
Secularization and Modernity.” p.67).” Conversely, “[t]he new, for Blumenberg is new, not belated, and 
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modern philosophy both historically (against medieval scholasticism) and disciplinarily 
(against other university faculties) by the early modern philosophers. 
Occasionally an explicit goal, most often a scientific philosophy with universal 
validity was an implicit assumption of modern theorists.15 Enumerating the appeals to 
such an ideal would demonstrate the wide influence of this ideal, and the next section will 
consider the role this goal played in the critique of Scholasticism. Nevertheless, these 
direct demands to raise philosophy to the status of a science can only illustrate the 
preponderance of this shared assumption if the entire scope of each such appeal is 
considered. If this characterization of philosophy truly is ingrained in the narrative of 
modern thought, its prevalence will be demonstrated most clearly by broader 
retrospective critiques of the tradition. In particular, attempts to dismiss the continued 
relevance of this view can reveal its pervasive role in modern theory. 
Clearly there are ways in which philosophy can be, and has been, characterized other 
than this scientific view emphasized particularly by Enlightenment rhetoric. The 
scientific definition can be rejected in order to present philosophy as a specific 
profession, a personal conviction, or a literary genre defined by an imagined audience 
rather than its conception of and relation to reason. In many circles, the Enlightenment 
conception of philosophy as a science of pure reason has been rejected explicitly and can 
no longer be considered the dominant characterization of the discipline. Critics following 
                                                                                                                                                 
[…] better than the old. The ‘self-assertion’ of modernity is, in a simple word, ‘legitimate (Pippin. 
“Blumenberg and the Modernity Problem.” p.536).” 
15 The “geometrical” argumentation of Spinoza shows the desire to ground philosophy in a scientific 
methodology. Likewise, Descartes’ rhetoric presages appeals to a scientific philosophy: “I realized that it 
was necessary […] to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I 
wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last (“Meditations on First 
Philosophy.” p.12).” 
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this path identify significant ways in which the rhetoric of an a priori science of reason 
proves unfruitful for contemporary concerns. Such objections, while deserving 
consideration, accept the basic premise that this study identifies and adopts as its critical 
problem—that modern philosophy understands itself primarily as a science of universal a 
priori reason—and thus they challenge only the current need for such a critique, not its 
accuracy. 
Alternatives to Enlightenment ideas of science, rationality, and humanity fail to 
dismiss fully the conception of philosophy which they contest. In fact, this reaction of 
modern academic philosophy ultimately suffers for denying or suppressing the continued 
influence of Enlightenment rhetoric. This is evident in no less prominent of an example 
than Richard Rorty’s schematization of twentieth century philosophy: 
Three answers have been given, in our century, to the question of how we should 
conceive of our relation to the Western philosophical tradition, answers which are 
paralleled by three conceptions of the aim of philosophizing. They are the Husserlian 
(or ‘scientistic’) answer, the Heideggerian (or ‘poetic’) answer and the pragmatist (or 
‘political’) answer [“Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics.” p.9]. 
 
What Rorty named the scientistic view resembles the view identified in this study as the 
central object of criticism. This could suggest that the current critique addresses an 
outmoded issue that no longer deserves critical attention. That would be the case if and 
only if the scientistic view can be separated as fully from the other views as the schema 
suggests. Rorty’s own criticism, however, does not support such a thorough distinction. 
Following Rorty, a criticism of the tendency toward pure abstraction holds promise 
for addressing problematic tendencies of modern philosophy. By emphasizing the 
political and social consequences suppressed by much of modern philosophical rhetoric, 
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it is easier to emphasize the problematic nature of the way modern philosophy 
characterizes religion. Certainly the conclusions that philosophers reach and the systems 
that they develop have political consequences, and those consequences influence a 
philosopher’s work. Theoretical problems are contextualized by practical issues and 
proper consideration of this fact undermines some of the appeal to an a priori philosophy. 
Nevertheless, Rorty’s critical conclusion is too strong: 
[W]e should carry through on the rejection of metaphysical scientism. That is, we 
should let the debate between those who see contemporary democratic societies as 
hopeless, and those who see them as our only hope, be conducted in terms of the actual 
problems now being faced by those societies. […] If we did, then I think we would 
realize how little theoretical reflection is likely to help us with our current problems 
[“Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics.” p.25]. 
 
Rorty was correct to insinuate that the turn to pure abstraction in philosophy is often 
unfortunate, but he was wrong to suggest that actual problems do not involve remarkably 
abstract issues related to this “metaphysical scientism.” Indeed, the most abstract and arid 
academic philosophy seldom lacks social and political importance, even if its 
professional formulation interferes with the realization of its implications.16 The relation 
of philosophy and religion, as this work demonstrates, is clearly one such matter which 
should not be addressed simply as an issue of pragmatic politics or poetic appeals. 
Neither alternative to scientistic conceptions of philosophy, as demarcated by Rorty, 
proves truly and completely distinct from the scientific view of philosophy upon further 
questioning. Pragmatic philosophy, if it could be presented as fully distinct from 
“metaphysical scientism,” must have some standard by which the “expedient” can be 
                                                 
16 Even the neo-Kantian pursuit of a seemingly neutral erkenntnistheorie appears, in hindsight, to have a 
clear political importance. Willey argues, in a summarizing conclusion, that: “Neo-Kantianism was an 
attempt to liberate German philosophy and politics from tutelage to intellectual confusion, social 
narrowness, and cultural vanity (Back to Kant. p.181, chapter seven).” 
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determined. Thus it must either hold arbitrary assumptions about what will prove 
politically expedient or keep its theoretical bases hidden; such a view cannot function 
without some extra-political foundation. It may be advantageous to admit that all 
philosophical commitments have political ramifications, neutrality can only be an 
illusion, and speculative metaphysical work must be critically reconsidered as a result of 
this realization. Nevertheless, this does not offer an effective and actual alternative to the 
scientific conceptions of philosophy; it simply challenges the completeness of such a 
view by emphasizing what such rhetoric ignores. 
What Rorty labeled the poetic, or Heideggerian, approach holds more promise as an 
alternative to the scientistic view. Summarizing Heidegger’s goal, Rorty insisted that “the 
aim of philosophical thought is not that of ‘human reason’ but is the creation of the 
thinkers of our historical past.”17 That is, philosophy is more a genre approximating the 
free use of poetic imagination than it is a science which transcends its context as modeled 
by empirical sciences that remain the same over time and across cultures. Poetry, as the 
free play of the human intellect, seems opposed to philosophy if the latter is conceived as 
a rigidly necessary science of human thought. However, poetry shares a connection with 
“science” if its creations are to be judged as useful, correct, edifying, or in any way true. 
Even imaginative statements must be grounded in the same reality as scientific analysis. 
                                                 
17 Rorty. “Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics.” p.16. Kaufmann also considered the nature 
of philosophy as characterized by it relation to science and poetry, but framed this relationship more as a 
both/and rather than an either/or: “The question is how we use language—to vivisect experience, killing it 
for the sake of generalized knowledge, or to capture experience alive. The scientist does the former, the 
poet the latter, and the philosopher must often try to do both and capture the experience before analyzing it. 
At its best, philosophy does not live in the shadow of either science or poetry: it offers something compared 
to which both science and poetry are restricted in scope (Critique of Religion and Philosophy. p.88).” 
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The opposition between these two models of philosophy is really only a matter of 
emphasis: the poetic and scientific in philosophy both require the other. 
The following chapter criticizes Kant’s a-historical view of reason and argues that 
Hegel’s historical dialectic repeats the core problems of Kant’s philosophy of religion in 
an historical guise, but it does not abandon the notion that philosophy is a science 
entirely. Rorty’s schema challenges the illusion that philosophy can be completely freed 
from perspectival limitations, but it fails to clarify how political or poetic conceptions of 
philosophy are truly and ultimately distinct from theoretical, scientistic conceptions of 
philosophy. Philosophy cannot truly adopt an unbiased “view from nowhere,” though it 
must be able to establish rules of discourse between otherwise irreducible viewpoints and 
alleviate conflicts between ways of framing and interpreting experience. Political theory 
and poetic imagination, despite their obvious differences, share this need and task with 
theoretical philosophy. 
The advantage of limiting philosophy to direct engagement with practical problems 
should not be overstated, as Rorty’s critique certainly did. The attempt to address 
concrete issues while rejecting their theoretical formulations undermines the dynamic 
interplay needed for the critique of current practices as well as indulgent abstract 
speculation. The need for separate yet conversant abstract and applied critical theories 
was affirmed in Rousseau’s Second Discourse which dismissed efforts to ground political 
inequality in natural inequalities: 
for that would be to ask in different terms whether those who command are necessarily 
better than those who obey, and whether strength of Body or of Mind, wisdom or virtue, 
are always found in the same individuals, in proportion to their Power, or their Wealth: 
A question which it may perhaps be good for Slaves to debate within hearing of their 
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Masters, but not befitting rational and free Men who seek the truth [“Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality.” In The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings. p.131]. 
 
That is, the assumption that a given social order rests entirely on pragmatic facts proves 
unfitting for philosophers. Confusing practical and theoretical critiques undermines the 
ability to create a proper sense of critical distance, a problem that shows pragmatic 
concerns at least must gesture toward a “scientistic” neutral standpoint. 
The subsequent discussions of Kant and Hegel—in the first chapter—will clarify the 
contours of the philosophy of religion when philosophy is conceived as a universal, a 
priori rational science. Specifically, their attempts at philosophy of religion indicate the 
manner in which this perspective forces religious thought to appear as a problematic rival 
to philosophy, regardless of their full intentions. Of course, the understanding of 
philosophy as an autonomous and a priori science of reason pre-dates their careers, and 
the views of Kant and Hegel have significant roots in the early modern period. In fact, the 
representation of philosophy as an a priori, universal science of pure reason served as an 
historical starting point for modern philosophy. The Enlightenment lent a further 
distinctive lionization of reason, but continued to build on the established assumptions of 
early modern philosophy. 
D. The Modern Critique of Scholasticism: Theorists have understood 
philosophical thought to stand in opposition to religious dogma throughout history, but a 
distinctly modernized conception of this conflict arose with the rejection of scholasticism. 
Many scholars consider philosophy to become truly modern only with an explicit 
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rejection of the supposed ecclesiastical exploitation of philosophical inquiry.18 This 
rejection of scholasticism led to a pervasive assumption that a methodological distinction 
separates philosophical and religious thinking; with philosophy conceived as a rigorous 
science, philosophical theology was characterized as either an imprecise science or a 
science with a ken that philosophy could not accept. This type of distinction follows 
necessarily from the self-delineation of an a priori universal science that links the 
identity of the field to the act of discarding less certain premises. Modern philosophy 
dismissed theology (though not always explicitly) as an unimportant remainder, but the 
existence of such a remainder proves vital. 
This methodological distinction drawn between philosophy and theology rests on a 
reductive view of medieval philosophical and religious thought. Early modern critics of 
scholasticism characterized the tradition as a single entity through an active suppression 
of the significant variety of scholarship included within such a label; they characterized 
this broad abstraction as subordinating rational inquiry to the pronouncements of the 
Roman Catholic hierarchy. Critics maintained that this made philosophy coterminous 
with Christian theology, the meta-interpretation through which scholasticism united and 
gave meaning to all of the scientific disciplines exercised in the university.19 The seeming 
correlation of these “arch-sciences” allowed no standpoint from which to criticize 
                                                 
18 Copleston weighed competing tendencies of intellectual historians emphasizing continuity or 
discontinuity between medieval and modern philosophy and noted the significant changes in the 
professional relation of philosophers to theology as indicating a transition often exaggerated as a dramatic 
break (A History of Philosophy, Vol. IV, pp.1-9) Nevertheless, he concluded “however we evaluate the fact, 
it seems to me to be indisputably true that philosophy became progressively emancipated from theology 
(ibid. p.7).” 
19 Hugh of St. Victor’s Didascalicon and Bonaventure’s Reduction of the Arts to Theology are outstanding 
examples of the Scholastic classification of the sciences through theology. Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy ibn Yaqzan 
shows that this tendency—the arrangement of the discreet sciences into a preparatory course for theology 
as the highest science—extended well beyond the faculties of Christian universities. 
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accepted dogma and thus posed a threat to the free progression of scientific investigation. 
Conversely, early modern critics emphasized a complete distinction between the arch-
sciences of philosophy and theology. 
Actual criticism of scholastic thought was typically shallow and often relied on pithy 
rather than incisive observations. For example, Locke provided no substantial support for 
his general accusation of pervasive ignorance and incoherence of the part of Scholastic 
scholars, as he offered only a broad assertion regarding pre-modern theorists: 
The Philosophers of old, […] and the Schoolmen since, aiming at glory and esteem, for 
their great and universal knowledge, easier a great deal to be pretended to, than really 
acquired, found this a good Expedient to cover their Ignorance, with a curious and 
unexplicable Web of perplexed Words […] Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and 
learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last Ages [An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. pp.494-95]. 
 
Such unsubstantiated dismissals proliferated throughout the modern period, with little 
nuance being added to the broad characterization being offered merely to be dismissed. 
Hegel, for example, echoed Locke by using scholasticism as a thinly defined counterpoint 
within his dialectical presentation of the history of philosophy that deserves only the most 
cursory consideration: 
Though the subjects which they investigated were lofty, and though there were noble, 
earnest and learned individuals in their ranks, yet this Scholasticism on the whole is a 
barbarous philosophy of the finite understanding, without real content, which awakens 
no true interest in us [Lectures on the History of Philosophy. pp.94-95]. 
 
These examples illustrate a pervasive indifference, at least on the part of mainstream 
modern philosophers, to the actual complexities of medieval thought.20 Such a dismissive 
                                                 
20 Further examples abound, such as Francis Bacon’s critique of the schoolmen for having their “wits being 
shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) (“The Advancement of Learning.” In: 
The Major Works. p.140).” This view remained common in histories of philosophy, despite obvious 
shortcomings. The multiple condemnations made of philosophical premises by church officials show that 
no such subservience prevailed: Bishop Tempier’s famous condemnation of 1277 was directed in part 
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account provides little insight and an insufficient “other” against which philosophy can 
be defined. 
The first of Descartes’ Meditations serves as, perhaps, the most significant 
illustration of how modern philosophy rests on the rhetorical dismissal of previous 
philosophical history rather than a detailed criticism.21 He avoided even the pity 
reproaches of the previous era and developed a new philosophical idiom with nearly no 
mention of its predecessors. The Meditations find rhetorical strength by presenting 
Descartes’ critical work as an a-historical, simply personal task: 
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had adopted as 
true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had 
subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my 
life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I 
wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last 
[Meditations on First Philosophy. p.12]. 
 
While his criticism is intentionally vague, both historical context and his other writings 
support the interpretation that his “childhood error” should be understood to denote, or at 
least include, scholasticism. The consequence is clear: modern philosophy invents itself, 
rather than renews its predecessors. 
This rhetoric has created a weak portrait of scholastic philosophy and theology 
within the modern imagination. With this thinly sketched other characterized widely as 
backwards, erroneous, or empty, the character of modern thought likewise has been 
described and imagined broadly. The various traditions of Thomism and Aristotelianism, 
                                                                                                                                                 
against Aristotelian assumptions. The element of truth within Bacon’s charge is undermined by overly 
simplistic characterization. 
21 Groarke demonstrated the significant degree to which the First Meditation has clear antecedents in 
ancient and medieval skepticism. The fact that he needs to argue that Descartes was following pre-modern 
arguments, despite Descartes’ direct acknowledgement of as much in his letters (“Descartes’ First 
Meditation: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed.” pp.296-97), itself illustrates the 
modern tendency to forget its predecessors. 
25 
 
 
the Averroism of Siger of Brabant, the Christian Platonism of Bonaventure, and 
nominalism all attest to the impossibility of any singular characterization effectively 
capturing the character and influence of Scholasticism. This reductive characterization 
has become a vested interest for modern theory: once scholasticism’s complexity is 
acknowledged, the simple division between intellectual subservience and autonomous 
scientific research fails to characterize philosophy effectively. Intellectual freedom, as 
conceived in modernity, did not appear tout à coup, and critiquing this dichotomy of the 
medieval and the modern reveals the modern desire for philosophy to fit such a view 
rather than the necessity of conceding that philosophy suddenly began to exercise radical 
autonomy.22 
Modern philosophy developed amidst the constant religious violence that followed 
the Reformation and the collapse of a political Christendom, a context that motivated the 
separation of philosophy from social, religious, and political affairs. Religious 
differences—between Catholics and Protestants, Christians and Muslims, Jews and 
Christians—left seemingly every social and religious group in ideological conflict, and 
often open war. As an autonomous entity, ideally philosophy could distinguish itself from 
the warring, decaying institutions and provide an unbiased standpoint from which to 
adjudicate intellectual conflicts. Thus, what Rorty labeled the “scientistic” conception of 
                                                 
22 Rather than reject the idea of a radical break, Leonine Thomism has attempted to “recover” scholasticism 
as an answer to the problems of later modernity. However, by ignoring, rather than emphasizing continued 
influences and shared lineages, Neo-Thomism implicitly agreed that Modern speculation opposes 
Scholasticism. By accepting this basic premise—the myth of modern philosophy’s new beginning—this 
position merely perpetuated the mistaken picture of modernity that is the problematic of this study. 
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philosophy has always held political relevance.23 The standard narrative that philosophers 
rejected an oppressive religious authority has led to a compromised understanding of the 
task to which intellectual freedom was directed. This contextual motive is precisely what 
the standard narratives of modern philosophical history hide. 
 
II. The Importance of German Idealism for the Philosophy of Religion. 
 
Theorists commonly portray the modern emphasis on rational autonomy as, in part, 
tied to the rejection of the transcendent values appealed to by non-modern world views. 
This includes the critique of scholastic thought, the dismissive attitude often adopted 
toward religious politics, as well as a pervasive bias against non-Western philosophies 
based on specific doctrines of the Absolute. This rejection influences more than the self-
image of academic philosophy as it makes a perceived conflict between transcendent 
faith and immanent reason central to modern conceptions of religion. Charles Taylor 
describes the perspective which creates this conflict as an immanent frame: 
And so we can come to see the growth of civilization, or modernity, as synonymous 
with the laying out of a closed immanent frame; within this civilized values develop, 
and a single-minded focus on the human good, aided by the fuller and fuller use of 
scientific reason, permits the greatest flourishing possible of human beings. Religion 
not only menaces these goals with its fanaticism, but it also undercuts reason, which 
comes to be seen as rigorously requiring scientific materialism [A Secular Age. p.548]. 
 
Taylor is not alone in identifying rational autonomy as the connecting element of 
modernity and the rejection of transcendence as a necessary consequence. Taylor’s work 
                                                 
23 The a-political and a-religious interpretation of philosophy clearly served a particular political end. 
Stephen Toulmin’s Cosmopolis and Gillespie’s The Theological Origins of Modernity are notable 
explorations of the relation of early modern philosophy to politics and theology, respectively. Many 
debates within modern philosophy lack clear pragmatic significance, yet even if one assumes that most 
professional philosophical work is pragmatically irrelevant (an overly dire portrayal), a complete division 
between political and “scientistic” philosophy—as made by Rorty—proves mistaken; the rhetoric used to 
portray philosophy as an unbiased rational perspective had evident pragmatic consequences. 
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straddles philosophy and sociological criticism, and other works oriented in this same 
fashion commonly arrive at similar critiques: 
For modernity as a civilizational project is predicated on the wager that transcendence 
can be represented as no more than transcendental reason yet still maintain its 
authoritative nature and sacred aura: Immanuel Kant’s ‘starry heavens above and moral 
law within’ or the ‘self-evident truths’ of the Declaration of Independence being this 
benchmark of modernity [Seligman. Modernity’s Wager. p.29]. 
 
As individual autonomy has been understood as conflicting with transcendence, and 
philosophers associate religion with the transcendent, a more nuanced philosophy of 
religion is not possible through moderate changes to the typical modern self-
understanding. This is especially the case as the disciplinary identity of both philosophy 
and religion are directly affected by the rejection of transcendence. 
The German Enlightenment and the German Idealist period played a prominent role 
in the development of this immanent frame, particularly as it solidified the modern 
philosophical emphasis on the autonomy of reason.24 While Kant did not begin this 
project, he certainly gave it a definitive expression which became a touchstone and 
continues to serve as a touchstone for academic philosophy. As such, the period proved 
foundational for subsequent academic philosophy and religious studies and reveals the 
problems of modern philosophy in sharpest focus. Additionally, the philosophers of this 
                                                 
24 See Heine regarding German Philosophy’s deep affinity with Descartes, the first to establish the 
autonomy of philosophy (Religion and Philosophy in Germany. p.59-60). These themes importance to 
modernity has been widely noted: see Pippin (Modernism as a Philosophical Problem), Beiser (The Fate of 
Reason, esp. pp.1-15), and Toulmin (Cosmopolis, esp. pp.13-22, 168-170). Gardner (“The Limits of 
Naturalism and the Metaphysics of German Idealism.” pp.21-23) notes that German Idealism has remained 
influential as the unstated counterpoint to dominant assumptions of naturalism. Gordon (“Self-authorizing 
Modernity”), reviewing recent literature on German Idealism, portrays the era as adopting a specific focus 
on the general modern interest in self-authentication and rational autonomy. The importance and influence 
of the era are further demonstrated by its immediate influences—the neo-Kantian era, Husserlian 
Phenomenology, and Heideggerian existentialism—after the specific period drew to a close (Von Rintelen. 
“Philosophical Idealism in Germany.”). 
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era were the first with significant access to religious and philosophical texts which 
originated outside of Western monotheistic cultures and challenged their conceptions of 
what both religion and philosophy were and could be. The first attempts to respond to this 
challenge were largely dismissive and unfortunately continue to influence how 
philosophy regards Chinese and Indian religious philosophy.25 
While modernity refers to and encompasses various traditions, the era’s emphasis on 
rational autonomy epitomizes and connects the competing positions and thus serves as an 
effective period through which to develop a critique of contemporary problems. 
Continental and Analytic philosophy alike have lionized reason,26 and the diverse 
disciplines which presume to define philosophy, religion, and culture all have claimed to 
follow the best method toward a purely rational perspective. Diverse perspectives 
indicate distinct problems. Nevertheless, in order to develop a properly multi-faceted 
understanding of modernity, one first must criticize the tradition emphasizing the a priori 
autonomy of philosophy as epitomized by German thought during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. 
                                                 
25 Herling argues that scholars of this period positioned “Indian thought such that it could be displaced from 
the philosophical agenda (The German Gītā. p.2),” and Hegel constitutes the key figure: “[Hegel’s] 
conceptions were extremely powerful in their support of the Western consolidation of identity and empire: 
India was the site of wild, barbarous imagination, a dull and empty religious consciousness, a rigid, 
ahistorical social structure, and the absence of self-conscious subjectivity (and thus freedom). These 
representations also supplemented a fateful and seemingly decisive displacement of Indian thought from 
consideration within the Western philosophical tradition in favor of Greek origins (ibid. p.223).” 
26 The dichotomy drawn between Analytic and Continental philosophy has weakened somewhat, in part as 
some Analytic philosophers have rejected the empiricist assumptions at the base of their tradition. That 
empiricist bias originally fueled a rejection of German Idealism and its metaphysical concerns. Several 
essays in Hammer’s (Ed.) German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives provide useful comments on this 
trend; see Gardner (“The Limits of Naturalism and the Metaphysics of German Idealism”), Beieser (“Dark 
Days: Anglophone Scholarship Since the 1960s”), and Bowie (“German Idealism’s Contested Heritage”). 
See also Winfeild. “Hegel versus the New Orthodoxy.” In Desmond (Ed.) Hegel and His Critics. pp.219-
35. 
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Schelling rejected the modern emphasis on rational autonomy and, as a result, denied 
the conflict between faith and reason and the purely immanent frame which assumes this 
conflict. He did not always call sufficient attention to how thoroughly this differentiated 
his work from that of his contemporaries, an oversight that contributed to the perception 
of his work as a regressive, muddled mysticism. The bias against mysticism stems from 
the assumptions of modernity that render any seemingly mystical works immediately 
suspect. Since Schelling rarely justified his mystical turn in terms acceptable to 
Enlightenment scholars, it is unsurprising his works were met with frustration and facile 
criticisms. Nevertheless, as a direct contemporary of the major formers of the immanent 
frame, Schelling provides an interior critique of the tradition which has bequeathed 
theoretical frameworks that worsen rather than address modern social problems. His 
perspective contributes to post-modern criticisms by clarifying a thoroughly modern 
attempt to criticize modern philosophy. 
The major theorists of this era wrote works which, through the influence the Prussian 
educational system has exercised over modern education, have had a great, if largely 
invisible, influence on how philosophy and religious studies were institutionalized in 
universities. The concluding chapter of the present study will briefly consider some of 
Schelling’s philosophical works regarding the proper structuring of universities and the 
role of philosophy within these institutions and culture more broadly. These works fit 
within the scholarly debates regarding the ideal of university education during the era of 
the University of Berlin’s founding. Where this chapter criticized Rorty’s premature and 
overly glib dismissal of the abstract “scientistic” view of philosophy, this study will close 
30 
 
 
by emphasizing the relation of the abstract question driving the investigation and the 
concrete manifestation of that issue within universities themselves. 
While German Enlightenment philosophers were securing the central place of the 
rhetorical emphasis on autonomous and universal reason for philosophy, a greater variety 
of foreign religious texts became available to the average scholar. These texts challenged 
many assumptions of western intellectual culture and should have contributed 
immediately to a philosophy of religion with a truly cross-cultural scope, but the 
framework of modern philosophy encouraged a thoroughly dismissive stance towards the 
religious and compromised such a critique before it could be recognized as a challenge. 
Thus, this era serves as a promising focal point for engaging modern philosophy and 
challenging its self-presentation, particularly as the critic can use largely the same tools 
which were employed in the development of the tradition itself. Before engaging 
Schelling’s work, a more detailed understanding of this context is needed. The following 
chapter surveys the theories of religion which Kant and Hegel bequeathed through their 
emphasis on rational autonomy, and considers their influence on other discipline’s 
understanding of religion. 
Immanuel Kant, perhaps the most widely acknowledged authority of the 
Enlightenment, presented religion as a popularization of pure moral maxims. Kant’s 
conception of rational knowledge—that it must include both sensual perceptions and 
mental conceptions—led to the dismissal of imperceptible religious ideas such as God 
and the soul as theoretically impossible. The critical philosophy granted to philosophy the 
sole credible perspective to interpret both itself and religious thought. Strictly, this denied 
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that any independent theoretical insight can be contained in religious thought, the 
contributions of which are relegated to issues of ethics and moral behavior as 
supplemental to pure reason. The following survey demonstrates that this is an 
inescapable conclusion following from the premises Kant adopted, but not an a priori 
rationally necessary conclusion. 
Hegel developed the most prominent alternative to Kant’s philosophy of religion by 
tracing a speculative history of religious and philosophical thought. On the surface, this 
opened a positive dialogue between each perspective. However, this effectively cast 
philosophy, at least in part, as a gradual disenchantment with what Hegel considered 
confused and indistinct religious conceptions of the Absolute. As such, while aspects of 
religious thought and practice that were dismissed by Kant were reconsidered and 
reappraised, they were deemed relevant only when interpreted from the perspective of 
philosophy. In this way, Hegel repeated what the present study considers the fundamental 
problem of the Kantian philosophy of religion, even while he grounded a richer dialogue 
between the two approaches to systematically interpreting human experience. 
Simply identifying the problem led to sprawling concerns which would quickly 
prove overwhelming for the present project if pursued even partially. The central role of 
German Idealism in late modern speculative thought opens a specific way to criticize the 
problem raised in this chapter, and it is this opening rather than an exhaustive survey that 
must guide the following analysis. By focusing on Kant, Hegel, and seminal scholars who 
utilized their work and conclusions to criticize their problematic views of religion in 
various manners, this study can address the broad concern articulated here within a 
32 
 
 
specific and defined area of scholarship. The thought of F.W.J. Schelling serves as a 
means to investigate an alternative conception of the relationship between philosophy and 
religious thought than has been the norm of modern thought. This interest will lead to a 
different emphasis than other studies of Schelling’s thought, but it is sufficiently close to 
Schelling’s own interests as to not veer too far afield from other studies.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Kant, the Religion of Reason, 
and the Suppression of Religious Theory 
 
 
 
Any field of human inquiry, whether nascent or extensively developed, defines itself 
against other traditions of inquiry and through internal subdivision. Such self-definitions 
find expression in an established textual canon that articulates the complex relations 
between the various narrower disciplines contained within an overarching field. The 
canon also helps to contextualize sub-fields and major disciplines within the full range of 
the academic world: a canon provides the common language needed for individuals to 
keep current with scholarship that is too diffuse and specialized to engage fully and 
directly. These functions of identifying limits and granting access can be accomplished 
only if the canon also has a policing authority to emphasize particular scholarly efforts as 
essential expressions of the core assumptions and tendencies operating within a 
discipline. The freedom of rational inquiry, to which modern philosophy prominently 
appeals, is filtered through such limits that provide a means to communicate reason’s 
supposedly universal insight. 
Within modern philosophy, the textual canon differentiates several academic 
traditions while nevertheless implying that these traditions share significant assumptions. 
For example, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, political theory, and philosophy of 
mind all illustrate the variety of disciplines that share roots in the Greek philosophical 
tradition; each nevertheless defines philosophy, in its methods and goals, differently. 
Across these disciplines, Kant constitutes perhaps the most prominent authority shaping 
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the academic investigation of religion. His dismissal of traditional metaphysics and 
demarcation of the limits of reason together fuel common assumptions that religious 
ideas have limited place within the rational discourse of modern liberal societies.27 As 
such, any approach to the problematic established in the introduction first must consider 
the legacy of Kant’s critical philosophy. 
 
I. Kant’s Philosophy of Religion and Kantianism. 
 
Kant, like many modern theorists, viewed religion through the frame of the rational 
theologies of Hume, Leibniz, and Wolff.28 These rational theologies dramatically limited 
modern philosophy’s ability to consider the amorphous field of religion beyond the 
doctrinal statements of certain traditions; once philosophy identified itself with pure 
reason, the discipline came to reduce religious thought to a body of dogmatic 
propositions that could be properly considered only from the supposedly universal a 
priori perspective of philosophy. Religions, to the extent that they offer a theoretical 
framework for their adherents, could appear only as a rival to, an exoteric form of, or 
inconsequential for a universal a priori philosophy. The following demonstrates the 
degree to which each of these options is untenable and to which the modern philosophical 
                                                 
27 In the first Critique, religion appears as a target of criticism in the form of rational theology (though the 
critique is closely tied to the criticism of rational psychology and rational cosmology), and as the space 
allowed for faith opened by the critical limiting of reason. This duplicity rests on questionable assumptions 
and constitutes a basic problem of Kant’s philosophy of religion; the second Critique and Religion within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason do not address this duplicity (see below). By limiting reason to make way 
for faith, Kant framed religion as dependent on reason and subject to its authority (leaving the authority of 
‘faith’ relevant only in margins that Kant barricades philosophy against). 
28 Wood explores Kant’s reception of these systems and notes that while modern rational theology did 
continue scholastic discussions in some sense [Kant’s Rational Theology. pp.62-63], Kant’s positive 
consideration of rational theology (overshadowed by the success of his overall critique of the discipline) 
was developed primarily as a means of improving aspects of Cartesian and Wolffian thought [ibid. p.147]. 
As the introduction has argued, the rhetoric of modernity has displaced the nuanced consideration of 
scholasticism and encouraged the conception of philosophy as self-generating and a-historical. 
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assumptions regarding religion (rather than the various interpretations made with those 
assumptions) must be challenged. The introduction of this study established that theorists 
of philosophy and religious thought ultimately cannot regard each field’s relation as an 
indifferent point. Kant’s philosophy of religion illustrates the inadequacy of 
characterizing religion as a popularization or corruption of reason. 
Two challenges face any critical engagement with Kant’s philosophy of religion that, 
when addressed, help focus criticism on the fundamental problem of Kant’s framing of 
religion. First, his corpus is too monumental to be interpreted convincingly and 
exhaustively. Second, contemporary readers cannot divorce their interpretations from the 
complex history of the critical philosophy’s reception, a problem indicated by the 
sentiment implicit (and occasionally explicit) in neo-Kantian works of the later 
nineteenth century: “It is not enough to insist upon the necessity of going back to Kant. 
All depends upon the way in which we go back to him, and there are different ways of 
going back.”29 This section addresses both of these issues at once; by considering rhetoric 
of the neo-Kantian era, the following justifies the focus on Kant’s philosophy of religion 
(even though Kant framed it mostly as a tangential concern) rather than either the 
epistemological or moral theories that were his principal concerns. What may seem 
initially like an unusual move—looking first to interpretive schools of Kantianism rather 
than Kant himself—proves fitting as this study’s interest lies with the commonly 
accepted limits that Kant drew around how scholars can frame religion as an object of 
philosophical criticism. 
                                                 
29 Stokes. “Going Back to Kant.” p.275. 
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A. Neo-Kantianism as Interpretive Context: As Kant’s influence over modern 
philosophy has been so prominent, it is unsurprising that conflicting interpretations have 
developed around his corpus. As such, any critical engagements with his thought must 
position themselves amidst fundamentally different readings of the sprawling corpus: 
For some, [Kant] was the philosopher of empirical science; for others, the enemy of 
dogmatic metaphysics; and for still others, the rescuer of morality and religion from 
skepticism. The neo-Kantians themselves, ostensibly the true legatees of Kant, did not 
always agree on what facet of Kant’s philosophy to emphasize [Willey. Back to Kant. 
p.131].30 
 
No single characterization of the critical philosophy adequately addresses these diverse 
interpretative possibilities. Though the neo-Kantian movements exceed any single 
schematic, the Marburg and the Baaden Schools are the most representative agendas and 
help to broadly schematize neo-Kantianism.31 The Marburg school, generally, 
emphasized epistemological concerns and contributed to strict conceptualizations of 
philosophy as formally scientific. Conversely, the Baaden, or Southwest, School 
generally used the critical philosophy to explore the role of norms that govern 
knowledge.32 
                                                 
30 Köhnke’s thorough overview of this period provides a more detailed taxonomy of the complexity 
captured by the single term “neo-Kantian” (See his favorable use of Oesterreich’s typology in The Rise of 
Neo-Kantianism. p.200). 
31 Such a schematic does not exhaust the possibilities categorizations of neo-Kantianism. Malter identifies 
four basic trends, adding to the Marburg and Baaden schools the early neo-Kantianism of Liebmann and 
Lange which focused on purging the first Critique of the thing-in-itself  and the “realistic” tendency of 
Riehl and Paulsen which saw the third Critique as the fullest expression of Kant’s thought (“Main Currents 
in the German Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason.” pp.536-50). 
32 Köhnke. The Rise of Neo-Kantianism. p.124; Beiser summarizes Windelband’s (a prominent figure in the 
Baaden school) normative conception of the discipline: “Philosophy differs from the sciences precisely 
because its chief concerns are to determine the fundamental norms governing our beliefs, and to assess 
whether particular beliefs conform to them. Its task is not to know what is the case, as with the other 
sciences, but to judge what ought to be the case according to norms (“Normativity in Neo-Kantianism.” 
p.14).” 
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Due to their influence, these disparate schools pose an immediate challenge: even the 
text through which one engages the critical philosophy signals a particular understanding 
of Kant’s corpus that the contemporary critic may not consciously intend. Perceptions of 
the critical philosophy change significantly depending on which focal point one adopts, 
and these changes impact how Kant’s philosophy of religion is interpreted. Those who 
focus on first Critique, read as a scientific epistemology, will view the later philosophy of 
religion as a problematic, however trivial, curiosity.33 Alternately, approaches that start 
from the practical philosophy typically emphasize the critical philosophy’s consequences 
for religion. For many, Kant’s philosophy simply destroyed traditional religious 
dogmas,34 though full consideration of his corpus reveals various perspectives regarding 
religion that cannot be exhausted by such a simple description. Within this milieu, the 
relation of religion and popular morality has been unsurprisingly a central concern for 
Kant scholarship, as first schematized and popularized by Reinhold’s Letters.35 
This approach still presents challenges, however, as Kant’s study dedicated 
specifically to this consideration, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 
(hereafter RwBMR), generally complicates the relation between the moral and the 
theoretical branches that constitute his philosophical system. Kant presented religion, 
which takes on different meaning in each branch of the critical philosophy, as a distinct 
                                                 
33 Heine’s statement regarding Lampe’s God shows that this criticism has been advanced since at least the 
1830’s (Religion and Philosophy in Germany. pp.119). 
34 Heine helped to secure this view, even if he only referred to Kant as the “arch-destroyer” of the religion 
of the old order dismissed by the French Revolution (Religion and Philosophy in Germany. p.109): “It is in 
this specific sense that he saw the first Critique as “the sword that slew deism in Germany (ibid. p.107).” 
35 Kant’s initial, generally positive appraisal of Reinhold’s Letters legitimates the current approach to his 
corpus through his philosophy of religion rather than his epistemology (see his letter of Dec. 28, 1787, 
quoted in: Breazeale. “Between Kant and Fichte.” p.787n5). Ameriks insists that Reinhold continues to 
shape how critics understand the critical philosophy (Kant and the Fate of Autonomy. pp.25-26, 81). 
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subject though the nature of its science remains obscure.36 It is predominantly approached 
as a moral concern,37 and perhaps superfluous in that role: 
So far as morality is based on the conception of the human being as one who is free but 
who also […] binds himself through his reason to unconditional laws, it is in need 
neither of the idea of another being above him in order that he recognize his duty, nor 
[…] of an incentive other than the law itself. […] Hence on its own behalf morality in 
no way needs religion [Kant. RwBMR. p.33 (6:3)].38 
 
As Kant argued that religious ideas are not essential for moral theory, and closely 
associated religious thought with morality, he seems to suggest that religious concepts are 
fundamentally irrelevant for philosophy.39 However, religious ideas also help to connect 
the theoretical and moral spheres of the critical philosophy and indicate the transitions 
between each sphere. Because of this very tension, RwBMR offers a promising focus for 
engaging the critical philosophy by drawing attention to the transitional point that 
connects the entire system and the limitations of Kant’s general schematic. 
Beginning with the post-Kantian idealists and continuing through various neo-
Kantian traditions, philosophers commonly have dismissed the letter of the critical 
philosophy in order to explicate and better serve the spirit of Kant’s work. Fichte 
                                                 
36 In the first ed. preface to RwBMR, Kant presents the theologian as either a pastoral or an academic 
profession, while the science of religion belongs to the philosophical theologian. The philosophical 
theologian follows the limits of pure reason in delineating the religious: philosophy considering religion 
rather than a distinct theory separate from philosophy (p.36-38, 6:7-10). In The Conflict of the Faculties, 
Kant presents theology as a higher faculty (it has authority; see pp.25-29) yet characterizes it as a public 
function at the service of the state rather than an academic discipline capable of articulating its own 
theoretical principles (pp.33-37). 
37 RwBMR opens with a consideration of the idea of evil (p.45) and turns to explicitly religious 
considerations only as they help make evil philosophically comprehensible. 
38 Fichte echoed this opinion in his early philosophy of religion: “In the truest sense [the idea of God] 
cannot strengthen our respect for the moral law in general, because all respect for God is based solely on 
his acknowledged agreement with this law, and hence on respect for the law itself [Attempt at a Critique of 
All Revelation. p.41 (55)].” 
39 This is only one of multiple passages where Kant presents religious thought as a supplement to morality 
and suggests that, perhaps, it is necessary but certainly it is not a valid independent perspective. See 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. p.63 (4:409); The Conflict of the Faculties. p.61. 
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distinguished common readings of Kant from the critical philosophy’s true meaning,40 a 
move Hegel followed and helped to establish as a standard interpretative move: 
The Kantian philosophy needed to have its spirit distinguished from its letter, and to 
have its purely speculative principle lifted out of the remainder that belonged to, or 
could be used for, the arguments of reflection [The Difference Between Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s System of Philosophy. p.79]. 
 
This appeal to the spirit of philosophy obscured by the letter became a common trope of 
Kantian scholarship. Most notably it was used by Liebmann against post-Kantian 
idealism in his foundational neo-Kantian work, Kant und die Epigonen: 
So far as the transcendental dialectic and the ideology developed in it is concerned, and 
further the rehabilitation on practical-ethical grounds of the same ‘transcendental ideas’ 
which had there been denied all objective cognitional value, and finally his positive-
mystical employment of the … ‘thing-in-itself’—we shall here pass over in silence this 
weak side of the great thinker. I am concerned not with the letter of the critical 
philosophy but with its spirit.41 
 
This distinction was common even though the “spirit” of Kant’s work was typically 
conceived differently so as to conform to the goals of each of Kant’s many critics; this 
interpretive flexibility helped to make the appeal to the spirit of critical philosophy such a 
popular and useful trope in Kantian scholarship. 
This rhetorical strategy, even as the conflict between letter and spirit itself was 
conceived differently, hinges on a shared aversion to any direct association with the 
Enlightenment views central to Kant’s work. Nineteenth century philosophers were 
compelled to distinguish themselves from Kant, in part, due to cultural shifts following 
                                                 
40 See the first preface to the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre:  “the enterprise of this great man […] has been 
a complete failure; since not a single one of his numerous followers perceives what is really being 
said. […] Kant is to this day a closed book, and what people have read into him is precisely what will 
not fit there, and what he wished to refute [Fichte. The Science of Knowledge. pp.3-4].” 
41 Liebmann, as quoted in: Kohnke. The Rise of Neo-Kantianism. p.141. 
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the Spring of Nations and the demise of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism.42 The 
conservative reaction to the 1848 revolutions saw in philosophical criticism a direct 
threat, an affront to established moral and political order much like the challenge posed 
by the emerging field of higher criticism to biblical authority. Already under such 
suspicion, philosophers could not secure a place within State-sponsored schools unless 
they could distinguish philosophy from the moral, social, and political aspects of the 
Enlightenment generally and Kant’s project specifically.43 These social forces together 
made a strictly scientific conception of philosophy—as a second-order critique of the 
logic and datum of other first-order disciplines—especially desirable. Kant’s critical 
philosophy became a canonical authority within this context, and this milieu profoundly 
influenced how his philosophy of religion was approached: any explicit treatment of the 
boundary between philosophy and religion within his corpus disrupted the claims to 
neutrality upon which late nineteenth century philosophy grew to depend.  
                                                 
42 These revolutions, as an epochal moment, have been variously interpreted: “Failure or not, 1848 was a 
genuine turning-point […] What had been, in the main, an aristocratic society, domestically and 
internationally, was consolidated or fell apart into more strongly centralized or nationalized fragments a 
process which was concomitant with the growing influence of the middle class [Rothfels. “1848—One 
Hundred Years After.” p.293].” Others emphasize in the post-March era the end of liberal dreams: “But the 
brave dream of a European polity of free individuals organized in free nations turned into a nightmare. The 
Revolution, greeted as the opening act of a process of cosmic liberation, degenerated before long into a war 
of all against all […]. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, liberalism could not control the forces it had unleashed 
and was defeated by the Revolution it had created [Hamerow. “History and the German Revolution of 
1848,” p.27].” 
43 Burrow (The Crisis of Reason) effectively surveys the context of materialism, de-historicizing theology, 
social Darwinism, and Marxism that, in the post-March era, pressured philosophy to eschew social 
radicalism. Köhnke notes the undeniable political element of neo-Kantianism’s rise within this context (The 
Rise of Neo-Kantianism, p.202). Beiser notes that unlike the present: “Then, much was at stake in the 
proper interpretation of Kant. It was not only an historical, but also a philosophical, even cultural, issue. For 
many philosophers, Kant seemed to provide the path out of the crisis of philosophy, and indeed of all 
modern culture (“Normativity in Neo-Kantianism.” p.11).” See also: Krell. “The Crisis of Reason in the 
Nineteenth Century.” 
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Approaching the critical philosophy through RwBMR,44 the present work 
intentionally focuses on the letter of the critical philosophy rather than the spirit. That is, 
the following emphasizes a significant problem with the way in which Kant articulated 
his philosophy of religion rather than focus on determining what he intended or the 
various interpretive possibilities regarding religion within the framework he developed. 
Such interpretations of Kantian philosophy of religion merit consideration, but the 
problem identified in the introduction directs the current focus to how Kant’s system led 
him to frame religion as a problem for philosophical theory to solve. RwBMR addresses a 
core issue that exposes problems within the critical philosophy generally, and specifically 
with the attempt to delineate a pure philosophy free to criticize religion apart from any 
reciprocal appraisal. The text approaches religion through Kant’s moral philosophy and 
thus depends on the context created by the transition between the first and second 
Critiques, especially as made evident in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
(hereafter Groundwork). 
B. The Rhetoric of Critique: By focusing on Kant’s philosophy of religion, this 
chapter concentrates on the broad consequences of the critical philosophy rather than the 
many intricate and technical arguments that occupy much Kant scholarship. The latter 
can obscure the questionable nature of how, following Kant, modern philosophy 
conceives of religion through problematically narrow parameters implied by the rhetoric 
                                                 
44 This study follows Lawrence in approaching this essay as one of the “great works of modern theology 
(“Radical Evil and Kant’s Turn to Religion.” p.319)”, though this involves a certain irony. As Copleston 
summarized: “just as Kant wrote on aesthetics and aesthetic experience without apparently possessing any 
personal and lively taste for, say, music, so he wrote on religion without possessing any deep understanding 
either of Christian piety or, for instance, of oriental mysticism. He was characterized by moral earnestness 
rather than by religious devotion (A History of Philosophy Vol. VI. p.184).” 
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of pure reason. Kant’s goal, summarized in the B edition introduction of the first Critique 
as “to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith,”45 was to delineate the boundaries 
of possible experience and knowledge. The concession that there is room for faith beyond 
knowledge suggests the importance of religion beyond what an isolated ‘pure’ 
philosophy can acknowledge as theoretically viable. While claiming to make room for 
faith, Kant’s metaphorical description of the first Critique’s aim—to delineate the island 
of truth surrounded by the sea of illusion46—better indicates the essential challenge that 
religion poses to the conception of philosophy as an a priori science of reason; the 
heterogeneity of religious thought challenges the attempt to demarcate a single, universal, 
and “pure” philosophical interpretation of human experience. 
This island metaphor cannot be dismissed as a mere rhetorical flourish as it 
characterizes an essential aspect of the critical project.47 Even dismissive views of Kant’s 
philosophy of religion rely on the separation, fortified by this metaphor, of pure 
philosophy from religious and moral philosophical concerns: 
[T]he field of Kant studies often has been bifurcated into two allegedly distinct types of 
inquiry: Kant’s philosophy as such, and the religious and theological implications of 
this philosophy. The effect has been to eliminate religion and theology from the 
                                                 
45 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. p.117 [Bxxx]. This seems to correspond with his famous avowal: “Two 
things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more 
steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me (Critique of 
Practical Reason. p.269 [5:161]).” These statements have been cited as evidence that Kant saw his work as 
strengthening faith independent from philosophy. Such a view that Kant was open to a legitimate religious 
theory is unlikely, as Marti critically noted: “Kant meant only knowledge of an objective kind, and by faith 
he meant faith in reason which leads beyond the limits of objective knowledge and leads to philosophical 
insights (“Young Schelling and Kant.” pp.475-76).” 
46 Critique of Pure Reason [A235-6, B294-5]. 
47 Metaphors inherently include some ambiguity, and thus are an admittedly odd tool for Kant to employ in 
delineating a certain “land of truth.” Pillow, relying mostly on the third Critique, clarifies Kant’s view of 
metaphors: “the validity claim of a metaphor relies on its success in transferring connotations [which] does 
not require that a metaphor mean just the same thing to everyone. The array of commonplaces a metaphor 
calls up for me may differ somewhat from yours; you may see an implication of it that others miss 
(“Jupiter’s Eagle and the Despot’s Hand Mill.” p.197).” 
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conversation over what Kant’s philosophy means […] This consequence is rarely the 
result of rational argumentation [Firestone and Palmquist. Kant and the New Philosophy 
of Religion. p.xix].48 
 
While some commentators have worked to overcome this interpretive problem in the 
critical philosophy—the separation of philosophy from its consequences for religion—it 
ultimately originates with Kant’s strong distinction between theoretical and practical 
philosophy. Though not Kant’s intention, this distinction grounds competing conceptions 
of religion as both a postulation supporting morality and as a theory that transgresses the 
boundaries of pure reason (see next section). The distinction also introduces a division 
within the secure ground for philosophical theory that the island metaphor characterizes 
as a singular foundation. 
The common sense view that animates this division of philosophy into two 
spheres—moral values inform abstract theory and abstract theory corrects biases in moral 
assumptions49—highlights the problematic nature of Kant’s island metaphor and the 
critical philosophy’s more general appeal to a single sure ground of reason. As the 
rhetoric of the first Critique makes clear, Kant thought that the ground of rational theory 
must be prepared through rational self-criticism. Sallis argued that the guiding metaphor 
of the Critique—“to prepare the ground for metaphysics by exploring that ground all the 
way down to the foundation”—suggests that reason only manages to explore and to 
                                                 
48 The authors critique this tendency, and their collection explores possible nuances within Kantian 
philosophy of religion. Their work criticizes those who dismiss Kant’s philosophy of religion (Milbank, for 
example, scoffs at “the Kantian formalist ‘saving’ of an essentially empty religious faith” in “An Essay 
Against Social Order,” p.201).” Vitiello went so far as to declare “It is in the Kantian philosophy that the 
experience of the word of Jesus—and not therefore the Christianity of Paul—finds its highest and most 
coherent interpretation (“Towards a Topology of the Religious.” p.163),” though this argument rests on 
adoption of Kant’s division of the phenomenal and noumenal in such a manner as to repeat the problem 
which the current criticism attempts to highlight. 
49 Cicovacki, Predrag. “Pure Reason and Metaphors: A Reflection on the Significance of Kant’s 
Philosophy.” p.12. 
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strengthen its foundation “by tunneling down to it in a way not unlike that very mole-
tunneling whose effects critique would expunge.”50 That is, the critique of reason 
employs reason against itself and creates new threats to the foundation it newly 
established. It thus renews, rather than resolves, the question of philosophy’s ground that 
it initially raised. Philosophy’s grounding, unsurprisingly, has remained a charged 
question in the reception of the first Critique as the insistence on universal and a priori 
certitude spotlights the deep difficulty of delineating a foundation for philosophy.51 
The more one insists on a pure theory distinguished from otherwise uncertain human 
experience, the greater the inherent torsion of reason’s self-critique will be.52 Rather than 
an island of certainty amid an otherwise undefined and shifting ocean, Kant’s metaphor 
                                                 
50 Sallis. Spacings of Reason and Imagination. p.7. Kant acknowledged this torsion, though not as a 
problem: “This is the search for the sources of given sciences in reason itself, so that its faculty of knowing 
something a priori may by its own deeds be investigated and measured. By this procedure these sciences 
gain […] an occasion for better explaining their own nature [Prolegomena. p.24].” Sallis sees this 
contortion, required for criticism of the very tool of criticism, as creating an instable motion in what is 
meant to be a static whole: “the entire Critique of Pure Reason is shaken from the ground up and thrown 
finally out of joint: critique withdraws that very self-presence that its possibility as critique requires—that 
is, it revokes itself (Spacings of Reason and Imagination. p.18).” 
51 For the post-Kantian idealists, philosophy is concerned with an absolutely unconditioned first principle 
from which each science must ultimately be derived (Franks. All or Nothing. p.80); this addressed 
skepticism regarding Kant’s failure to establish objective, scientific grounds for his system (See; Di 
Giovanni. “Kant’s Metaphysics of Nature and Schelling’s Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature.” p.199-200: 
Wood. “The ‘I’ as Principle of Practical Philosophy.” p.94). The idealist interpretation is contested; 
Ameriks argues that Kant’s philosophy constitutes a “modest system” that does not insist on an absolutely 
certain basis or strict necessity in its derivations, and which accepts that a completely systematic science is 
only a regulative goal (Kant and the Fate of Autonomy. pp.62-63; for a further critique of the idealist 
reception of Kant, see Franks. All or Nothing. esp. pp.140-45). Ameriks’ position largely sidesteps the post-
Kantian idealists’ challenge: such a “modest system” could only delineate necessary confines for 
philosophical thought for those who accept his system for extra-philosophical reasons.  
52 Many commentators attempt to alleviate the inherent torsion of self-critique by distinguishing the science 
of philosophy from a propaedeutic critique of reason (Gill. “Kant, Analogy, and Natural Theology.” p.20, 
for example). The letter of the critical philosophy, insisting that all sciences manifest what is implicit in the 
single and unifying seed that is reason (Critique of Pure Reason. A834, B862), shows that the relation of a 
science and a propaedeutic for Kant complicates the current critique but cannot dismiss it: the critique of 
reason determines what is possible within scientific system. If the distinction between critique and 
constructive philosophy is strong enough to avoid the torsion of reason preparing its own ground, the island 
of truth cannot be viewed as a singular foundation (which is the essential claim at present). 
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may prove more apt if it expanded to a more complex analogy of an archipelago: multiple 
possible grounds for theoretical constructions, connected loosely but not reducible to a 
single ground.53 This extended analogy proves especially helpful for issues related to the 
philosophy of religion as such questions emphasize the multiplicity of theoretical grounds 
relevant in seemingly singular problems. The ground of a theory—in Kant’s case, pure 
reason—can be defined and limited in part through self-criticism, but only by relying on 
the perspective of another theory both related to and yet independent from the object of 
critique. Simply put, a plot of ground cannot be surveyed completely without stepping off 
of it and moving to a different plot. This is where the expanded analogy helps; the 
various theoretical frameworks available to a philosopher can be imagined as a chain of 
islands that offer multiple standpoints from which to assay each specific island. Every 
standpoint can be criticized, surveyed, and prepared so long as the critic has recourse to a 
distinct vantage point. This archipelagic metaphor stretches Kant’s intention, but also 
reflects the heteronomy involved in his critical project more accurately. 
With this change, the metaphor is better suited for the complexity of characterizing 
the obscure foundation of any theory. “Archipelago” denotes, in its strictest original 
sense, the ambiguous body of water that itself groups and defines the habitable islands. 
Just as islands are understood as a connected chain due to the indefinite body water that 
circumscribes them, so too can several types of theory belie a shared source that remains 
inaccessible to any one theoretical framework and unexhausted by each attempt at 
                                                 
53 Derrida’s essay on Kant’s philosophy of religion notes that Kant categorizes religion in two families 
(Faith and Knowledge. p.10, ¶15), yet in reality religion points to multiple positions and the “infinite spiral 
of outbidding, a maddening instability among these ‘positions’ (ibid. p.12-3, ¶15.).” Competition between 
philosophy and theology glosses over the irreducible multiplicity of ‘religion’ and often leads scholars to 
neglect the real complexity at play. 
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theoretical reconstruction.54 The negative space that direct inquiry cannot engage proves 
more central to critique than Kant acknowledged and his metaphorical ideal—a secure 
and certain ground—exposes the pretense of modern philosophy’s assertion of its 
autonomy. The inner tensions of self-criticism show the need for multiple standpoints to 
make meta-interpretive perspectives like philosophical and religious thought possible.55 
The modern rhetorical emphasis on reason’s self-sufficiency undermines the plurality of 
standpoints needed to prepare a philosophical foundation, a need that should ultimately 
direct abstract definitions of philosophy to the more concrete context of a functioning 
university.56 
As pure theory can only acknowledge alternate theories as corruptions or as rivals, 
the language of a self-critique becomes problematic once philosophy acknowledges that 
it must consider religion within the limits it drew around proper science. This is 
especially true on the level of abstraction at play in the first Critique specifically and the 
critical philosophy in general. Even the multiple perspectives of theoretical and practical 
reason within the critical philosophy exceed Kant’s attempts to establish a singular 
foundation of knowable experience. While Kant followed common sense in noting the 
                                                 
54 The aspect of theory that cannot be fully captured within theory plays a particularly noticeable role in the 
philosophy of religion; what is visible to philosophy may overlap what is visible to religious theory, but 
each perspective exposes the other’s blind spots. Derrida refers to the “chora”, the indefinable spacing in 
which a theory operates, a spacing that religion challenges philosophy to acknowledge: “From the open 
interior of a corpus, of a system, of a language or a culture, chora would situate the abstract spacing, place 
itself, the place of absolute exteriority [“Faith and Knowledge.” In Religion. p.19, ¶23].” By admitting to 
this spacing exterior to theory, Derrida challenges the Kantian project’s insistence on self-critique and self-
delineation. 
55 Some criticisms find these tensions explicit in Kant’s own development, as Heine charged: “Kant is 
unfaithful to the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ even whilst writing the ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ (Religion 
and Philosophy in Germany. p.154-55).” 
56 The conclusion of this study will sketch briefly the connection between abstract German Idealist 
arguments and more concrete university structures; this connection can be used to fruitfully reframe the 
problematic of this study. 
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mutual determination of moral and theoretical philosophy, this heterogeneity indicates 
fault lines that become problematic in Kant’s philosophy of religion. 
 
II. Kant’s Moral Religion: Remainder and Departure. 
 
Though primarily interested in Schelling’s philosophy of religion, this study must 
start with Kant’s critical philosophy due to its unparalleled influence over how 
subsequent philosophy frames and criticizes religion. Kant approached religion through 
the lenses of both the critical philosophy’s theoretical and moral branches. Each branch 
requires the other and together forms a whole: the first Critique demarcates a science of 
pure reason that assumes structures of governance, communication, and commerce that it 
cannot, as an a priori science, provide.57 The second Critique attempts to provide—
through an innate, universal, and compelling ethics centered on duty—a theory of the 
social and moral context that motivates the move toward a science of pure reason and is 
itself shaped by that science. The rhetorical framing of the first Critique indicates pure 
reason’s need for an other that contrasts with proper knowledge, and the second Critique 
delineates the moral context in which the first Critique proves useful; both of these 
philosophical goals make it necessary to delineate and criticize religious ideas. 
Though the first and second Critiques form a whole, they nevertheless stand as 
independent works that operate in isolation with the exception of the transition from 
theory to morality in the I ought. The critical philosophy operates as two hemispheres 
                                                 
57 This is implied within Kant’s system: even if the kingdom of ends is viewed as the final form of human 
society, it cannot also be the first. The position Kant delineates as pure reason can only be considered 
purity by distillation, rather than by preventing corruption. The kingdom of ends must be developed and, 
while the ideal of a “science of reason” may lead there, that science can only be realized in such a kingdom 
[See RwBMR, p.40, 6:12-13]. 
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with their own governing assumptions and goals and, as a result, different 
conceptualizations and estimations of religion. In the first Critique, religion appears as a 
rational theory, a dogmatic theology that distorts reason’s proper a priori and universal 
use; in the second Critique, religious ideas are essential assumptions of moral law that 
help to popularize the austere morals of the critical philosophy. The critical philosophy 
forces religion to be categorized within the structure of philosophy, either as an epistemic 
claim or as moral postulates, as “pure reason” cannot accept additional theory unbounded 
by its own limits. Kant assumes that a definitive form of religion can be identified, and 
that it can be framed academically only through the concerns and assumptions of each 
branch of the critical philosophy. This framing, rather than Kant’s specific arguments 
regarding religion, is what interests the present study. 
A. Religion in Theoretical and Moral Philosophy: A theory of religion certainly 
must be flexible enough to consider diverse rituals, beliefs, and actions if it is to fairly 
account for the fullness of the religious phenomenon. The duality and complexity of 
Kant’s conceptualization of religion holds legitimate promise in this regard; it insists that 
religious action and religious thought in many ways present separate interpretive 
challenges. However, both perspectives within the critical philosophy must conceive of 
religious ideas univocally and thus work against this promise of a multifaceted theory of 
religion. Kant’s system opens different approaches to the philosophy of religion but 
cannot frame this complexity adequately due to his emphasis on a singular universal 
philosophy demarcated through autonomous self-critique. The transitional place that 
religion most clearly occupies within his critical philosophy, between theory and 
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morality, serves to obscure rather than address this problem. The following sections—
II.A.i and II.A.ii—consider how the critical philosophy frames religion as a philosophical 
concern in each of its branches and emphasize the tension inherent in this dual 
understanding. The tension between the two conceptions of religion adds focus to the 
consideration—in II.B—of Kant’s explicit philosophy of religion as developed in 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. 
i. Kant’s philosophy of religion encompasses two different conceptions of religion: 
the first Critique presents religious concepts as transgressing the proper confines of 
reason while Kant’s ethics characterize religious concepts as assumptions of moral 
thinking. The explicit consideration of religion most clearly adopts the framework of the 
practical philosophy (certainly the more positive consideration of religious ideas is in the 
moral hemisphere of the critical system).58 Religious concepts are properly moral in 
Kant’s system as they arise as a constructive philosophical concern only due to the 
tension between moral action and the happiness of a moral agent. Specifically, a moral 
agent who considers how the world ought to be: 
would thus feel himself compelled by reason to acknowledge this judgment [that he will 
the highest good] with complete impartiality, as if rendered by somebody else yet at the 
same time his own, and in this way the human being evinces the need, effected in him 
by morality, of adding to the thought of his duties an ultimate end as well, as their 
consequence. Morality thus inevitably leads to religion, and through religion it extends 
itself to the idea of a mighty moral lawgiver outside the human being [RwBMR. p.35-6 
(6:6)].59 
                                                 
58 See Vossenkuhl “The Paradox in Kant’s Rational Religion; Ames “The Religion of Immanuel Kant” 
p.173. This contextualization has led many to argue that Kant reduces religion to morality. Cassirer adopts 
this view (Kant’s Life and Thought pp.381-82), see Palmquist’s “Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?” 
for a critique of this view. 
59 Fichte’s Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, initially confused for a work by Kant himself, followed 
Kant in emphasizing that religion is fundamentally moral in character: “[…] obligation is based on nothing 
but its agreement with its own law, and no obedience to God is possible except out of obedience to reason 
[p.39 (52)].” 
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Kant captures a common sense point—that religion can inspire selfless moral actions—
and asserts that it is the foundational contribution religion makes to reflective thought. It 
is easy to overlook the reductive assumption underlying this moral religion if focus is 
kept on Kant’s widely accepted criticism of rational theology, important but only one-
dimension of his philosophy of religion. 
Legitimate religious ideas, according to moral religion, are those that support the 
development and maintenance of an ethical society. As clear from the quote above, Kant 
emphasized the autonomous will even in describing what he saw as universal morality.60 
The universal character of this individual compulsion led him to characterize the moral 
society as a “kingdom of ends”, a society in which autonomous individuals are always 
treated as their own ends rather than instrumentalized as a means to another agent’s ends. 
Religion contributes to this kingdom by formalizing this moral compulsion: 
Morality consists, then, in the reference of all action to the lawgiving by which alone a 
kingdom of ends is possible. This lawgiving must, however, be found in every rational 
being himself and be able to arise from his will, the principle of which is, accordingly: 
to do no action on any other maxim than one that such that it would be consistent with it 
to be a universal law, and hence to act only so that the will could regard itself as at the 
same time giving universal law through its maxim [Groundwork. p.84; 4:434]. 
 
This “kingdom of ends” captures Kant’s interest in distinguishing moral action from its 
consequences. Any religious ideas associated with this “lawgiving” that do not directly 
serve moral action are dismissed as either irrelevant or misguiding; Kant makes religion a 
philosophical concern primarily in issues of moral volition. This, rather than the first 
                                                 
60 See: Groundwork. pp.82-89 [4:432-4:440]. Kant’s conception of morality allows no external authority or 
motivation that might interfere with the autonomous will: Kant was quite clear in asserting that morality 
does not require religion even while noting their inevitable connection, see RwBMR p.33-5 [6:3-6]. 
51 
 
 
Critique portrayal of religion as a noumenal rational theology, indicates what Kant saw as 
religion’s essential contribution. 
The distinction between moral action and its consequences, clear in common sense, 
requires a more specific philosophical conceptualization. The moral duty, as Kant 
understands it in its essential form, is the awareness of the I ought that encompasses the 
moral agent aware of its freedom, and pushes the agent to adopt moral axioms. For the 
philosophy of religion, it is additionally important that the I ought also carries the sense 
that the law is given from outside of the individual (see RwBMR pp.35-36).61 Thus the 
noumenal ideas of the soul and God, dismissed by the first Critique as leading reason 
beyond its secure ground, are reintroduced in moral philosophy as postulates that make 
the agent’s sense of duty comprehensible by linking it to the idea of consequences for a 
persisting agent. Insofar as these ideas make a priori moral instincts comprehensible, 
they are essential for morality. 
As Kantian morality emphasizes duty over incentive, the role that the ideas of God 
and the soul play remains unclear. Nevertheless, they show that his moral system requires 
ideas that theoretical reason censured and thus cannot provide. This reflects a common 
sense goal of Kant’s division of philosophy into two hemispheres: so long as the I ought 
remains only a supposition, moral freedom cannot be reduced to the necessary structures 
of rational thought. While reductive efforts to link the sources of scientific analysis and 
value judgments are problematic, Kant exacerbates rather than ameliorates such potential 
                                                 
61 Cited on pp. 49-50 above; see also Groundwork p.108; 4:463. The balance between morality and reason 
rests on the moral agent positing an external source of moral duty that guarantees moral action will 
eventually coincide with happiness. Critics throughout the post-Kantian period disagree about the viability 
of this argument and its importance within the critical philosophy as a whole. See Heine’s Religion and 
Philosophy in Germany (pp.119-20). 
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confusion by emphasizing both a full division of philosophy’s branches and an 
unknowable common source. As religious theories are often linked to ethical systems, the 
critical philosophy’s strong division of moral and theoretical philosophy means that it 
only frames religious thought in terms foreign to its natural and autonomous forms. 
Though theoretical and moral philosophy both have different concerns, Kant’s 
system requires compatibility between each sphere. This need conflicts with actual 
functioning of each philosophical sphere; his ethics disrupt the presumed boundaries of 
critical speculative knowledge by reintroducing ideas of God (as the lawgiver) and an 
enduring soul (as the recipient of the moral law). The rational emphasis of Kant’s 
morality exacerbates the tension between the branches of philosophy. Kant argued, in the 
Groundwork as in RwBMR, that the severity of moral duty—from the perspective of 
personal happiness—naturally leads an agent to doubt its obligations unless rational 
criticism is used to counteract self-interest: 
So there develops unnoticed in common practical reason as well, when it cultivates 
itself, a dialectic that constrains it to seek help in philosophy, just as happens in its 
theoretical use; and the first will, accordingly, find no more rest than the other except in 
a complete critique of our reason [Groundwork. p.60 (4:405)]. 
 
A properly philosophical morality relies on the first Critique and accepts the boundaries 
it draws around reason. Moral philosophy remains an autonomous science as it requires 
premises that have no foundation on the “island of truth” demarcated by the first 
Critique, yet Kant insisted that reason must ultimately be one.62 To account for this unity, 
                                                 
62 Kant argued that the critical philosophy must be able, ultimately, “to present the unity of practical with 
speculative reason in a common principle, since there can […] be only one and the same reason [Kant. 
Groundwork. p.47 (4:391)].” In the opinion of some commentators, this insistence on unity proves deeply 
problematic in the context of his bifurcated system: “His whole philosophical posture is predicated on 
keeping these two dimensions of human existence quite separate, pure or theoretical reason involving 
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he emphasized a dialectic of pure reason and morality that threatens to make morality 
into another iteration of the critique of reason. 
Despite clearly understanding reason to be limited and only one aspect of human 
experience, Kant’s dialectical structuring of theory and morality betrays a skewing of 
philosophical anthropology toward rationalism even as he tried to limit reason’s ken. The 
structure of the Groundwork demonstrates this rational emphasis in Kant’s anthropology: 
beginning with the premise that the highest good is an undetermined will acting in 
accordance with its duty,63 the first of the text’s three major sections uncovers the need 
for a moral theory that exceeds instinct. Common sense can be misled by selfish 
inclinations,64 thus the second section moves beyond empirical moral concerns for a 
rational metaphysics of morals.65 The call for universality leads to an emphasis on pure 
rational morality: 
But such a completely isolated metaphysics of morals, mixed with no anthropology, 
theology, physics, or hyperphysics and still less with occult qualities (which could be 
called hypophysical), is not only an indispensable substratum of all theoretical and 
surely determined cognition of duties; it is also the desideratum of the utmost 
importance to the actual fulfillment of their precepts [Groundwork. p.64 (4:410)].66 
 
This move to pure universals threatens to undermine the dialectic between the branches 
of philosophy; such an isolated metaphysics of morals can only be an exercise of reason. 
Though this does not preclude the possibility that reason denotes a different set of 
                                                                                                                                                 
cognition and practical, moral reason involving volition [Gill. “Kant, Analogy, and Natural Theology. 
p.27].” 
63 Kant considered all previous attempts to discover the principle of morality failures because they did not 
realize that man is subject only to his own will and that heteronomous influences on the will are the source 
of false moral principles (Groundwork. p.82 [4:432-3]; see also p.89-90 [441]). 
64 Kant. Groundwork. p.59 [4:404-5]. 
65 Kant. Groundwork. p.62-3 [4:407-9]. 
66 Kant also argued that “[…] all moral concepts have their seat and origin completely a priori in reason, 
and indeed in the most common reason just as in reason that is speculative in the highest degree 
(Groundwork. p.65 [4:411]).” 
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concerns in moral philosophy than it does in theoretical philosophy,67 it frames the person 
as primarily a rational knower. The categorical imperative—for Kant the supreme 
practical principle—articulates a universal law grounded in the principle that “rational 
nature exists as an end in itself.”68 The third section concludes the text by establishing 
that an autonomous will must be a property of all rational beings, again underscoring the 
tendency of Kantian ethics toward a fully rationalized and universal moral philosophy.69 
While Kant’s moral philosophy looks to reason as the sole arbiter of moral action, 
his moral theory utilizes concepts deemed impossible by the boundaries that the first 
Critique drew around “the island of certainty” for pure reason. As such, if his system is to 
be seen as coherent, it must allow for these religious ideas to have their own ground 
independent of philosophy. As discussed below, Kant saw the objectification of the 
rational intellect—as an extra-physical soul—as an abuse of theoretical philosophy. 
While the critical philosophy distinguishes the moral agent and rational knower, ethical 
theory can only be philosophical if it respects the boundaries of the first Critique. 
Nevertheless, Kant’s ethical system requires that the will be taken as a philosophical 
object: 
A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its 
fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in 
                                                 
67 Moral philosophy may still accept the premise of freedom and thus differ from theoretical philosophy, 
but the movement of Kant’s ethical thought is toward a pure reason and away from the context that makes 
freedom detectable and meaningful. 
68 Kant. Groundwork. p.79 [4:428]. 
69 Kant. Groundwork. p.95-6 [4:447-8]. Kant’s focus on universal and singular ethics assumes a singular 
characterization of the Good. Desmond notes problems with this approach: one, it divorces the theory of 
good from actual goods: “These two are defined by negation: the transcendental is what the empirical is 
not, and vice versa. This means continual difficulty in thinking the interrelation of the two in terms that are 
not dualistic (Ethics and the Between. p.67).” Additionally, this position forces morality to “be purged of its 
relativities (ibid)” and accept pure practical reason as the sole authority. While concerned with the 
limitation of reason, Kant’s moral theory effectively undoes the limitations. 
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itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could 
merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the 
sum of all inclinations [Groundwork. p.50 (4:394)]. 
 
Since Kant viewed the undetermined will as the highest good, it must be considered as an 
identifiable agent that, apart from concerns for external reward or punishment, can 
perform its duty. Likewise, even if this theory originates in a personal experience, it must 
assume the noumenal premise that other agents also have free agency if it is to be a 
meaningful and useful theory; the Groundwork presents freedom as the presupposition of 
the categorical imperative that can never be established.70 Thus moral autonomy requires 
an assumption that it can never verify and which contradicts rational theory. 
As religion enters into philosophical inquiry as a noumenal concern related to human 
free choice, it is conceived under ethics and serves to make the challenging demands of 
pure practical reason accessible to the masses that are otherwise unsuited for the austere 
demands of philosophy.71 As a moral concern, Kant saw religion as supporting 
philosophy’s interests; as a theoretical concern, as considered in the following, the same 
religious ideas are dismissed as illegitimate and unsound. Religion is subordinated to the 
philosophical critiques of rational theology and remains, at least in theory, dispensable. 
The maxims from which morality may be derived—the a priori ordering of drives and 
                                                 
70 “[H]ow this presupposition itself is possible can never be seen by any human reason. On the 
presupposition of the freedom of the will of an intelligence, however, its autonomy, as the formal condition 
under which alone it can be determined, is a necessary consequence (Kant. RwBMR. p.106 [4:461]).” 
71 The distinction Kant drew between revealed and natural religion is particularly telling: “a religion can be 
natural, yet also revealed; if it is so constituted that human beings could and ought to have arrived at it on 
their own through the mere use of their reason, even though they would not have come to it as early or as 
extensively as required, hence the revelation of it at a given time and a given place might be wise and very 
advantageous to the human race, for then […] everyone can henceforth convince himself of the of its truth 
by himself and his own reason (p.154 [6:155]).” The ecclesiastical forms of religion are legitimate as 
vehicles for the pure faith of religion (RwBMR p.122 [6:115]) and are destined to disappear as the pure 
religion of reason is ushered in (RwBMR. p.127 [6:121]). 
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desires before duty72—certainly do not originate in religion or any extra-philosophical 
source. Morality requires religious ideas only as a consequence of the challenge of acting 
ethically in the face of undesirable costs, and thus many commentators have dismissed 
Kant’s moral philosophy as unnecessary.73 
The problematic relation of the moral interpretation of religion to Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy illustrates the challenge that the characterization of philosophy as an 
autonomous a priori science of reason poses for the philosophy of religion. Kant’s moral 
religion is conceived so abstractly that it homogenizes diverse religious phenomena into a 
single, somewhat thin conception of morality. By separating this homogenized “pure 
religion” from ecclesiastical religion (RwBMR, see II.B below), Kant was able in a single 
sweeping move to bracket all ecclesiastical religions and undermine the distinct voice of 
religion. The homogenized moral religion suppresses, rather than engages, the ground of 
religion that maintains its autonomy against the claims of philosophy, just as philosophy 
maintains its own autonomy from the claims of religious dogma. The dismissal of 
religious organizations and congregations follows from choice to treat religion as 
primarily a moral postulate within an ethics that values the autonomous will. Kant 
approached religion as an object requiring philosophical explanation, rather than as the 
complex source of several alternative schematizations of experience. 
ii. While Kant’s moral philosophy presents religious ideas as buttresses of the austere 
ethics demanded by pure reason, the first Critique defined the same ideas as affronts to 
                                                 
72 Kant. RwBMR. p.46. 
73 This argument was advanced by Hegel in his posthumously published Positivity of the Christian 
Religion. It will be considered in that context below. 
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the proper confines of reason, excessive ideas that create problems when employed 
theoretically. While the diversity of religious phenomenon grounds and necessitates such 
varying critical accounts of the religious, the moral postulation of God and soul only 
work if these concepts are compatible with the boundaries that the first Critique drew 
around pure reason; the capacity to think as if something is the case rests on the ability to 
delineate that idea while also maintaining the structures of thought that ordinarily rule out 
such a concept. As the rhetoric of pure reason implies a rejection of any heterogeneous 
theory, the critical philosophy allows of no counter against the homogenizing power of 
philosophical reason and the first Critique only allows religion to be considered as a 
corruption of reason. Religion is not a purely theoretical construct, but it must have its 
own theoretical legitimacy—which the first Critique rejects in the form of traditional 
metaphysics—if it capable of providing moral value. 
With the critical philosophy Kant attempted to steer between radical skepticism and 
Newtonian determinism.74 This attempt shaped his epistemic schematic in which religion 
appears as a significant threat to rational theory. Kant’s philosophy rests on the argument 
that knowledge is a combination of the intuited (that which is sensible, spatial, and 
necessarily determined) and the intellected (the internal, temporal, and spontaneous). 
Through this schema, several central ideas for traditional philosophy, religious thought, 
and ethics necessarily appear as problematic concepts of pure reason—the paralogisms, 
antinomies, and the Ideal of Pure Reason—that are inherently impossible, according to 
                                                 
74 For Kant, Newton schematized the traditional problems of determinism and fatalism in modern scientific 
form; Hume’s aggressive skepticism undermined the belief that rational philosophy can engage 
conventional experience. Both views threaten the philosophical ability to schematize human activity and 
moral accountability: Newton threatened to make everything rational and determined by necessary laws, 
and Hume seemed to dismiss all efficacy of reason. 
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Kant, because they have no object within experience.75 The arguments in each of these 
sections, dedicated to dismissing these concepts, reinforce Kant’s schema by discrediting 
potential challenges to its thoroughness. 
The problems of the position into which Kant forced himself are most evident in the 
paralogisms, where Kant treated the impossibilities the concept of a thinking substance 
poses within his epistemological schema. Not only does the mind seem incorporeal, it 
also seems immediately evident and thus a challenge to the schema that necessitates the 
combination of intuition and intellection in all valid thought. It is immediate because no 
thought, it seems, is possible without it already present; it is incorporeal by definition as 
the unobjectifiable aspect of the self. If a philosophical theory of the self or mind is 
possible, it stands as an affront to boundaries of pure reason that Kant drew to prevent 
unfounded speculation. Yet what is dismissed as a thinking substance in the theoretical 
philosophy proves essential under the guise of soul in the moral philosophy. Thus treating 
all concepts of self and mind as thinking substance, as the paralogisms must, pushes the 
critical philosophy into the odd corner of refusing theoretical conceptualizations of 
something it utilizes.  
With thought presented as a composite, the demarcation of separate theoretical and 
practical realms seems more strongly grounded, despite the conceptual disconnect this 
                                                 
75 These a priori concepts pervade reflective experience as problematic yet necessary over-steppings of 
pure reason. Treated as proper scientific objects, they give rise to the (false, according to Kant) disciplines 
of rational psychology (soul), cosmology (world), and rational theology (God). Each discipline is criticized 
for exhibiting an impossible connection between philosophical theory and experience. The Refutation of 
Idealism, specifically, rejects the attribution of both spatial (intuition) and temporal (intellection) cognition 
to one inner sense. Thus a priori (and consequently, certain) philosophy can only account for the structure 
of the combination of intuition and intellection—the possibility of experience. This introduces a permanent 
division between philosophy as a tool, and the experience it is meant to help interpret. 
59 
 
 
forces regarding the human agent. The moral agent and rational knower are obviously 
connected, but Kant places this connection beyond theoretical reach. Thus, the soul 
constitutes an especially troublesome idea for Kant as both philosophical and ordinary 
consciousness imply an ego, or sense of self, that he must dismiss as paralogisms of pure 
reason when considered as an object by theoretical reason: 
It would be a great, or indeed the only stumbling block to our entire critique, if it were 
possible to prove a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, 
thus (as a consequence of the same ground of proof) that personality is inseparable from 
them, and that they are conscious of their existence as detached from all matter [B409-
10].76 
 
This rhetoric betrays the central importance of the paralogisms as Kant’s critical 
philosophy rests on a very specific sense of ‘self’ as rational knower and must eliminate 
competing philosophical understandings of this self. Kant understood rational psychology 
to encompass four propositions about the soul—it is substance, simple, unified over time, 
and related to possible spatial objects [A344, B402]—each the focus of one paralogism. 
Though he considers each proposition, the first paralogism criticism of substantiality as 
an absolute subject is the key to the entire section [A348]: if the dismissal of 
substantiality works, the other doctrines do not even arise.77 
The critique initially appears successful as substantiality seems to necessitate treating 
a subject as an object. Since the “I” refers to that which determines objects, it cannot 
                                                 
76 The specific target of Kant’s criticism (and his intended view on personality), like most technical issues 
in Kant studies, is a matter of debate. See Longuenesse “Kant on the Identity of Persons.” The current 
presentation follows Kant’s insistence that “[…] the vehicle of all concepts whatever, and hence also of 
transcendental concepts, and is thus always comprehended among them, and hence is likewise 
transcendental, but […] it can have no special title, because it serves only to introduce all thinking as 
belonging to consciousness [A341, B399].” 
77 The revised syllogistic presentation of the critique of substantiality (B411), and the absence of the 
remaining paralogisms in the second edition, indicates the preeminent significance of this paralogism. Kant 
considered the success of this criticism of the upmost importance for his system, suggesting the importance 
of limiting philosophical anthropology to the capacity for reason. 
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itself be considered as a predicate without contradiction. If all thought involves a 
combination of intuition and intellection, the “I” can never be observed without a 
reflective thinking-about-thinking serving as an intuition and a substantial subject proves 
impossible for reason. However, as it is the “vehicle of all concepts”, philosophy can 
only refuse to make doctrines of the soul explicit, not avoid such concepts altogether. 
Kant revealed his limited scope in identifying the sole use of substantiality as the 
improper inference that the soul (or subjective “I”) is neither generated nor corrupted 
[A349]. This Leibnizian assumption that the soul ought to be conceived as an 
incorruptible monad illustrates Kant’s unwillingness to consider the person, for 
philosophical purposes, as anything other than a rational knower. Kant’s critique 
dismisses a particular pseudo-rational conception of the soul without justifying the claim 
that such is the only or best conceptualization. Rather than emphasize the spirit in place 
of the letter of Kant’s philosophy of religion, the tension between his intention and 
explicit framing of his system must be acknowledged as a central concern. 
As Kant’s moral religion provides a robust and nuanced theory from which artful 
interpreters can address many of the above critiques, the need to challenge its core 
assumptions may seem exaggerated. Because the problems suggested here with Kant’s 
rational psychology are not explicitly tied to his moral religion, the current criticism 
could be misunderstood as confusing two different issues within the critical philosophy. 
The large body of literature on the subject attests that Kant’s philosophy of religion both 
allows and invites competing interpretations capable of addressing many of the current 
criticisms and focused on narrow concerns internal to the system. However, these 
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responses merely distract from what leads this study to the critical philosophy in the first 
place: the problematic horizon Kant defined and resulting limitations he imposed on 
modern philosophy of religion.78 For its own functioning, philosophy needs religion as a 
heterogeneous element of human thought and culture, rather than as a category to be 
dismissed in order to identify and further isolate a pure philosophy. No matter how 
nuanced the attempt to interpret religion, modern philosophy resists this fundamental 
need, as illustrated by Kant. 
To establish his philosophy of religion as definitive, Kant needed to establish the 
dubious premise that religion can be properly understood both fundamentally and 
sufficiently through exclusively moral categories.79 Within his system, even if examples 
of religious thought and practice that are clearly not concerned with morality are ignored, 
the moral value of religion is itself problematic. Once religious ideas are established as 
legitimate, Kant’s critical system must engage acrobatic concessions to avoid direct 
contradiction between theoretical and moral philosophy: moral precepts must hold 
authority without making impositions on the will. The notion of a persisting soul may 
                                                 
78 As religion serves a transitional role between theoretical to moral philosophy, Kant’s philosophy of 
religion provides a perspective for criticism apart from labyrinthine interpretive issues. In this, the 
following follows the tradition of meta-critical approaches opened by rhetoric of critique itself. The 
tradition of such an approach dates to the immediate aftermath of the first Critique’s publication. See 
Loncar’s summary of Jacobi’s (“Transcendental Idealism and the German Counter-Enlightenment.” esp. 
p.6) and Hamman’s (ibid. esp. p.4) meta-critical responses to Kant’s qualified Enlightenment view of the 
authority of reason. In each case, the tension between pure reason and religion was central to their critique 
of Kant. 
79 Vossenkuhl nicely schematizes why this is unlikely: “Kant’s reduction of rational religion to morality 
hinges on two claims: (i) that the set of religious beliefs is identical with the set of moral beliefs, and (ii) 
that the antinomy between historical (ecclesiastical) and rational (pre religious) faith is a pseudo-antinomy 
(“The Paradox in Kant’s Rational Religion.” p.180).” Wood noted that Kant’s philosophy of religion 
ignores the actual religious phenomenon: “Kant’s God is, most aggressively, the God of the philosophers. 
And as an Enlightenment philosopher, Kant shares the Enlightenment’s suspicion of all revealed or 
ecclesiastical religions and all popular religious cults (Wood, Kant’s Rational Theology. p.60.).” 
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encourage citizens to follow moral axioms and avoid immoral behavior, but actions so 
motivated can only be deemed moral as a concession from Kant’s perspective. The 
critical philosophy both needs and cannot accept its own conceptualization of religion. 
Thus the moral branch of philosophy ultimately must hold religion in suspicion like the 
theoretical philosophy. Philosophy of religion cannot avoid the marginalization of 
religious theory unless philosophy acknowledges a degree of heterogeneity to theory. 
B. Religion of Reason, Moral Religion, and Religious Remainder: Kant’s first 
Critique, by claiming to delineate the boundaries of certain knowledge, both challenges 
the legitimacy of religious theory and skews how it can be academically framed. 
Philosophy, if understood as a science both a priori and universal, must approach 
particular religions and contingent experience from an external and skeptical standpoint. 
As a result, Kant’s philosophy of religion marks much of what comprises religious 
thought and practice as a “remainder,” though even as a remainder religion exposes a 
tension within the system. Pure practical reason, in working toward a metaphysics of 
morals, reintroduced the ideas of God and soul as placeholders,80 but pure reason cannot 
accept any theoretical account of such noumenal ideas; even as “empty” ideas, the moral 
conceptions of God and soul generate tension with theoretical philosophy. Simply by 
virtue of its subject, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason either muddles the 
boundaries of the first and second Critiques or signals a departure from Kant’s earlier 
approach to religion. 
                                                 
80 Kant. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. p.33-6 [6:3-6]. 
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The concept of radical evil, and the human propensity for this evil, constitutes the 
heart of RwBMR.81 Kant uses “radical evil” to denote the subordination of the moral law 
to non-moral maxims due to frailty, impurity, and depravity. Such a volitional capacity is 
not enacted necessarily, otherwise it would undermine the autonomy that characterizes 
the I ought as given in experience: 
[…] and yet we shall always be satisfied that nature is not to blame for it (if the 
character is evil), nor does it deserve praise (if it is good), but that the human being is 
alone its author. But since the first ground of the adoption of our maxims […] cannot be 
any fact possibly given in experience, the good or the evil in the human being is said to 
be innate (as the subjective first ground of the adoption of this or that maxim with 
reference to the moral law) only in the sense that it is posited as the ground antecedent 
to every use of freedom given in experience […] [RwBMR. 6:22, p.47]. 
 
This propensity resembles, while transforming, the Christian doctrine of the Fall. Though 
presented as an a priori philosophical principle, Kant reveals his dependence on a 
specific revealed tradition.82 Such dependence on traditional revealed doctrines poses a 
direct challenge to the rhetoric of a critical, pure philosophical standpoint that can 
determine the religious as encountered in all religions. Kant could not fully meet the 
strict demands of a philosophy based purely on universal reason. 
Kant’s position not only depends on revealed religion and concepts that the first 
Critique made impossible, it ignores evil which lies beyond the adoption of maxims. The 
                                                 
81 Kant. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. p.47 [6:22]. 
82 Brown notes that Kant’s views on this matter cannot be derived solely from his philosophical principles: 
“Thus from the side of his theological convictions Kant champions the view that everyone has an evil will. 
From Kant's own philosophical stance, however, the universality of human fallenness can only be an 
unproved (and unprovable) empirical proposition [“The Transcendental Fall in Kant and Schelling.” p.57].” 
More generally, Derrida’s meditation on RwBMR notes the thoroughly ‘Christian’ nature of Kant’s religion 
within the boundaries of mere reason: “The [consequences of the Kantian thesis] seems strong, simple, and 
dizzying: the Christian religion would be the only truly ‘moral’ religion [“Faith and Knowledge.” In 
Religion. p.10].” The notion that humanity is “fallen” certainly is not a universal premise of world religion: 
Daoism emphasizes the good of the natural man; Confucians concerned with social chaos emphasizes the 
fundamental goodness and perfectibility of humanity; Hinduism and Buddhism see illusion, rather than an 
ontological fault, as humanity’s driving problem. 
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emphasis on obedience to principles for their own sake, not the good gained thereby,83 
means that desired ends can only corrupt the proper performance of duty and the 
phenomenal experience of evil remains beyond the scope of this theory. Since the effects 
of willing are not all equal ‘reactions’ to a volitional ‘action,’ noble ethical maxims can 
have horrific consequences and thus require an additional principle to guarantee that the 
maxims are employed toward actually desirable ends. Likewise, institutional evils 
perpetuated without an identifiably responsible agent not only lie beyond RwBMR’s 
concern with moral axioms, they are inconceivable within the framework offered. Kant, 
relying on the assumption that religion functions primarily as a moral concern, dismissed 
significant aspects of religious thought and practice even in the work dedicated 
specifically to the philosophy of religion.84 Without a voice independent from moral 
philosophy, religious theory cannot escape from the pretense that philosophy interprets 
religion better than it does itself. 
With its concern for radical evil, Kant’s philosophy of religion largely ignores the 
complexity of relating the religion of reason to historical religious traditions. Though this 
neglect was clearly intentional,85 his aim of using critical philosophy to serve moral ends 
                                                 
83 Groundwork, p.13-14 [4:400-1]. 
84 His criticism of ‘priestcraft’ and the attempt to construct rules of morality (RwBMR, pp.170-78 [6:176-
85]) reflect his cosmopolitan Enlightenment assumptions; he does not consider the ways in which religious 
practices, institutions, and beliefs may offer a rejoinder to the claims of reason. This assumption continues 
to need criticism as several responses to the “return of religion” and fundamentalism fail to treat “religion” 
as an abstraction that collects diverse idea, practices, and authorities. Without acknowledging the distinct 
reality of religions independent of philosophy, the full challenge of these phenomena proves difficult to 
understand.  
85 Part Three of RwBMR contains Kant’s consideration of how ecclesiastical differences relate to the moral 
religion and are ultimately dispensable (p.127 [6:121]). Though this section deserves careful attention, 
there is only space to agree with Derrida that the consequence of Kant’s philosophy of religion is that only 
the Christian religion can be properly moral (Faith and Knowledge. p.10, ¶5), a consequence that shows a 
confusion of one historical and ecclesiastical religion with the pure moral religion. 
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requires ideas that philosophy cannot supply. He thus needed religious theory to be truly 
distinct from pure reason with its own authority and range. By ignoring the practice of 
religion, Kant instead framed religion as an object of rational critique and thus skewed 
his philosophy of religion to affirm philosophy’s biases. This obscured the degree to 
which the symbolic goal of his moral theory—various individuals who accept no external 
imposition on following moral duty coexisting as a kingdom of ends—depends on the 
particular assumptions of a specific religion: it is clearly the idea of the church reworked 
philosophically as “the mere representative of a state [ruled] by God.”86 This virtuous 
state, this church, is interpreted most properly through the pure practical reason, merely 
using historical and revealed religion to provide content for the idea without 
acknowledging that such an idea does not originate in pure reason. Kant takes ideas from 
revealed religion as filtered through his system, and presents them as if they were derived 
from a purely philosophical standpoint.87 
This suppression of different religions and competing authorities under one 
abstraction follows from the position taken in the first Critique. Yet Kant’s moral religion 
relies on specific theological concepts and thus stands opposed to the position of pure 
reason as expounded in the first Critique. Kant’s philosophy of religion, largely 
                                                 
86 Kant. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. 6:96-109, p.107-18; quote p.112. 
87 The same point may be critiqued from another angle: “Kant‘s metaphysics of morals is a glorious 
construction, in the best spirit of the metaphysical tradition he himself criticized. He offered a vision of 
what ought to be, of the highest ideal to which a rational being can aspire. Unfortunately for Kant, it turned 
out that there was not much that was necessary about his vision of the metaphysics of morals and the 
noumenal world. It was at best one of many possible ideals of what could be; it was a product of Kant‘s 
creative imagination ironed by his reason (Cicovacki. “Pure Reason and Metaphors.” p.18).” 
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concerned with the moral advancement of individuals and humanity, makes use of 
reveled ideas that are precluded by the theoretical philosophy:88 
The possibility of freedom, [Kant] holds, is as incomprehensible as the possibility of 
goodness, because we do not know the cause of either. Nevertheless freedom exists. 
The same applies to moral recovery: we do not know its cause but we know it is 
possible. […] Kant’s aim is to make sure that salvation, mercy and moral recovery are 
comprehensible and real. At this point the paradox of Kant’s Religion […] emerges in a 
modified version: Rational faith can only be moral faith if it implies a belief in revealed 
mysteries. This seems to be incompatible with the character of rational belief 
[Vossenkuhl. “The Paradox in Kant’s Rational Religion.” p.189]. 
 
Since Kant’s God guarantees the kingdom of ends, a valid account of this principle is 
needed if a moral community can become an object of criticism; this need makes the 
rejection of all rational theology untenable. This does not suggest that a return to the 
Wolffian metaphysics, which the Critique of Pure Reason attacked, can fix the tension of 
Kantian philosophy of religion: the direct object of his critique of rational theology was 
effectively dismissed. The crucial point is that Kant’s fixation on such philosophical 
rational theology led him to ignore the fuller possibilities of religious thought implied in 
his works. By treating religion only as concession to human weakness, Kant was blinded 
to his own dependence on historical religions and the need in the philosophy of religion 
to acknowledge the independent authority of religion relative to philosophical reason. 
Religion differs from rational theology, but Kant refused to consider religion as 
relevant in its independence from philosophy. In the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant’s 
rejection of religious theory was confined to modern philosophical principles, despite his 
bold, far-reaching rhetoric. The inadequacy of his conception of religion exposes 
ultimately untenable problems in his system’s overall structure. Specifically, the 
                                                 
88 Vossenkuhl. “The Paradox in Kant’s Rational Religion.” p.183-4. 
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opposition between faith and reason rests on the assumption that philosophical reason can 
and should be separated and isolated from other modes of thinking, and that religion can 
be divided between a posteriori trivialities and a pure religion of reason; ultimately the 
system based on this belief cannot support itself. The focus on humans as rational 
knowers in the first Critique requires the practical philosophy, a dependence that makes it 
impossible to simply dismiss his view of religion without admitting the failure of his 
system. Conversely, the “purely rational” critique of rational theology exposes limitations 
of Kant’s conception of the human person. 
As mentioned above, RwBMR does not necessarily follow Kant’s earlier philosophy 
of religion by adding greater complexity to the inherent tension at its core. As an alternate 
reading, Kant’s emphasis on radical evil can be understood as an intentional break from 
his earlier thought. Specifically, as Lawrence notes, Kant’s “attempt to philosophically 
appropriate the old Christian doctrine of original sin, which undermines the faith in the 
essential goodness of humanity, appears to be fully out of place.”89 For, while the concept 
of radical evil extends the Enlightenment emphasis on human autonomy to its fullest 
extent, Lawrence notes that it does so by placing evil within the faculty of reason: 
Evil as such is an act of pure intelligence. Common vice may well be understood as the 
random play of sensuality. Evil lies deeper. Evil is the willed and thoroughly rational 
decision to let self-love assume priority over the dictates of our moral conscience. Evil 
is not the irrational rule of instinct. It is the spirit of pure utilitarianism, the rule of 
instrumental reason [“Radical Evil and Kant’s Turn to Religion.” p.321]. 
 
Lawrence presents this as delivering on the promise of the third Critique and Kant’s late 
works that explored the metaphysics needed to support the Enlightenment lionization of 
                                                 
89 Lawrence. “Radical Evil and Kant’s Turn to Religion.” p.320. 
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autonomy that so thoroughly dismisses the transcendent.90 While such a view may not be 
radical in itself, it is a departure from the first Critique’s scientific philosophy which 
separated the critique of ethical values from that of reason itself. 
This scientific view of philosophy contributed to the Enlightenment confidence in 
human progress under the guidance of rationality. While reason and science can be 
abused, Enlightenment rhetoric admitted no possible error or limitation within reason and 
science. RwBMR, however, presented evil as a specifically rational issue: 
In doing so, he undercut several competing tendencies within modernity. The first is the 
tendency to deny evil all together by viewing its effects through the value-neutral filter 
of science. Closely related is the tendency to identify evil with nature—to be 
progressively overcome through the instrument of technology and the movement of 
history. Seemingly opposed to these tendencies, both of which are reconcilable with a 
belief in the essential good of humanity, is the manichaean substratum of 
Enlightenment: the identification of evil with the demonic other. […] Each of these 
tendencies can actually serve to foster evil by enhancing the desire for power and 
control [Lawrence. “Radical Evil and Kant’s Turn to Religion.” p.326]. 
 
Thus, the idea of radical evil must be understood as undercutting the systemic vacillation 
of the critical philosophy between theoretical and practical philosophy centered on the I 
ought and moral religion. Radical evil requires a rejection of the paralogisms, as “[i]ts 
ground and the ground of the self are the same thing.”91 This line of argument suggest 
that no matter how nuanced a Kantian philosophy of religion is, the basic structure of the 
critical philosophy is a poorly suited frame for such efforts. 
C. Conclusion: Kant’s system presents two distinct views of religion; religion qua 
rational theology, in the first Critique, represents a corrupting over-extension of reason: 
                                                 
90 Lawrence elaborates: “the empirically observable reality of evil in human history is itself enough to 
awaken metaphysical reflection. If modernity is characterized by a tendency to substitute a scientific 
description of reality for a metaphysical one, it is the fact of evil that renews metaphysical concerns 
(“Radical Evil and Kant’s Turn to Religion.” p.322).” 
91 Lawrence. “Radical Evil and Kant’s Turn to Religion.” p.329. 
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in moral philosophy, religion qua moral principle denotes ideas that make an austere 
ethics of moral duty comprehensible and palatable. For religion properly to be both, it 
also must be something distinct that exceeds both characterizations. This possibility is not 
only lacking in the critical philosophy, the structural frame of Kant’s system makes such 
a concession inherently problematic as it must lie beyond the purview of pure reason. 
While both interpretative frameworks acknowledge that pure reason cannot ignore 
religion, neither allow religious thought to challenge the claims of philosophical reason. 
Such an external challenge would allow religion to appear as both speculative theory and 
a moral principle as neither characterization would be exhaustive. 
This criticism pushes back against the rhetoric of modern philosophy that identifies 
the discipline with the position and authority of rationality. Reason, as a tool, does not 
belong to philosophy. If philosophers claim to serve as the proper officials judging how 
reason can be employed in contested cases, they need rules overseeing the proper use of 
their authority as well.92 Logic and rationality cannot establish a theoretical frame on 
their own; for Kant’s general goal of delimiting reason, it is necessary to establish a 
limiting force that is not internal to reason. Yet Kant’s critical philosophy allows only 
one legitimate theoretical schematization of human experience. The rhetoric of 
philosophy’s radical authority distracts but does not address the conflicting ends 
                                                 
92 Consider: the officials of any sports league must respect and defend the fundamental rules of the game 
they officiate, but they certainly should not follow those rules as if they are themselves contestants under 
the authority of the same regulations. In fact, some form of governing authority needs to be created to 
guarantee that the officials properly complete their role in a satisfactory manner. If philosophy presents 
itself as a second-order critic of other sciences, and claims “pure reason” as its own ken, it undermines the 
possibility of officiating the officials. This need has been demonstrated by the significant number of 
twentieth century philosophers who supported totalitarian and fascist regimes as conforming to their 
rational systems [see “The Responsibility of Intellectuals: A Discussion.” Steiner, et al. esp. pp.166-68]. 
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philosophy can reach.93 This criticism ultimately must abandon the pretense of pursuing 
pure reason independently of the concrete and material implications of such questions.  
The pretense that an academic discipline can delineate its own “pure” territory 
burdens other fields with a parallel expectation to define their unique specific focus. This 
is especially true with modern philosophical rhetoric that emphasizes reason’s autonomy 
and consequent role as an authority over all other fields that likewise assert their own 
ken. Such self-determination of disciplinary boundaries engenders conflict over specific 
claims of authority and allocations of resources within a university. Modern university 
structures embody the questionable association of religious theory with rational theology 
by using the abstract division of disciplines to guide the partition of faculties. Thus, the 
definition of philosophy as an a priori and universal science of reason cannot be 
considered only an internal issue for philosophy; the philosophy of religion forces 
philosophy to abandon the pretense of authority over and independence from other 
theoretical disciplines. 
 
III. Pure Theory and Alternative Approaches to Religious Thought. 
 
Though problematic, Kant’s philosophy of religion has been hugely influential. Its 
fundamental appeal stems from its promise to establish peaceful co-existence between 
distinct theoretical frames: 
Many think [Kant] cut the knot [of the relation between science and religion] instead of 
untying it, for his solution was to separate [them] more sharply and completely […]. So 
far as science is concerned, his contribution lay in a new and far more rigorous negation 
                                                 
93 William James addressed this point by noting the different conclusions that philosophers—his colleagues 
Santayana and Royce—reach through sophisticated reasoning (“Reason and Faith.” Journal of Philosophy. 
p.197-98). 
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of the claims of knowledge in matters of religion. He exposed the fallacies in the 
traditional arguments for the being of God, for the existence of the soul, and for its 
freedom [Ames. “The Religion of Immanuel Kant.” pp.172-73]. 
 
The presumption is instinctive: both philosophy and religion function best when kept 
distinct, each free to offer its unique contributions to human culture. Though explicitly 
interested in limiting reason to make room for faith, Kant presented philosophy as the 
only viable theory through which to interpret experience. Various modern philosophers, 
theologians, and sociologists have problematized Kant’s philosophy of religion while 
others have defended its spirit, lost in the technical letter. By briefly surveying post-
Kantian theory of religion in Hegel, Schleiermacher, Durkheim and Cassirer the 
remainder of this chapter will illustrate Kant’s centrality to modern philosophy of religion 
and the persistence of the problem found in the letter of his philosophy of religion. 
A. Hegel, Philosophical reason, and Consummate Religion: Scholars typically 
view Hegel, in comparison to Kant, as offering a more overtly “religious” philosophy. 
Löwith went so far as to characterize Hegel as a decidedly Christian philosopher: 
With his understanding of Christianity as an absolute and at the same time an entity, 
connected historically with the world and the state, Hegel is the last Christian 
philosopher before the break between philosophy and Christianity. This break was 
perceived and made final from two opposite directions by Feuerbach and Kierkegaard 
[From Hegel to Nietzsche, p.49]. 
 
This claim is not unique,94 but it is odd for emphasizing continuity so strongly between 
Hegel and earlier “Christian” philosophy. Rather than follow scholastic philosophical 
theology, Hegel presented religion (abstractly, and Christianity specifically) as the 
                                                 
94 Olson (Hegel and the Spirit), having explored Hegel’s relation to Christianity at length, concluded that 
not only must Hegel’s philosophy be understood as Christian, it is thoroughly enough invested in the 
Christian tradition that it can be understood even more specifically as a speculative pneumatology. Without 
challenging this interpretive line, this chapter raises concerns with the manner in which his philosophy 
frames religion as a category. Even as Hegel was a Christian philosopher, how he delimited religion as a 
philosophical category committed his system to echoing the problem of Kant’s philosophy of religion. 
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penultimate development of Geist only as it is relevant to the genealogical development 
of philosophy. While Hegel developed a robust philosophy of religion, it operates within 
assumptions that problematize religion, much like Kant’s philosophy of religion. 
The interpretive challenges of Hegel’s massive and technical corpus can be limited 
by focusing on the increasing attention he gave to religious thought throughout his 
career.95 While Hegel dismissed religion in his earliest works, he later developed a 
nuanced philosophy of religion as he realized the full significance of religion for the 
articulation of a distinct philosophical science. This later view deserves consideration, 
particularly as it offers insight into how Hegelianism has been widely perceived as a 
problematic alternative to the Kantian philosophy of religion: 
Kant is considered the destroyer of metaphysics, while Hegel is regarded as the 
philosopher who gave back to metaphysics the rights that Kant had torn away from it. 
In reality Hegel only completed Kant’s work. The conviction that faith is knowledge, 
the hostility to Holy Scripture carefully hidden under the appearance of respect, the 
denial of the very possibility of any other participation in truth than that which science 
offers—all these sufficiently testify to the goal that Hegel had set for himself [Shestov. 
Athens and Jerusalem. p.131]. 
 
Despite this problematic duplicity regarding faith, the general movement toward an 
increasingly sophisticated interpretation of religion proves telling. Hegel’s alternative to 
Kantian philosophy of religion deserves full consideration in its own right, but here focus 
will be narrowed to showing that he repeated the Kantian error of affording no true voice 
to religious theory independent of philosophical interpretation. 
                                                 
95 William Desmond nicely described this transition: “Hegel was a left-wing post-Hegelian, like Feuerbach and 
Marx, before he became a ‘Hegelian’ (Hegel's God: a Counterfeit Double? p.42.)” The following brief survey 
adopts this statement as a framework as it allows a quick drawing of attention to how Hegel related philosophy 
and religion. A full critique of Hegel’s philosophy of religion would require a study of its own. 
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i. Early critique of Kant: Hegel’s posthumously published early theological essays 
betray a significant debt to the Kantian religion of reason, even as he rejected the explicit 
limits Kant drew around religious concepts. In these essays he developed a critique of 
Kantian religion that informed Hegel’s mature views even though he largely abandoned 
their position. The Positivity of the Christian Religion, the earliest work, shows the 
Kantian character of Hegel’s starting point: 
[…] that the aim and essence of all true religion […] is human morality, and that all the 
more detailed doctrines of Christianity, all means of propagating them […] have their 
worth and their sanctity appraised according to their close or distant connection with 
that aim [Hereafter, Positivity. In Early Theological Works. p.68]. 
 
The essay argues that Christianity transformed the original, primarily ethical teachings of 
Jesus into particular doctrines that delineate a dogmatic sect. His essay, following Kant, 
argues that morality does not require such historical doctrines. In fact, religious sects 
often elevate dogma to a point that it threatens morality. Thus, Hegel followed Kant in 
maintaining that the source of moral good must be an undetermined will, but he pushed 
this standpoint to reveal that if religion is at the service of morality, then its doctrines—
which take the form of impositions on the will—prove to be not just poor tools, but 
inherently counterproductive. 
In The Spirit of Christianity, composed about three years later, Hegel continued to 
criticize religion as generally detrimental to true inner virtue, though he presented 
Christianity as partially transcending this censure. Surveying the development of Judeo-
Christian thought through key Biblical narratives, Hegel schematized religious history to 
reflect predetermined philosophical positions, rather than analyze revealed accounts as a 
full record in their own right. Through Hegel’s approach the Pentateuch becomes both 
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figurative (the events are not actual…) and literal (…but they describe necessary 
‘moments’ of human consciousness). While rejecting the moral interpretation of religion, 
Hegel reduced religion to a narrative version of philosophy. The Kantian assumption that 
religion is philosophy in popular guise remains a fundamental part of Hegel’s view—
revised, but not eliminated.96 The early dismissal of religion was abandoned, but the 
rationale that drove this dismissal remained. 
While these assumptions informed Hegel’s mature thought, in Faith and Knowledge 
he began to develop a view that truly constitutes an alternative to Kantian philosophy of 
religion. Through lengthy critiques of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte he argued that 
Enlightenment assumptions skew the conception of both reason and religion: 
[…] seen in a clear light the victory comes to no more than this: the positive element 
with which reason busied itself to do battle, is no longer religion, and victorious Reason 
is no longer Reason. The new born peace that hovers triumphantly over the corpse of 
Reason and faith, uniting them as a child of both, has as little of Reason in it as it has of 
authentic faith [Faith and Knowledge. p.55]. 
 
The misrepresentation of reason—as mere understanding which leaves what is best and 
most essential outside of itself—leads to a misrepresentation of “faith” as denoting 
everything simply outside of the providence of reason. The total separation of each 
concept lends itself to the simple valuation of one over the other, as demonstrated by 
Kant, Fichte, and Jacobi.97 This critique demonstrates the significance that Hegel 
                                                 
96 “He always remained faithful to some elements of this heritage, such as the belief in un-alienable human 
rights and the faith in human reason, but he re-acted violently against other aspects. Where he had 
previously condemned Christianity for its irrationality, he later defended its essential rationality and came 
to celebrate Christian dogmas as ultimate philosophic truths in religious form. […] Thus Hegel always 
remains the heir of the Enlightenment, and opposed to romanticism and theology alike, by maintaining until 
the end that there is one pursuit which is far superior even to art and to religion, namely, philosophy 
(Kaufmann. “Hegel’s Early Antitheological Phase.” p.18).” 
97 Faith and Knowledge. p.56. 
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attributed to religion as an other to reason,98 and the promise Hegel’s philosophy of 
religion holds for addressing the concerns of this study. This promise does not 
overshadow, however, the problematic way he instrumentalized religion in the framing of 
his philosophical system. 
Hegel defined the Enlightenment as an absolute opposition between the finite (the 
sensible and particular) and the infinite (the pure concept). He insisted that his 
predecessors perfected this antagonism and consequently formulated a philosophy in 
which neither absolute finitude, nor the infinite are understood in proper abstraction: 
The fundamental principle common to the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte is, 
then, the absoluteness of finitude and, resulting from it, the absolute antithesis of 
finitude and infinity, reality and ideality, the sensuous and the supersensuous, and the 
beyondness of what is truly real and absolute [Faith and Knowledge. p.62]. 
 
Hegel viewed each system that resulted from this antithesis as an idealism of the finite: 
systems that take limitedness as an eternal law, and thus can cognize man but not God.99 
Since Hegel understood the aim of philosophy as absolute and universal knowledge, 
Faith and Knowledge argues that philosophy requires a richer understanding of religion 
than his predecessors allowed in order to overcome the limitations of finitude. Thus, the 
essay established a new philosophical task for his later writings: restoring religion to a 
proper level of scholarly estimation in order to properly reclaim philosophy itself. 
                                                 
98 Hegel expended significant effort to elevate religion in philosophical estimation, as Olson establishes in 
summarizing Hegel’s critique of the Enlightenment understanding of religion: “True religion, therefore, 
does not have to resign itself to this unhappy exchange and should not [Hegel] warns, ‘be led astray and 
corrupted by the [false] insinuations of Enlightenment.’ Furthermore, there is no cause for knee-jerk 
Biblicist and dogmatical reactions by Pietists and Orthodoxists to Enlightenment criticisms regarding the 
alleged heteronomy of the contents of its faith since Enlightenment faith is itself devoid of content (Hegel 
and the Spirit. p.123).” Yet while Hegel defended the vitality of religion, he made religion relevant only 
insofar as it serves rational ends (ibid. p.127). His philosophy of religion leaves philosophical reason as the 
sole authority for interpreting religious theory. 
99 Faith and Knowledge. p.64-6. 
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The Phenomenology of Spirit fully adopted this program and, in developing this 
conception of religion toward which his early works moved, grounds the following 
investigation of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. While the Phenomenology is 
challenging and complex, its general consideration of religion can be noted quickly for 
present purposes. Hegel presented religion as a moment of philosophy’s development, 
and as such he was interested in its content not its form.100 The form of religion has 
interest only as it mediates between finite being and the Absolute: no particular doctrines 
of historical religions play a major role in his narration of the development of Geist, 
despite the fact that abstract religion is only delineable based on the beliefs and practices 
of a particular religion. In order to avoid the problematic subordination of religion into 
philosophy, Hegel would need to present the actual practice of religion and the 
development of theological ideas as they occurred distinct from their philosophical 
interpretation. Further, his account must manage to preserve the distinctness of religion if 
it is to serve a mediating stage in the development of philosophy. 
ii. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: Despite his significantly different 
framing of religion as a concept, Hegel’s echoing of Kant’s philosophy of religion shows 
once he turned his focus to historically practiced religions. As philosophy ultimately 
serves as the sole interpreter of religious thought, the problems of Kant’s interpretation of 
religion reappear. Despite the need, established in the Phenomenology, for philosophy to 
                                                 
100 The opening of the chapter on “Absolute Knowing,” following that on “Religion” provides a clear 
example of this rhetoric: “The Spirit of the revealed religion has not yet surmounted its consciousness as 
such […] Spirit itself as a whole, and the self-differentiated moments within it, fall within the sphere of 
picture-thinking and in the form of objectivity. The content of this picture-thinking is absolute Spirit; and 
all that now remains to be done is to supersede this mere form [Hegel. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. 
A.V. Miller. p.47 (§788)].” 
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account for its own development (of which religion, first as natural and then as revealed, 
is the penultimate development), Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion start the 
interpretation of religion from an a priori concept rather than an exploration of the 
historical developments of religious systems that make such an abstraction possible. 
Likewise, he assumed a specific terminus for the development of religious thought that 
shaped the interpretation of individual religions; as Hegel presented Christianity as the 
consummate religion, he must provide a plausible interpretation of at least this tradition 
as the penultimate moment of his system. 
The delineation of religion: The introduction to the 1827 version of the Lectures 
asserts that “In its concept religion is the relation of the subject, of the subjective 
consciousness, to God, who is spirit. [Religion] is therefore spirit conscious of its own 
essence.”101 This seemingly indicates the same positive assessment of religion advanced 
in the Spirit essay, as consciousness of the absolute had been the driving goal of Hegel’s 
philosophy. This suggests that religion contributes exactly what philosophy cannot 
provide for itself, yet he failed to allow religion to form a distinct perspective, since it 
shares the same content as philosophy (which alone has the final interpretive authority): 
[T]he content of philosophy, its need and interest, is wholly in common with that of 
religion. The object of religion, like that of philosophy, is the eternal truth, God and 
nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is only explicating itself when 
it explicates religion, and when it explicates itself it is explicating religion [LPR I. 
p.152-3]. 
 
Hegel maintained the peculiarity of both philosophy and religion by presenting them as 
esoteric and exoteric versions of the same content, respectively.102 While attempting to 
                                                 
101 Hegel. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Vol. I. p.178. 
102 Hegel. LPR I. p.180. 
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develop a more nuanced perspective that does not reduce religion to moral philosophy, 
Hegel followed Kant in disregarding religion’s unique and non-philosophical voice. 
Hegel’s project assumes that philosophy alone can properly explicate religion which, 
abstractly conceived, must fit into a predetermined place within the structure of his logic. 
The first moment of the philosophical science of religion is the content of religion, taken 
dogmatically, as “the concept of religion itself, that God is the absolute truth, the truth of 
all things, and subjectively that religion alone is the absolutely true knowledge.”103 This 
concept begins a dialectical movement with the second moment, that of distinction 
between the divine and the mundane, between good and evil.104 Religion progresses 
through four engagements with this distinction; immediate faith and the representation of 
God in our thought which, as internal, is not properly God: feeling which presents the 
content of a thing subjectively and thus cannot bear truth: representation, which reveals 
the true content of religion: and thought, which makes contradiction visible by drawing 
all things into connection through the category of necessity.105 This schematic insists that 
religion finds its proper explication in philosophical categories into which it neatly fits. 
For Hegel, thought in its true form unites that which is immediately present in human 
spirit and the mediating act bringing it to mind. Thus, “religion exists only within self-
consciousness; outside that it exists nowhere.”106 While religion works toward a 
philosophical goal, it proves less capable of achieving this goal than philosophy as it can 
provide only a deficient transition from the finite to the infinite due to its numerous and 
                                                 
103 Hegel. LPR I. p.366. 
104 “The distinction of good and evil makes its entrance together with the distinction of God from the world, in 
particular from human beings (Hegel. LPR I. p.378, [275]).” 
105 LPR I; faith (p.385ff, [281]): feeling (p.390ff, [285]): representation (p.396ff, [291]): thought (p.403ff, [298]). 
106 Hegel. LPR I. p.412, [306]. 
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contradictory particular forms.107 There is no transition from the finite to the infinite, as 
such limits are already transcended when they are identified:108 the practical cultus of 
religion aims to actualize this unity.109 Thus, from the concept of religion, philosophy is 
led to a comparative historical investigation of religion (even as this multiplicity of 
religious thought and practice is deemed problematic). 
Historical Religion: Within the Lectures, historical religions are presented only as 
components of a dialectical progression. This perspective requires that individual 
religions fit general, yet nonetheless restrictive, parameters established systematically 
before considering religious practices and doctrines themselves. Hegel’s shifted ordering 
of religions in each iteration of his lectures,110 his near indifference toward Islam,111 and 
his facile critiques of Indian religion and philosophy112 can be attributed only partially to 
                                                 
107 “Genuine transition does not consist in change, in perennial alteration. Instead the genuine other of the finite 
is the infinite, and this is not bare negation of the finite but is affirmative, is being (Hegel. LPR I. p.423, [316]).” 
108 Hegel. LPR I. p.425, [317]. 
109 Hegel. LPR I. p.442ff, [331]. 
110 In his introductory essay to Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Vol.II, Hodgson charts the 
changed order the determinate religions are treated in various editions of Hegel’s “Determinate Religion” 
lectures (pp.88-89). 
111 Hourani notes that this is not surprising: “There has never been a single authentic and, so to speak, 
'official' attitude of the Church towards Muhammad and his prophetic claims, and perhaps there cannot be: 
for one of the many causes of the tension and unease which have marked the relationship of Christians and 
Muslims is that, while Muslims regard Christianity as an essential stage of the process which culminated in 
the revelation through Muhammad, and simply by being Muslims are committed to a certain attitude 
towards Christianity, this is not so for Christians (“Islam and the Philosophers of History.” p.209).” 
Hourani mentions Hegel only tangentially, though his assessment offers insight into Hegel’s thought and 
problems of his assumptions. A similar problem, as Rotenstreich notes, can be found in Hegel’s approach 
to Judaism that characterized it in a manner foreign to its self-understanding: “Hegel, in shifting from the 
socio-historical frame of reference in general, sees now the essence of Judaism in the position of God and 
not any longer in the position of the people in it. Judaism is no longer a Judaeo-centric culture but a 
Theocentric one (“Hegel's Image of Judaism.” p.43).” 
112 Hegel’s assessment of the Bhadavad-Gītā ends on a disappointing note as he cites the varieties of 
“theogonies and cosmologies” within Indian thought as evidence that Indian religious thought betrays a 
“caprice of fancy imagination” that “interferes with the most sublime concepts of our consciousness, but in 
the state of that wonderful profundity abruptly takes a rapid fall down to the most profane (On the Episode 
of the Mahabārāta. p.149).” This ends his lengthy consideration of the text that otherwise suggests a 
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the limited availability of religious literature now taken for granted; they demonstrate the 
rhetorical rather than critical consideration that governed Hegel’s approach to each 
religious system. Most problematic is the fact that, despite significant interest in the 
variety of religious experience, Hegel’s historical framework severely marginalizes non-
European thought. Hegel focused exclusively on Jewish, Greek, and Roman religious 
thought once his dialectic transcended immediate and natural religion. The traditions that 
were not formative for Christian thought are discarded as insufficiently determined 
forms. Hegel treated religions selectively to serve his characterization of religion as a 
category within philosophy. Though such selective interpretation may be unavoidable, 
Hegel problematically ignored religions’ ability to autonomously interpret themselves. 
There is only one point at which this shortcoming could be seen as problematic from 
within Hegel’s view: he consistently presented Christianity as the consummate and 
revelatory religion wherein the concept of religion is able to ‘think itself.’ According to 
Hegel, Christianity is the religion that overcomes the division between absolute essence 
and the thought of that essence and thus the form that leads to the religion of spirit. This 
assessment of Christianity relies on his distinction between abstract positivity— a 
“contingent [feature], which can just as well take one form as another”—and the positive 
in the form of rational law that is a seated in human rationality itself.113 The critique 
originally made in the Positivity of the Christian Religion, though modified, was not 
dropped. Rather than affirm religion as a distinct interlocutor for philosophy, Hegel 
                                                                                                                                                 
consistent philosophical position behind these ‘fanciful elements.’ This dismissal illustrates his procrustean 
approach to specific religions. 
113 Hegel. LPR III. p.253, [181]. 
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followed Kant in dismissing the diversity of religious beliefs and practices as contingent 
features that have no bearing on the abstract category that fit their systems. 
The Absolute perspective sublates each distinct religion in its finitude through the 
consummate religion. This allows inner religion to be manifest in positive statements and 
for spirit to think itself: 
Spirit is precisely that which determines itself infinitely. To be sure, the series of forms 
that we have passed through is a succession of stages that follow upon one another; but 
these forms are encompassed within the infinite, absolute form, in absolute subjectivity, 
and only the spirit so defined as absolute subjectivity is spirit [LPR III. p.268 (193)]. 
 
In its final stage of development, Spirit determines itself and in doing so brings all 
determinate things into the concept: infinite subjectivity. Concept and reality are thus 
united: “content as idea is the truth,” though it “is spirit only because it has achieved 
determinacy through this circuit.”114 The Spirit of the consummate religion expresses the 
necessities of Hegelian logic which shaped the critical idea of such a religious 
perspective, rather than expressing a distinct and free theoretical framework. The true 
diversity of religion remains excluded from Hegel’s historical dialectic.115 
Hegel treats Christianity as an important manifestation that gives determinate form to 
the abstraction “religion.” Despite this role, he pays little attention to the actual features 
of Christian practice, even as he considers them an essential stage of human mindfulness. 
Hegel never clarifies what philosophy adds to religious consciousness, he states only that: 
In religion the truth has been revealed as far as its content is concerned; but it is another 
matter for this content to be present in the form of the concept, of thinking, of the concept in 
speculative form [LPR III. p.283, (209)]. 
 
                                                 
114 Hegel. LPR III. p.269, [194-5]. 
115 Schelling has been criticized for this point as well; the final chapters of the present study will return to 
this critical point. 
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Thus the philosophical formulation of the Christian religion adds nothing to the faith 
unless one accepts that philosophy alone is suited to interpreting and formulating what 
religion is about.116 The dialectical development of philosophy through religion requires 
a significant difference through which philosophy can be determined and become more 
aware of its own character and limits: a merely formal difference means that religion, 
appropriated by philosophy, becomes obsolete once philosophy appears and religion 
proves incapable of providing a mutually determining other for philosophy.117 
Regardless, this brief survey shows the importance of religion in Hegel’s system. His 
philosophy of religion has sufficient nuance to reveal that he considered neither the 
Kantian moral God nor the simple dismissal of religion acceptable. He constantly revised 
and refined an alternative to the Enlightenment perspective in which philosophical reason 
worked out its a priori universal perspective through historical religious systems. The 
result was a perceptible shift, an attempt to abandon the open antagonism toward religion 
which the young Hegelians would embrace, an antagonism inherent to Kant’s position (as 
Hegel found in his youthful works). Unfortunately, these shifting views never produced a 
theory of religion that can legitimately constitute an ‘other’ capable of dialectically 
                                                 
116 David James explores religion as mediating between art and philosophy and he criticizes Hegel’s 
conception of religion as the penultimate development: “We must therefore assume that the superiority of 
the revealed religion in relation to arts rests on the fact that its form (i.e., representational thought) […] is 
closer to pure thought than intuition, which is the form of art (“The Transition from Art to Religion in 
Hegel’s Theory of Absolute Spirit.” p.275).” This means that once philosophy “arrives” religion becomes 
redundant rather than remain a distinct framework legitimate independently of philosophical 
reinterpretation. James argues that religion proves unnecessary as a mediation between art and philosophy 
(ibid. pp.276-82). 
117 The development of the doctrine of the Trinity illustrates this: “Even in the Christian religion the Holy 
Trinity does not appear in the immediate appearance [itself]; rather the idea is first completed only when 
the Spirit has entered into the community and when the immediate, believing spirit has entered into the 
community and when the immediate believing spirit has raised itself to the level of thinking (Hegel. LPR 
III. p.287, [212]).” 
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engaging philosophy.118 The shift between the Positivity essay and the Spirit essay 
indicates the most significant change within Hegel’s corpus on this fundamental point: 
latter works, for all of their insight regarding the importance of religious thought and 
practice for philosophy, presented only a mute abstraction derived from Christianity 
rather than a true religious voice independent of philosophy. 
Hegel developed the most significant philosophical alternative to Kant’s interpretive 
framework for religion, an alternative which problematically reiterates a fundamental 
flaw of the Kantian approach. In this, he provides an important negative example: while 
failing to develop a system with his intended result, Hegel also revealed the impossibility 
of a modern philosophy of religion based exclusively within a singular tradition: by 
presenting all religions along a speculative historical continuum, diversity invariably will 
be repressed and actual religious views will be distorted. This repression ultimately 
undermines the ability of religions to interact with philosophy, leaving only an abstract 
idea of religion as a philosophical prop. The efforts of theologians and sociologists—here 
Schleiermacher and Durkheim will be taken as archetypal expressions of their respective 
field’s response to modern philosophy—have also offered alternatives without fully 
addressing this issue. They can illustrate the persistence of the problematic of this study 
in various contexts, even in works which broadly reject the Enlightenment project. 
                                                 
118 Cullen contends “Hegel’s conception of the dialectical relationship between human beings and God is 
both existentialist and speculative. The believing individual is dialectically subsumed into the reasonable 
(vernünftig) totality that is the world in history, but remains an individual person and is not thereby 
obliterated in the process (“Hegel on the Human and the Divine, in Light of the Criticisms of Kierkegaard,” 
p.96).” He acknowledges that Hegel can only conceive of religion as imperfect philosophy, but sees this 
positively as an accommodationalist approach (ibid. p.101). Vaught notes the difficulty of criticizing the 
Hegelian dialectic on this point: “First, Hegel makes the phenomenon of negation the central element of his 
system so that any attempt to stand outside it becomes an indirect way of being imprisoned within it. […] 
In the Second place, Hegel claims that even if non-dialectical difference were possible, it would be 
absolutely unintelligible (“Hegel and the Problem of Difference.” p.35).” 
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B. Rational Anthropology beyond Philosophy: The influence of Kant and Hegel 
extends to attempts to define and interpret religion across academic disciplines. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, a central figure in the development of modern Christian theology,119 
illustrates this especially well as he framed the study of religion in a manner influenced 
by and yet critical of Kant. He adopted the critical philosophy’s division of theoretical 
and moral reason but recast this epistemological division as anthropological categories: 
the distinction between, and fundamental connection of, theoretical reason and morality 
are both explained as the person acting in different manners.120 Though he accepted 
Kant’s division between theoretical and practical thought, he found religion could not be 
reduced to either and thus expanded the division to include feeling as a third category.121 
Schleiermacher’s reworking of Kant’s schematic led to a philosophy of religion that 
complements this study. While it avoids reducing religion to a philosophical category, it 
does not fully address the problems noted above. By rejecting both the theoretical and 
moral categorization of religion, he shifted the focus within the Kantian framework 
without abandoning the fundamental schema: 
[Religion] does not wish to determine and explain the universe according to its nature 
as does metaphysics; it does not desire to continue the universe’s development and 
perfect it by the power of freedom and the divine free choice of a human being as does 
morals. Religion’s essence is neither thinking nor acting, but intuition and feeling. It 
wishes to intuit the universe, wishes devoutly to overhear the universe’s own 
                                                 
119 See Neihbur. “Schleiermacher: Theology as Human Reflection” (a survey of Schleiermacher’s influence 
on the conception of theology as a discipline, esp. p.24); Barth. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century (a critique of Schleiermacher for committing liberal modern theology to a perspective that lacks an 
“ultimate opposition between God and man.” p.473); Crouter. Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between 
Enlightenment and Romanticism (a survey of the continued influence of Barth’s assessment. esp. p.177); 
Wellman. “Schleiermacher Today.” 
120 “The two forms of consciousness (Knowing and feeling) constitute the abiding-in-self, while Doing 
proper is the passing-beyond-self (Schleiermacher. The Christian Faith. p.8).” 
121 See The Christian Faith. esp. pp.7-11. 
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manifestations and actions, longs to be grasped and filled by the universe’s immediate 
influences in childlike passivity [On Religion. pp.22-23]. 
 
Schleiermacher maintained Kant’s problematic division of theoretical philosophy and 
morality grounded in an original unity conceived as feeling rather than moral duty.122 In 
this sense, religion is a universal category, an inherent part of human experience.123 As 
such, his account of religion can only be illustrated, not deduced. 
Rather than a simple original union of the two Kantian spheres of human thought, 
Schleiermacher posited feeling as a distinct third faculty encompassed neither by 
morality nor metaphysics.124 Though not dismissing theology, Schleiermacher echoed 
Kant by seeing metaphysics as an incursion of reason into the domain proper to religion: 
If you put yourself at the highest standpoint of metaphysics and morals, you will find 
that both have the same object as religion, namely, the universe and the relationship of 
humanity to it. This similarity has long since been a basis of manifold aberrations; 
metaphysics and morals have therefore invaded religion on many occasions, and much 
that belongs to religion has concealed itself in metaphysics or morals under an 
unseemly form [On Religion. p.19]. 
 
                                                 
122 Within the critical philosophy, “feeling” denoted the emotive impression of the moral duty. Kant had 
identified and dismissed inner feeling as a possible alternative to reason for interpreting Scripture, and 
maintaining a particular church (RwBMR. p.119-21 [6:112-3]). His ethical philosophy rejected any 
consideration of personal feelings which by nature cannot definitively be attributed to a single cause 
(RwBMR. 6:114, p.121). Schleiermacher’s use of “feeling” should not be confused with these meanings. 
123 Thus it is possible to interpret Schleiermacher’s conception of religion as a generic construct. However, 
Schleiermacher certainly sought an alternative to interpretations that view religion as an artificial construct 
(See Crouter. Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism. pp.54-55, 58). As the 
grounding religious experience finds expression in metaphysical and moral schemas, Schleiermacher 
certainly considered the abstract category of religion as invariably connected to historical religions in their 
full diversity. 
124 “[T]here is both a Knowing and a Doing which pertain to piety, but neither of these constitutes the 
essence of piety: they only pertain to it inasmuch as the stirred-up Feeling sometimes comes to rest in a 
thinking which fixes it, sometimes discharges itself in an action which expresses it (Schleiermacher. The 
Christian Faith. p.10-11).” Piety and feeling are the “determination of self-consciousness” that mediates 
Knowing and Doing (ibid, pp.12), and distinct from action as it does not involve a passing-beyond-self 
(ibid, pp. 8, 12). 
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The essence of religion, unlike metaphysics or morality, does not constitute a system: it 
supplies the raw material for such derivative schematizations.125 Religion, metaphysics, 
and morality cannot be reduced to or derived from one source, nor can morality or 
metaphysics be asserted as the dominant science. In this sense, Schleiermacher 
minimized philosophy’s pretense to be a final authority over other disciplines. 
Schleiermacher’s preferred term for distinguishing religion from moral action and 
rational explanation, Gefühl, creates confusion as emotion has several common uses. 
Some have criticized his choice to denote the purview of religion as emotion rather than 
intuition,126 though Schleiermacher used the term intentionally as shown by his careful 
refinement of the term throughout his career.127 While On Religion offer the best brief 
insight into Schleiermacher’s relation to Kantian philosophy of religion, The Christian 
Faith delineated Gefühl with significantly greater clarity. In this mature work, 
Schleiermacher clarified that feeling refers to more than any specific emotional state: 
The common element in all those determinations of self-consciousness which 
predominantly express a receptivity affected from outside quarter is the feeling of 
dependence. On the other hand, the common element in all those determinations which 
predominantly express spontaneous movement and activity is the feeling of Freedom.128 
 
Feeling and piety refer to an awareness of the self’s relationships not directly available to 
the rational mind. While Schleiermacher agreed with Kant that reason cannot grasp this, 
he resisted an overly rational anthropology by allowing that the idea remains a 
                                                 
125 Schleiermacher. On Religion. p.20; theology, however, does allow of systematization (Neibuhr. 
“Schleiermacher: Theology as Human Reflection.” p.23). Schleiermacher drew a clearer distinction than 
Kant had between religion and theology, a choice that allowed a much richer understanding of reason 
relates to the full range of religious thought. 
126 See Tillich. Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology (ed. Carl E. 
Braaten; New York: Harper & Row. 1967. p.96 (cited in Lamm “The Early Philosophical Roots of 
Schleiermacher’s Notion of Gefühl, 1788-1794.” p.68 n4). 
127 Lamm. “The Early Philosophical Roots of Schleiermacher’s Notion of Gefühl, 1788-1794.” p.69. 
128 Schleiermacher. The Christian Faith. pp.13-4. 
87 
 
 
meaningful and essential aspect of both theoretical and moral thought even though it is 
not rationally explicable. 
One promising result of Schleiermacher’s approach is that he conceives of religion 
as neither essentially rational nor irrational. His schema opposes the tendency of the 
Kantian and Hegelian views to prioritize the rational as an exclusive authority over 
religious thought. It is thus fitting that Schleiermacher defined the essential religious 
phenomenon as piety. The term indicates that while religion may be caught up with 
particular theological doctrines, it always remains distinct from dogmatic statements as a 
feeling which may partially be understood as un-reflexive experience. As such, religion 
never disappears as a unique entity or becomes dismantled into raw material for 
philosophical reinterpretation: feeling refers to a pre-reflective state. Discourse about 
religion is always already an attempt to retrieve an earlier consciousness.129 This suggests 
that, rather than a critique of religious epistemological claims, the philosophy of religion 
could be best conceived as a task rather than a static doctrine. 
While demarcating a distinct theoretical framework for the religious, Schleiermacher 
repeated a serious problem of Kant’s moral religion. He interpreted religion with no 
concern for how the abstract concept relates to historical religious traditions. Feeling 
proves unconcerned with specific traditions and doctrines, referring simply to an 
intuition of the universe. […] All intuition proceeds from an influence of the intuited on 
the one who intuits, from an original and independent action of the former, which is 
then grasped, apprehended, and conceived by the latter according to one's own nature 
[On Religion. pp.24-25]. 
 
                                                 
129 Schleiermacher. On Religion. p.21. 
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The term intuition is misleading as in Kant's first Critique it meant mere sensation, an 
understanding of feeling that Schleiermacher rejected.130 Feeling in this context indicates 
a broader type of intuition, denoting something different from, or more encompassing 
than, the intuitions of typical consciousness. While intuition must be of a decidedly 
different sort than that which Kant addressed, it remains unclear how such a separate type 
of intuition is possible while maintaining the essential anthropological dichotomy of the 
critical philosophy. While expanding the categories of Kant’s philosophy of religion, 
Schleiermacher still left philosophy and rational theology as the voice of religion. 
Schleiermacher’s view of religion indicates a dramatically different concern with the 
how the individual is theorized than the Kantian framework allowed. Whereas morality 
and metaphysics express the individual universally, Schleiermacher saw religion as 
subordinating everything to the particular intuition. Despite insisting on its particularity, 
he did not maintain that religious experiences are relative to the point of surrendering any 
categorical insight;131 the subsequent moral and metaphysical interpretations based upon 
the religious feeling are open to critique even if the feeling itself is not. Nevertheless, 
such an unquantifiable experience, beyond the threshold of rational criticism, cannot 
provide the needed “other” to philosophy that Kantian and Hegelian philosophy of 
religion lacked.132 While capturing the fundamental individuality of religious experience, 
                                                 
130 Schleiermacher. On Religion. p.35. 
131 For example: “Each person must be conscious that his religion is only a part of the whole, that regarding 
the same objects that affect him religiously there are views just as pious and, nevertheless, completely 
different from his own, and that form other elements of religion intuitions and feelings flow, the sense for 
which he may be completely lacking (On Religion, p.27).” 
132 Schleiermacher certainly shared the current study’s interest in affording a distinct voice to the religious 
within the philosophy of religion: “And the task of thus exhibiting in a conceptually exhaustive way, 
according to their affinities and gradations, the totality of all those ‘Churches’ which are distinguished from 
89 
 
 
Schleiermacher struggled to delimit religion as a theoretical voice distinct from 
philosophy and specific theological systems. 
Theology has been, historically, the most significant rival to philosophy within 
universities, though sociology has grown into an alternate rival. While a pure rational 
science imposes limits that prevent abuses of speculative thought, it also separates 
philosophy from the phenomena it is meant to interpret as well as the disciplines that 
focus on the contingent phenomena of history and culture. Philosophy, as a pure science, 
proves incapable of considering much of human experience as many ideas and practices 
get skewed when taken out of their social context. As a result, philosophy leaves other 
disciplines with the task of connecting abstract speculation to recognizable experience. 
Sociology, in general, provides a notable counterpoint to the modern philosophers 
considered here by focusing theoretical lenses on concrete social phenomena. As such, 
the present critique of philosophy—that it is overly concerned with an abstract 
rationality—could suggest that religious studies simply belong in sociology faculties 
rather than philosophy. 
With significantly different methodological approaches, it is unsurprising that 
sociology and philosophy adopt different perspectives on what shape the study of religion 
should take. However, these differences should not obscure similarities in the 
assumptions and biases shared by each field. Sociology has been criticized for the same 
                                                                                                                                                 
each other by peculiar differences of basis—this task would be the business of a special branch of historical 
science, which should be exclusively designated Philosophy of Religion (The Christian Faith. p.4)” 
Nevertheless, the relegation of this pursuit to “history” suggests problems with how Schleiermacher 
understood the significance of his own insistence.  
90 
 
 
tendency toward rationalization that philosophy has been criticized for above.133 The 
recurrence of this problem emphasizes that each discipline, despite judging the relevance 
of specific cultural experiences differently, relates rational constructs to social problems. 
The turn toward producing and interpreting an empirical record of social action involves 
an implicit criticism of philosophy illustrated by Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life. The work is introduced in terms that suggest a pointed criticism of 
Kantian approach to the categories of human thought: 
If, on the other hand, the categories are, as we believe they are, essentially collective 
representations, before all else, they should show the mental states of the group; they 
should depend on the way in which this is founded and organized, upon its morphology, 
upon its religious, moral and economic institutions, etc [The Elementary Forms. p.28]. 
 
This critique—of the Kantian presentation of space and time as the unalterable conditions 
of human thought—makes society a foundational context for philosophical thought and 
undermines the rhetoric of reason as self-founding. Specifically, philosophy cannot 
exhaust religion as a category through universal and a priori reasoning as religion is 
joined to society itself;134 it thus plays a part in framing philosophical thinking. 
Durkheim’s approach resists the philosophical tendency to reduce particular religious 
faiths to an ideal form as the collective, in its concrete singularity, serves as a basic 
                                                 
133 Bellah has criticized a “symbolic reductionism” that follows from narrow conceptions of scientific 
method that approaches religion with the goal of “discover[ing] the falsifiable propositions hidden within it, 
discard the unverifiable assertions and those clearly false, and even with respect to the ones that seem valid 
to abandon the symbolic and metaphorical disguise in which they are cloaked (“Christianity and Symbolic 
Realism.” p.92).” Bellah considered all of the foundational sociologists to have followed this tendency in 
some important sense. Featherstone and Sorrell (“Sociology Dismissing Religion?”) more recently have 
traced the continued influence of the secularization thesis in sociological conceptualizations of religion. 
134 “The general conclusion of the book which the reader has before him is that religion is something 
eminently social. Religious representations are collective representations which express collective 
realities; the rites are a manner of acting which take rise in the midst of the assembled groups and 
which are destined to excite, maintain or recreate certain mental states in these groups (Durkheim. The 
Elementary Forms. p.10).” 
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component for understanding religion. In this early sociological work, a clear challenge 
to the philosophical approach to religion is clear. 
Precisely this point is at stake in Ernst Cassirer’s latter philosophical work, an 
important point of comparison for Schelling’s work. The introduction of his An Essay on 
Man shows the multiplicity of perspectives necessary to navigate human experience, 
though Cassirer’s account of humanity—as a symbol making species—addressed 
concerns about the relevance of religion for philosophy noted above while maintaining 
the problematic dichotomy between reason and irrational religion. The last major figure 
of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism,135 Cassirer appropriated this fundamental 
sociological objection to abstract theorization and raises it within the tradition of modern 
philosophy: 
[R]eligion has always been accused of darkness and incomprehensibility. But this 
blame becomes the highest praise as soon as we consider its true aim. Religion cannot 
be clear and rational. What it relates is an obscure and somber story: the story of the sin 
and the fall of man. It reveals a fact of which no rational explanation is possible [An 
Essay on Man. p.12]. 
 
This appraisal nevertheless remains within the limits that Kant drew between reason and 
religion. More than simply acknowledging the need for the inconceivable, philosophy of 
religion should force philosophy to stake a more complex relationship relative to other 
types of mindfulness in light of the complexity of religion. 
While religion, according to Cassirer, cannot be clear and rational, his text offers a 
rational explanation of the phenomenon. While more nuanced, Cassirer presented a view 
of religion that proves too close to repeating the overall problem of Hegel’s system: 
                                                 
135 See Krois. “Cassirer, Neo-Kantianism, and Metaphysics.” pp.444ff for Cassirer’s departure from the 
traditional transcendental method. 
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The taboo system threatens to make the life of man a burden that in the end becomes 
unbearable. Man’s whole existence, physical and moral, is smothered under the 
continual pressure of this system. It is here that religion intervenes. All the higher 
ethical religions […] set themselves a common task. They relieve the intolerable burden 
of the taboo system; but they detect, on the other hand, a more profound sense of 
religious obligation that instead of being a restriction or compulsion is the expression of 
a new positive ideal of human freedom [An Essay on Man. p.108]. 
 
Religion provides a fundamental contribution to human experience, but requires the input 
of philosophy to fully explain this contribution; the autonomy of religious thought 
relative to philosophy remains absent. Cassirer’s work, itself worthy of longer 
consideration, here should confirm that philosophical attention to the full human person 
must adopt an approach to religion much different than that of modern philosophy. 
 
IV. Conclusion: From Problematic to Programmatic: 
 
Neither the Kantian nor Hegelian interpretation of religious theory allows a distinct 
theoretical interpretation of experience that does not ultimately reduce to philosophy. As 
Kant and Hegel are determining representatives of the limits of modern philosophy, their 
philosophies of religion indicate a pervasive problem within modern scholarship on 
religion that cannot be easily avoided, even after it has been described; following Kant’s 
presentation of religion as a popularized formulation of moral precepts, multiple 
disciplines have likewise approached religion as something to be rationalized and 
understood through philosophical assumptions. The critical alternative developed in the 
following chapters is concerned less with identifying and directly addressing internal 
problems of Kant’s and Hegel’s systems and more with the goal of articulating an 
alternative framework for the relation of philosophical and religious thought which can 
help address the needs of the contemporary world: in order to provide a philosophical 
93 
 
 
understanding of religion qua religion, the temptation to find an external universal 
account must be resisted. An effective philosophy of religion must adopt a fundamental 
ambiguity between philosophical abstraction and religious particularity. 
By rejecting the appeal to a pure philosophy, and the resulting overly rational 
anthropology, this study also challenges the schematization of philosophy and religion as 
reason and faith. While the distinction between faith and reason is long-standing, the 
division of philosophy and religion as proper and an improper use of human reason is 
distinctly modern. Specifically, this view has narrowed the conception of man to a 
rational, politically manageable unit which can be utilized to maximal effect for the 
immanent goals of the state. This involved classifying other concerns as private, and 
effectively removing religious claims from the public sphere so that individuals could 
more easily be integrated into the collective. A more balanced anthropology, then, will 
contribute to a better understanding of religion and philosophy, their opposition, and their 
possible historical relations. This need coincides with the general movement of 
Schelling’s early thought, making writings from his early career particularly helpful for 
developing a philosophy of religion. 
In reconsidering the correct philosophical way to define humanity, the nature of 
philosophy becomes an open question. If the division between reason and the non-
rational proves more subtle than direct opposition, philosophy cannot be defined simply 
as a science of reason. Articulating the rational understanding of the world relies on some 
form of the irrational and the nature and role of philosophy are discernible only in 
reference to some other type of mindfulness beyond its bounds. The philosophy of 
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religion, as a discipline that takes not religion as its object but the confluence of cultural 
forces involved in questions related to the variety of ways of being mindful, requires the 
cooperation of various perspectives in order to arrive at an acceptable “definition” of 
religion. So long as philosophy adopts religion as an object yet leaves religious theory as 
an unknowable quantity with no legitimate autonomy, philosophy will be unable to close 
its interpretations; once philosophy accepts the separate viability of religious thought, it 
must admit that its interpretations can never be closed.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Philosophical Anthropology and the Task of Philosophy 
 
 
 
There is a temptation, having outlined the entrenched tendency of modern 
philosophy to problematize religion relative to reason, for religious studies to ignore 
academic philosophy altogether. Freed from Kantian and Hegelian conceptions of reason, 
religious studies could abandon counterproductive constraints which rest on assumptions, 
rather than deductions, about the fundamental character of religion. Yet these 
assumptions—which cast philosophy as corrupted by, indifferent to, or rivaled by 
religious thought—have served as essential building blocks for subsequent religious and 
philosophical studies. Critics must engage the philosophical bias against religious theory 
in order to avoid inverting the problem posed by the Enlightenment and producing 
religious theories that simply substitute the bias of specific religious ideologies for those 
of rationality. Philosophy has a vital role to play in religious studies and inter-faith 
dialogue as its critical stance can prevent the naïve promotion of the biases of specific 
religious traditions. 
The general perception that Kant successfully exposed theology as a false science 
has affected, directly and subtly, subsequent religious studies. The Enlightenment 
characterization of philosophy as abstract, timeless, necessary, and universal remains 
both an influential touchstone and a necessary starting point for the philosophy of 
religion. Alternatives to Kantian theories must both challenge the self-sufficiency of 
reason and establish the compatibility of rationality and religion without fully confusing 
each with the other. Both tasks can be addressed through critically interpreting Schelling, 
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whose mature philosophy was motivated by the problems he encountered while working 
within the assumptions of the critical philosophy.136 Schelling made important 
contributions to the development of German Idealism even as his mature thought grew 
dismissive of strictly idealist perspectives.137 While the alternative he explored arose out 
of and through his idealist engagement with Kant’s critical philosophy and Hegel’s 
absolute idealism, it stands apart as a distinct distillation of, and response to, modern 
philosophy. 
Schelling scholarship frequently has divided his corpus into multiple eras, each 
relatively discrete, to be appraised separately. His corpus, so conceived, lacks a coherent 
interpretive principle apart from what the contemporary critic provides. This tendency 
suggests that his work may be a problematic tool for the present study’s aims regarding 
the philosophy of religion as its disparate foci threaten to further obscure an already 
contested border. These proposed earlier and later divisions delineate Schelling’s 
mystical influences from his idealist work and enforce (and assume) the Enlightenment 
conviction that a turn to religious and mystical thought must be a turn away from rational 
discourse. However, this interpretative approach has grown less popular and now largely 
serves as a point of critical departure that is quickly rejected in favor of more holistic 
                                                 
136 This chapter considers Schelling in the context of the early reception of Kant without focusing on the 
narrative of German philosophical development from Kant to Hegel. As Henrich’s Between Kant and 
Hegel demonstrated, there is no singular narrative of German Idealism; the various thinkers of this fertile 
period cross-influenced each other so thoroughly that any interpretive narrative must narrow its focus to a 
specific issue or select authors. The previous chapter helped to frame Schelling’s work so that here it is 
possible to emphasize the argument of his texts themselves. 
137 Several commentators characterize Schelling’s work as the “endgame of idealism”: see Pfau. 
“Introduction.” Idealism and the Endgame of Theory. pp.1-7; Snow. Schelling and the End of Idealism. 
pp.181-215. 
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readings.138 Indeed, Schelling’s late philosophy of religion shared the same concerns 
which drove his early criticisms of Kant. These earlier works revealed that topics of 
mysticism, religion, and theology follow from, rather than prove dismissed by, the critical 
philosophy.139 This chapter considers the limitations of Schelling’s early works; they 
focused on Kant’s conception of the human person, rather than religious thought, but the 
shortcomings of these early essays posed a challenge that led him to reimagine the nature 
of philosophy.  
 
I. Early Attempts to Re-ground the Critical Philosophy. 
 
His reputation as a philosophical proteus is partly deserved; Schelling did shift focus 
and style often, especially in his early works. This tendency gave rise to and encouraged 
the dismissive accounts of his thought as unfocused and isolated and it continues to pose 
persistent interpretive problems. Though scholarship must acknowledge the evident 
differences between the interests and styles Schelling adopted as he matured, it also must 
consider the collective effect of these disparate pursuits. Schelling’s earliest works—
especially Of the I and the Philosophical Letters—revolve around a shared goal which, 
once identified, provides a guiding insight for the interpretation of the System of 
Transcendental Idealism. His frequent changes in philosophical style and argumentative 
                                                 
138 This dismissal itself has become a trope within Schelling literature. O’Meara (“F.W.J. Schelling”) 
surveyed major studies from the “Schelling Renaissance,” following the 1954 conference attended by Benz, 
Schulz, Habermas, Jaspers, and Fuhrmans, that critiqued this characterization of Schelling as a 
philosophical proteus. Tilliette also emphasizes the importance of this issue for the flowering of Schelling 
scholarship: “Schelling, en effet, a passé longtemps pour le « Protée de l'Idéalisme », et cette épithète de 
nature fixait l'image d'un penseur brillant, chatoyant, mais versatile et invertébré (“Actualité de Schelling.” 
pp.358-9).” See also Bowie. Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An Introduction. pp. 12-14. 
139 Though beyond the scope of the present study, it merits noting that several neo-Kantians eventually 
arrived at related positions (see Beiser “Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall”). Schelling 
proves less of an aberration than his reputation has suggested. 
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focus do not preclude a comprehensive interpretation; they instead show a continued 
effort to satisfactorily express his driving convictions.140 
A. Internal Revisions of the Critical Philosophy: In Of the I, Schelling presented 
his work as concerned with refounding, not rejecting or replacing, Kant’s critical 
philosophy.141 The essay presents its scope, limits, and goals following the terms 
established by Kant’s work even while insisting that the coherence of the critical 
philosophy rests on a more robust theory of inner sense than Kant had allowed. Though 
he avoided a return to rational psychology in the form rejected by Kant, Schelling 
nevertheless reopened consideration of the ideas dismissed by the paralogisms and, as a 
result, concepts of God and world. This posed a challenge to the coherence of philosophy 
as Kant conceived it, separated from conflicted and uncertain sciences. By pushing the 
boundaries of pure theoretical philosophy, Schelling attempted to ground the Critique of 
Pure Reason more fully as a philosophical—rather than methodological—position: he 
sought to complete rather than challenge Kant’s basic project.142 
The essay emphasizes inner sense, a focus that transforms the perceived character of 
philosophy even while employing Kantian terminology. Specifically, Of the I departs 
from modern philosophy by presenting the grounding principle of knowledge as 
reflective rather than descriptive. Like the Cartesian Meditations, the text opens by 
seeking one certain point which grounds all other knowledge. Yet rather than adopt 
                                                 
140 This is the view Heidegger adopted in his lecture course on Schelling (Schelling’s Treatise on the 
Essence of Human Freedom. p.6). 
141 This “refounding”, which the German Idealists considered necessary, followed as a response to the 
initial responses to Kant of Schulze, Maimon, and Reinhold (Franks. All or Nothing. esp. pp.258-59). 
142 Franks’ All or Nothing provides a thorough account of how the reception of Kant led to this project; see 
pp.12-83 for an initial summary of the problematic Kant represented for his successors. 
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Cartesian skepticism toward common consciousness, Schelling accepted ordinary 
consciousness as an occasion for reflection rather than a premise requiring verification. 
This standpoint shifts philosophy from skepticism of intuition into a dissection of 
experience that sees ordinary knowing as grounded in a foundational knowing that cannot 
be directly experienced: 
If there is any genuine knowledge at all, there must be knowledge which I do not reach 
by way of some other knowledge, but through which alone all other knowledge is 
knowledge. In order to reach this last statement I do not have to presuppose some 
special kind of knowledge. If we know anything at all, we must be sure of at least one 
item of knowledge which we cannot reach through some other knowledge and which 
contains the real ground of all our knowledge [Of the I. p.71-72 (162-63)].143 
 
Without abandoning the critical project, Schelling uncovered a transcendental element of 
knowledge; even if it cannot be directly experienced, it is central to both Cartesian doubt 
and Kantian critique. In this early essay, Schelling attempted to make this element more 
explicit as a focal point for philosophical reflection. 
Schelling’s characterization of philosophy as a reflective pursuit reveals why he saw 
a need for re-grounding the critical philosophy in an unconditional principle. Kant 
emphasized the synthesis involved in all thought; intellect and intuition, freedom and 
necessity. Conversely, Schelling emphasized the more fundamental unity assumed by 
every such synthesis.144 He argued that the mutually conditioning subject and object, 
which exhaust finite cognition, require the positing of an absolute in order to avoid 
recourse to an infinite regress of causally related finite cognitions. Thus, Of the I presents 
itself as providing a foundation to Kant’s system, even as it exceeds the limits which 
Kant carefully drew. Posited prior to a subject, and thus not a determined object, the 
                                                 
143 In The Unconditional in Human Knowledge. Ed. Fritz Marti. 
144 Schelling. Of the I. p.65, [153-4]. 
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absolute must be viewed according to the model of the subject. This “absolute I” 
precedes all thinking and imagining and, thus, cannot be conditioned by proofs.145 
Schelling argued that the critical philosophy must be based upon this absolute, even 
though it cannot be conceived within Kantian parameters. 
With philosophy unconstrained by direct experience, the fundamental question for 
systematic thought becomes the connection between this absolute and the finite realm of 
direct experience. Schelling characterized the history of philosophy as a series of 
deliberations between the dogmatic and critical approaches to explaining this connection. 
Each attempt privileges either the subjective or the objective component of cognition and 
thus fails to provide the needed perspective: 
Only through an absolute I, only through the fact that it is posited absolutely does it 
become possible that a not-I appears to contrast it, indeed that philosophy itself 
becomes possible. For the whole task of theoretical and practical philosophy is nothing 
else than the solution of the contradiction between the pure and the empirically 
conditioned I [Of the I. p.81, (176)]. 
 
Philosophy cannot be simply a method of pure reason as it must continually synthesize 
and transition between the abstract and concrete, general and specific, the necessary and 
the free. Nevertheless, Schelling presented his argument as a recontextualization, rather 
than radical revision, of the critical philosophy. 
The essay defines a philosophical need that it does not fully satisfy as significant 
ambiguities remain in Schelling’s conception of the absolute. The early works could not 
deliver fully on their promise because, while pushing beyond the confines of the critical 
philosophy, Schelling attempted to remain as much within that system as possible. The 
different descriptions of the absolute discernible in the seventh, eighth, and ninth sections 
                                                 
145 Schelling. Of the I. p.74-6, [167-9]. 
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of the essay show the underdevelopment of the concept. First, the I takes the form of 
identity.146 Second, Schelling insists that “the I can be determined in no way except by 
being unconditional.”147 Third, the I must be a simple unity.148 These three descriptive 
conditions, including “unconditional,” are not inherently contradictory as an internal, 
spontaneous principle of unity could be considered “unconditioned” from its own 
perspective even as philosophical reflection grasps the principle as conditioned. They are, 
however, unfocused and reveal complexity to the rational knower unnoticed by Kant and 
insufficiently acknowledged in Schelling’s early work. 
Due to this ambiguity, the “absolute I” of this essay proves easily confused with the 
pre-critical rational theology. The tenth section of the essay presents the absolute I as “the 
generic concept of all reality.”149 This suggests a mystical goal difficult to accept in post-
Enlightenment philosophy: “The ultimate goal of the finite I is therefore an expansion 
toward identity with the nonfinite.”150 The text itself does not identify this absolute I with 
the concept of God though the association proves difficult to avoid.151 Schelling’s 
                                                 
146 Schelling, Of the I. p.82, [177]. 
147 Of the I. p.83. Schelling stated the same point, alternately, as “the pure I must be determined in freedom 
(p.85).” The subjective/objective framework for consciousness forces such awkward locutions. This 
framework, especially as received through the Cartesian influence on modern thought, encourages views of 
the self limited to a theoretical knower since the framework is poorly suited to the other possibilities of 
self-consciousness. 
148 Schelling, Of the I. p.86, [182]. 
149 Of the I. p.89. If the I contains all reality then it “must be absolutely nonfinite (p.93),” and all reality 
must be a quality, or accident, and the I “must posit everything in itself, that is, posit as equal to the I 
(p.95).” Such an “I” resembles the presentation of God in Leibniz’s Monadology, §§38—47 (p.218—19). 
150 Of the I. p.99. 
151 Schelling’s reasoning for maintaining a distinction between the Absolute and God in this early view 
rests on categorizing God as an epistemic object only: “Yet in his early writings Schelling was concerned 
not to identify the Absolute Self with God. He pointed out that God to us is an object of knowledge, and 
that any object, simply by virtue of being known, presupposes a knower outside of itself. Therefore the 
object (the known) is determined by the subject (the knower), and cannot be the Absolute (Sedlar. India in 
the Mind of Germany. pp.64-65).” If a religious (rather than dogmatic theology) conception of God is 
assumed, this distinction unravels. 
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argument approaches the Absolute I as a totality of Being, a sort of Spinozistic substance 
underlying the attributes of thought and extension, or a Leibnizian simple substance 
manifest in each monad of which the universe consists. By connecting self-consciousness 
to an ultimate principle, Schelling seemed to re-commit philosophy to theological ends 
that far exceed the capability of pure reason. While Of the I presented a conception of 
philosophy which departed from that of the critical philosophy, Schelling failed to realize 
that vision satisfactorily. 
B. The Transition from Theoretical to Practical Philosophy: The importance of 
the self for Schelling forced him to reconsider the division between philosophical loci—
theoretical and moral—within the critical philosophy. In The Philosophical Letters on 
Dogmatism and Criticism, also published in 1795, Schelling’s focus shifted to the 
collective system formed by Kant’s three Critiques. Where Of the I perfunctorily 
dismissed Kant’s practical philosophy,152 the Philosophical Letters emphasized the 
importance of the second and third Critiques to the coherence of the critical project. The 
Letters presented the division between theoretical and practical philosophical loci not as 
an actual difference, but merely as a pedagogical necessity. Thus, post-critical 
philosophers cannot maintain Kant’s thorough split of practical and theoretical 
philosophy (and, in light of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, philosophy 
and religion).153 
                                                 
152 In that essay, Schelling presented the moral portion of critical philosophy as an inessential afterthought: 
“[…] it seems to be a mere annex to his philosophy as a whole and, what is more, an annex wide open to 
attacks from the main building (Of the I. p.66, [154]).” 
153 Theodore George identifies Schelling’s Letters as an “extended and quite caustic polemic against his 
mentors and teachers in the theological seminary at Tübingen (“A Monstrous Absolute.” p.137).” Nauen 
also addresses Schelling’s specific critical targets (Revolution, Idealism, and Human Freedom. pp.1-26, 27-
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The Kantian conception of God, according to Schelling, exposes the impossibility of 
a pure theoretical philosophy maintained in independence of moral philosophy. The 
Letters open by dismissing Kant’s conception of God as a moral postulate154 and argue 
that God cannot only be a moral postulate: 
[T]he deity cannot be affected by the weakness of your reason; though you could arrive 
at the deity only through the moral law, this is not in turn the yardstick by which the 
deity is to be measured […]. In short, as long as the steps of your philosophy progress, 
I’ll grant you all you say; but don’t be astonished, my dear friend, if, on my way back, 
retracing the steps I took with you, I destroy all that you have just laboriously erected 
[Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. p.160].155 
 
So long as God remains only a postulate of practical reason, a new dogmatism can arise 
that will be secure from reason.156 Kant’s conception of God proves untenable: the 
interpretation of individual action requires a connection between specific ethical actions 
and universal theoretical knowledge. In Schelling’s estimation, neither the second nor the 
third Critiques can alleviate the tension inherent in the assumption of a purely moral God. 
Kant’s critical philosophy possesses the apparent capacity to delineate a faculty of 
pure reason, a result that stems from his narrow and limited focus on the rational faculty 
rather than the entire, or even fundamental, person. This constrained focus proves 
impossible to maintain, as the Second Letter argues: 
[T]he fight against dogmatism is waged with weak weapons if criticism rests its whole 
system merely upon the state of our cognitive faculty, and not upon our genuine 
essence. […] For if it is not my essence which forbids me to admit of an absolute 
                                                                                                                                                 
49, esp. 26 and 32). Presently, the specific target of criticism proves unimportant as perceptions of Kant’s 
arguments (as well as German Idealism generally) have long been entwined with the general reception of 
his work: this study criticizes the perceived antagonism between religious and philosophical theory codified 
in Kant’s work, a point which Kant’s critical commentators have largely accepted. 
154 Schelling. “Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism.” In The Unconditional in Human 
Knowledge. p.156-7. 
155 All citations refer to translation published in Marti. The Unconditional in Human Knowledge. 
156 Düsing. “The Reception of Kant’s Doctrine of Postulates in Schelling’s and Hegel’s Early Philosophical 
Projects.” pp.204-15, esp. 205. 
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objectivity, if it is only the weakness of reason which hinders my transition to an 
absolutely objective world, then you may still set up your resulting system of weak 
reason; but you must not credit yourself with having set up laws for the objective world 
itself. A breath of dogmatism would overthrow your house of cards [Philosophical 
Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. p.161]. 
 
Assuming that pure rationality does not define a person exhaustively, Kant’s 
proscriptions regarding “pure reason” prove inconclusive for the possibilities of human 
thought. Specifically, “reason” does not constitute the foundational essence of the human 
person, so it cannot dictate strict proscriptions in the sense done by Kant’s critical 
philosophy. The critique of Wolffian rational psychology does not apply properly to all 
philosophical psychology, as Schelling frames critique as a method rather than a doctrine. 
The Fourth Letter develops this argument by noting that the first Critique cannot 
accomplish its goals by itself since the cognitive faculty—the domain of synthesis 
between the subjective and objective—cannot dismiss dogmatism without also 
establishing an original or terminal end of the synthesis: 
One of the two must come to pass. Either no subject and an absolute object, or not [sic] 
object and an absolute subject. […] Theoretical reason necessarily seeks what is not 
conditioned; having formed the idea of the unconditioned, and, as theoretical reason, 
being unable to realize the unconditioned, it therefore demands the act through which it 
ought to be realized [Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. p.167]. 
 
Accepting Kant’s presentation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a universal 
methodology, Schelling insisted that such an analytic method raises, rather than answers, 
philosophical problems. The Fifth Letter concludes this point by arguing that a science of 
knowledge itself cannot provide an absolute principle that founds a true system: such a 
principle must be realized productively. 
Like Of the I, the Philosophical Letters present the basic problem of philosophy as 
the egress of finite existence from the absolute. The Letters also characterize the history 
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of philosophy as the dogmatic and critical attempts to answer the question of how this 
egress is possible,157 and the Seventh Letter repeats the argument from Of the I that each 
approach fails to achieve this end: 
Philosophy cannot make a transition from the nonfinite to the finite, but it can make one 
from the finite to the nonfinite. […] the finite itself must have a tendency towards the 
non-finite, a perpetual striving to lose itself in the nonfinite [Philosophical Letters on 
Dogmatism and Criticism. p.178]. 
 
The Eighth and Ninth Letters conclude this portion of the text by arguing that all 
dogmatic and critical positions share this fanatical spirit of utopianisms (Schwärmerei): 
the delusion of the annihilation of the self which still thinks of itself as existing. The 
critical philosophy provides only a method shared by each approach, not an answer to the 
problems it poses. Thus, Schelling argued, Kant’s conclusions ought not to limit 
conceptions of philosophical possibilities.158 
C. Schelling’s Letters and Reinhold: The far ranging concerns of Schelling’s 
Letters—including ethics, aesthetics, religious enthusiasm, and the cognitive faculty—
suggest that a narrow focus on his philosophical anthropology might misrepresent the 
text. However, these various topics coalesce into a coherent text when viewed as 
                                                 
157 Schelling. Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. p.164, [294]. The Letters treat this topic 
twice. The Third Letter presents both dogmatism and criticism as simply alternative philosophical 
perspectives, claiming that Kant established, rather than dismissed, these opposing options by critiquing the 
cognitive faculty alone. The Sixth Letter presents dogmatism and criticism as foils rather than as opponents, 
equally incapable of solving this problem. Unable to address this issue, they prove distinct only in the realm 
of productive reason. 
158 The Tenth Letter considered Greek tragedy as a model for overcoming the objective threat of 
annihilation of the self. It deserves brief mention as its explicit turn to aesthetics has led some scholars (as 
George’s “A Monstrous Absolute” illustrates) to over-emphasize its significance as an acknowledgment of 
the “end of traditional philosophy” and the anticipation of the “poetic turn.” While distinctive, the aesthetic 
end of Schelling’s early philosophical system relies on, and should not distract from, his critique of the 
critical philosophy on decidedly theoretical grounds. Even George downplays the distinct aesthetic 
conclusions he emphasized: “After all, even if poetic art might provide an essential resource for 
philosophy, this does not mean that philosophical thought could ever exhaust the potential of poetry 
(p.145).” 
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contributions to Schelling’s critique of Kantian anthropology. The interpretation of the 
text through its concern for developing an integrated view of the self, as both the knower 
and moral agent, helps to clarify the core of Schelling’s critique of Kant: the absolute 
division of theoretical philosophy from practical philosophy cannot be maintained 
philosophically. Philosophy requires an essentially unified and more vigorous theoretical 
view of the self than Kant allowed. 
The distinct importance of the self in Schelling’s Letters can be established through a 
comparison with Reinhold’s Letters on the Kantian Philosophy. In addition to genre,159 
the texts share several thematic concerns: each presents Kant’s moral postulation of God 
as central to his system, interprets the critical philosophy in relation to the cultural 
religious practice, and focuses on the entire critical philosophy rather than the individual 
Critiques. These similarities show that each author had a similar conceptual project 
driving their works: holistically interpreting the critical philosophy as socially livable. 
This shared concern underscores the significant difference in each author’s approach to 
inner sense and the role of rational psychology in philosophy. 
Each author viewed Kant’s conception of God as a moral postulate as centrally 
important for the coherence of the critical philosophy.160 While Schelling immediately 
                                                 
159 Notable examples of this stylistic approach include Schiller’s Aesthetical Education of Man, Jacobi’s 
Letters on the Teachings of Spinoza, Schleiermacher’s On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultural Despisers, and 
Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther. This short list demonstrates both the popularity and versatility of the 
genre. While genre alone does not justify a comparison between two texts, important similarities do follow 
from the philosophical use of such an approach. The presumption of writing letters makes a philosopher 
more conscientious about their audience than otherwise may be the norm and pushes authors to address 
their argumentative motivation more explicitly and directly. Additionally, as the “correspondent” remains 
anonymous and silent in these publications, this genre tends to downplay the philosophical trend toward 
technical obscurity. 
160 Despite the significant effort Kant expended on this theme, many have dismissed Kant’s philosophy of 
religion as insincere, systematically unimportant, or such a failure as to deserve little attention. Such 
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dismissed Kant’s moral postulate, Reinhold accepted the moral proof as a major 
philosophical accomplishment: 
The question, What role does reason have in our conviction in God’s existence?, thus 
divides into two other questions that are provoked by the needs of our age, namely: 
Does Reason contain apodictic proofs for God’s existence—proofs that make all faith 
dispensable? and, Can there be a faith in God’s existence that requires no grounds of 
reason? The Critique of Pure Reason answers both questions negatively. Just as it 
demonstrates from the essence of speculative reason the impossibility of all apodictic 
proofs, it demonstrates from the essence of practical reason the necessity of a moral 
faith in God’s existence [Letters on the Kantian Philosophy. p.20]. 
 
Reinhold presented the characterization of religion as a moral concern as the goal, rather 
than the consequence, of Kant’s first critique. Humanity has a fundamental interest in 
theological questions, an inclination that justifies interpretations of the critical philosophy 
that focus on the moral god: 
The all-important and ever-active interest that humanity takes in a conviction regarding 
God’s existence […] makes all indifference impossible here and transforms that doubt 
into the following specific question: Is a universally satisfying answer to the question of 
God’s existence possible? […] And since we cannot remain at a standstill, we must take 
the path before us—which is to say, we must solve the problem [Letters on the Kantian 
Philosophy. p.10-11]. 
 
By judging the value of the critical philosophy based on its ability to satisfactorily 
conceptualize and understand God,161 Reinhold adopted a similar concern as Schelling. 
Despite the claims of the Critique of Pure Reason, theoretical reasoning cannot be kept 
independent of the moral postulation of God as their mutual interests are too entangled. 
This view forced each author to abandon the position of “pure reason” in favor of a 
holistic account of experience. This obvious consequence led both Schelling and 
                                                                                                                                                 
arguments often use the anecdote of Lampe’s God in order to characterize the moral postulation of God as 
foreign to the rest of his thought (See, for example: Heine. Religion and Philosophy in Germany. p.119). 
Neither Reinhold nor Schelling considered the moral postulation of God to be such an avoidable aspect of 
the critical philosophy. 
161 Schelling. Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. p.160. 
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Reinhold to revise Kant’s position by emphasizing its relation to religious Schwärmerei. 
While Schelling arrived at this point mid-text, Reinhold opened with the concerns 
religious factions have in the outcomes of philosophical debates: 
If the phenomena that you, my friend, have arranged together in your portrait actually 
share a common ground, then this ground is none other than the old and still persistent 
misunderstanding, which today is more lively—or rather, more visible—than ever 
before, regarding the right and power of reason in matters of religion. […] the disputing 
factions are latching directly onto reason itself, which they elevate or degrade 
depending on whether or not they believe they have cause to be satisfied with its 
decisions [Letters on the Kantian Philosophy. p.5]. 
 
This shared concern, among various religious factions, with reason renders the separation 
of critical philosophy from religious entanglements inherently impossible (and the 
delineation of a religion within mere reason likewise problematic). The success of the 
first Critique rests, in Reinhold’s interpretation, with its usefulness for addressing 
religious factions and arbitrating conflicts. Schelling instead saw the critical philosophy’s 
tendency to drift toward the self-renunciation of Schwärmerei as illustrating the inability 
of philosophy to solve its own problems.162 Each author disagreed on the value of Kant’s 
work relative to religious enthusiasm, nevertheless they both assess the critical 
philosophy through its relation to social religious concerns. 
As such, both authors concentrated their interpretations on the comprehensive system 
of the critical philosophy rather than on the isolated, specific foci of each individual 
Critique. As the summary of Schelling’s early works above clarifies, he judged Kant’s 
moral ideas according to their aesthetic implications, and Kant’s theoretical philosophy in 
light of its repercussions in each context. While Schelling had access to all three critical 
works, Reinhold had to speculate how Kant would apply the Critique of Pure Reason. He 
                                                 
162 Schelling. Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. p.186 [327]. 
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successfully anticipated Kant’s practical philosophy before it was published. This was 
possible because he approached the critical philosophy with concerns similar to those of 
Kant, at least relative to religion.163 Both Schelling and Reinhold, despite unequal access 
to Kant’s full system, agreed that moral and theoretical philosophy cannot be drastically 
distinguished, with each re-interpreting Kant’s views relative to the person, rather than 
the rational faculty alone. 
Reinhold’s defense of Kant’s moral religion rests on his key disagreement with 
Schelling. Reinhold rejected any rational psychological grounding of religious theory and 
presented moral religion as the only coherent way to speak of the rational soul: 
Yet [the psychological concept of reason] contradicts itself as soon as its meaning 
extends beyond the distinction between soul and body that arises in experience and that 
no materialist can rationalize away. It contradicts itself as soon as it is supposed to 
express more than the mere difference between predicates of inner and outer sense, or 
as soon as it is supposed to express the absolute subject of our thinking I, the genuine 
and incomprehensible essence of our soul [Letters on the Kantian Philosophy. p.78-79]. 
 
Reinhold defended Kant’s critical position, as laid out in the paralogisms of pure reason, 
by surveying the history of philosophy164 to support the conclusion that there can be no 
rational account of the knower besides an account of the knowing faculty. Schelling did 
not seem aware that a full account of the reasoning subject required a rejection, rather 
than revision, of the critical philosophy. He accepted Reinhold’s holistic presentation of 
the critical philosophy as the necessary standpoint for appraising Kantian thought, but he 
insisted that the center of this holistic interpretation is the soul. The concerns of faith, 
                                                 
163 Breazeale. “Between Kant and Fichte.” p.787 n5; Reinhold developed and switched his philosophical 
views, eventually leading Kant to note the significant gulf between their projects (p.789-90 n12). 
164 This spreads across the sixth, seventh, and eight letters. His understanding of history of philosophy 
through the paralogisms suggests an overly “common sense” view of Kant’s critique of rational 
psychology. That is, he emphasizes seemingly sensible aspects of the critique rather than an intelligible 
comprehensive view. 
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moral religion, and the practical postulates of God and soul strain, rather than strengthen, 
the critical philosophy. Schelling failed to note, in these early writings, the radical 
revisions necessitated by expanding philosophical anthropology. Reinhold’s fidelity to 
Kant emphasizes the significance of Schelling’s account of the knower. 
D. The Seeming Common Sense of the Critical Philosophy: However, Schelling’s 
motivation for reconsidering rational psychology and, by extension, the basic character of 
philosophy is unclear. Since Kant sidestepped intractable and unfruitful philosophical 
problems by dismissing rational psychology, an explicit motivation to undermine his 
argument must be identified if this development is to be justified. So long as the critique 
of reason can be accomplished without a vigorous account of the agent who employs the 
faculty of reason, the limitations of viewing the self as primarily rational appear 
irrelevant. In fact, the division between the rational knower and moral actor at the center 
of Kant’s philosophical anthropology seems so intuitive that any alternative, at least 
within a generally Kantian framework, initially will seem like a regressive move. 
The appeal of dividing theoretical reason from practical reason rests on, in part, the 
common sense position that thinking and acting operate according to distinct rules. The 
schematic division of direct, empirically determined experience from transcendent, free 
experience helps to manage the complex categories needed to interpret daily experience: 
the necessary and the free, the concrete and the abstract, the possible and the desirable, 
etc. These distinctions clarify what can be expected of others, what is reasonable to 
desire, and how to measure intangible goals. The oppositions drawn between the 
phenomenal and noumenal, or theoretical and practical reason, also encourage a degree of 
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honesty in speculative theories and dispassionate judgments regarding the myriad of 
issues stemming from theoretical cognition within society. Such divisions clearly serve 
important functions, though such utility can establish neither Kant’s particular limits of 
rationality (and by extension, religion), nor their inviolability. 
While instinctive, a strict differentiation of theoretical and practical philosophy leads 
to counterintuitive results. A distinct thinking and acting agent within a single individual 
proves to be an untenable theoretical framework; the more forcefully the division is 
drawn, the stronger the need for the theory to connect the two principles. This connection 
is as instinctive as the distinction: actions are directed by theories and theories are formed 
by actions. Experiences are shaped by thoughts which transcend the very limits of 
possibility we impose on experience.165 In this light, no perspective from within human 
experience qualifies as either pure—synthetic a priori judgments based upon the 
possibility of experience—or as exclusively noumenal. Direct experience, reflective 
consciousness, and purely speculative ideas all exist simultaneously within the act of 
consciousness before philosophical reflection can describe their relation. Splitting these 
components of human thought and experience serves to clarify what they are, but at the 
cost of separating theory from what it is meant to describe and inform. 
Schelling’s full effort to reestablish the critical philosophy as a true system must not 
distract from the present point that internal limitations leave Kant’s restrictions of reason 
                                                 
165 A similar point can be made by challenging the Kantian conception of experience: “The difference 
between Schelling and Kant lies in Kant’s inclination to see the genuine natural science in physics alone, 
and to consider the undeniable purposiveness of organisms not as necessarily inherent in nature […]. Even 
for young Schelling, nature is alive. Later […] he wrote in the Critical Fragments of 1806: ‘Kant says we 
know nothing but what is in experience. Very true; but that which really is in experience is what is living, 
the eternal, or God (Marti. “Young Schelling and Kant.” p.478).” 
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and religion open to debate. Schelling’s Letters and Of the I together identify a central 
interpretive problem with the critical philosophy, though with different foci which 
obscured their shared assumptions.166 As each work rests on the other without properly 
establishing the other, Of the I and the Letters need a systematic restatement to properly 
present their implicit philosophical perspective. While the Philosophical Letters assume 
that an account of the self is possible in order to ground its broad range of concerns, their 
broad concerns provide the needed context for the transcendental psychology of Of the I. 
The Letters emphasize the problematic inconsistency which the critical philosophy’s 
division of theoretical and practical reason demands of the philosopher: 
Further, the positing of a moral god cannot fail to influence theoretical reason: You may 
give me a thousand demands for it on behalf of an absolute causality outside of myself, 
and a thousand demands for it on behalf of an intensified practical reason, yet I shall 
never be able to believe in it as long as my theoretical reason remains the same! My 
capacity even to assume an absolute object would presuppose that I had first abolished 
myself as a believing subject [Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. 
p.159]!167 
 
Kant’s denial of any knowable continuity between theoretical and practical reasoning 
necessitates a strict division between “pure” reason and ordinary experience. The facts of 
human experience, however, show that there must be an accessible I that transcends the 
boundaries of theoretical reason as defined by Kant.168 
                                                 
166 Ford suggests that in addition to being composed at nearly the same time, each text also reveal a shared 
indebtedness to Jacobi as well as Fichte (“The Controversy Between Schelling and Jacobi,” p.80). 
167 Of the I likewise criticizes Kant’s division of theory and practice: “Give man the awareness of what he 
is and he will soon learn to be what he ought to be. Give him the theoretical self-respect and the practical 
will soon follow (p.67, [156]).” 
168 Kant admitted this in the closing sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, though he 
insisted that this merely means the ‘I’ lies beyond the perspective of pure reason. Such an admission may 
preserve the critical philosophy as a viable framework in light of the idealist critiques it attracted, but only 
by making the critical philosophy largely useless as it can only operate in isolation from human experience. 
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Neither Of the I nor the Letters provide a satisfactory alternative to the Kantian view 
of the person. Each text argues against a fundamentally divided account of the thinking 
and willing agent, yet each text accepts the Kantian synthesis of intuition and intellection 
as a model for the subject. This undermines the radical implications of these works, a 
problem best illustrated by Of the I; the introduction established that the impetus for the 
work was Kant and that the essay’s success is measured against the first Critique: 
I have tried to depict the results of the critical philosophy in its regression to the last 
principles of all knowledge. […] What I hope for my essay is precisely such a test of 
the principles here elaborated. I cannot expect this testing from any readers who are 
indifferent to all truth, nor from those who presume that no new investigation of 
principles can be possible after Kant and think that the highest principles of his 
philosophy have already been established by him [Of the I. p.64 (152-53)]. 
 
Of the I shows that the limits drawn by the first critique are malleable, but it accepts a 
general Kantian outline of philosophy. Schelling ignored the far reaching consequences 
of his critique and maintained the isolation of reason from human actions and living. 
Of the I anticipated the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, as the internal 
problems of Kant’s thought forced Schelling to more robustly reconsider the foundations 
of philosophy. Specifically, Schelling grew increasingly aware of the much more 
complicated philosophical project that followed his complex understanding of the 
subject. One commentator noted that: 
[…] having shown to his satisfaction that the Kantian Enlightenment is grounded in the 
unconditioned spontaneous activity of the Absolute I, Schelling saw philosophy’s next 
goal as trying to answer the question of how and why this process of self-limitation 
took place in the way it did. The kind of theorizing that Schelling developed in order to 
answer these questions was unique in the history of Western thought [Linker. “From 
Kant to Schelling. p.359]. 
 
These early works did not present a philosophical standpoint which could be judged to be 
sufficiently distinct from that of Kant. Collectively, however, they did point forward to a 
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view capable of realizing how the limitations of both reason and the non-rational could be 
reconsidered as actions of the self. 
Schelling’s critique of Kant centers on the concept of an absolute that, in radical 
freedom, determines the finite. This Absolute differs from, but bears some likeness to, the 
concept of God which Kant dismissed in the Transcendental Dialectic. Schelling 
explicitly distinguished the absolute I from God, though the similarity is both obvious 
and hard to overlook.169 He insisted that the absolute is an essential concern for 
philosophy, for “as soon as philosophy begins to be a science, it must at least assume an 
ultimate principle and, with it, something unconditional.”170 Schelling re-imagined the 
Ideal of pure reason as an absolute I, a somewhat more palatable idea for Kantian 
epistemology than a mythic deity as it prioritized rational knowing. Schelling rejected a 
medieval “chain of being”, as the way to conceptualize the totality of possibility: 
I have in mind a chain of knowledge that is conditioned throughout and attains stability 
only in one supreme, unconditioned point. […] Thus the very concepts of subject and 
object are guarantors of the absolute, unconditionable I [Of the I. p.77, [170]]. 
 
Even while pushing well past the boundaries Kant drew, Schelling followed Kant’s 
framework and took knowing for the primary human action. The use of Kantian 
terminology and schematics served the argument poorly as Schelling did not attempt to 
revive the rational psychology which Kant rejected, despite appearances of as much. He 
did continue to interpret experience exclusively through the knowing self, even while 
inchoately sketching a new approach. 
                                                 
169 He insisted that the unconditioned is no more a genus than it is an individual or a species; that is, he uses 
a sort of via negativa to delineate the concept (with a locution that suggests St. Thomas Aquinas) (Of the I. 
p.73 [164]; see also translator’s note 13, p.131). 
170 Schelling. Of the I. p.73, [164]. 
115 
 
 
While seeking ways to use the concepts of pure reason meaningfully, Schelling was 
unable to redefine them sufficiently so as to avoid the criticisms of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. He merely showed how those criticisms were unsatisfactory when pushed, even 
within the system of critical philosophy. Even though they were at best partial successes, 
these early works provide important context for understanding the 1800 System, a text 
that encapsulates his earlier work and lays the groundwork for his mature perspective and 
interests. Schelling, following Fichte, transformed the Kantian conception of philosophy 
in Of the I which 
[…] closely follows Fichte in claiming that Kant’s question, “how are synthetic a priori 
judgments possible?.” Leads to the question: “how did the I come to take leave of itself 
in order to stand in opposition to a Not-I” The epistemological problem concerning the 
possibility of a priori knowledge has definitely evolved into a metaphysical problem 
that has its own metaphysical solution [Grondin. “The A Priori from Kant to Hegel.” 
p.211]. 
 
That is, he saw that philosophy cannot be confined in the manner Kant had proposed. 
These early works show Schelling struggling to realize just how radical this realization 
was. Nevertheless, they establish the promise of a reflective philosophical position that, 
potentially, can rival the seeming common sense of Kant’s work without requiring a 
counterproductive division of the subject. 
E. The Move towards Systemization: The 1797 Treatise Explicatory of the 
Idealism in the Science of Knowledge—Schelling’s first attempt to systematize his 
idealist work—opens by reiterating the now familiar contention that both theoretical and 
practical knowledge are deficient apart from the unified personality.171 The Treatise 
                                                 
171 This personality must involve both practical and theoretical perspectives, for “the center or core of 
human fortitude can be found only where all the forces of man converge (Schelling. Treatise Explicatory. 
p.63 (1,346)).” 
116 
 
 
departs from earlier works by emphasizing the faculty of representation and reworking 
the 1795 criticisms with a clearer conception of the I and its function. In the essay, 
transcendental psychology is grounded in the inability of intuition to explain the 
distinction between object and representation. Knowledge requires an immediate 
correspondence of object and representation, which “is the ‘I’ within us.”172 Clearly 
Schelling already had begun to look at the critical philosophy as an exhausted possibility 
for developing and articulating his own perspective. 
This transcendental psychology manages to avoid repeating rational psychology as it 
largely reinterprets the critical activity of uncovering the necessary structures of thought. 
The self, following Schelling’s reinterpretation, plays an active role in articulating the a 
priori rules which thought must follow.173 This emphasis on representation—the activity 
of the I—stresses the distinction between ordinary and philosophical perspectives. 
Philosophical possibilities cannot be determined exclusively by ordinary experience; a 
dialectic is necessary if theory is to address rather than simply continue experience. 
Ordinarily, concepts appear to be derived from intuition, but representation detects no 
original difference between ideal concepts and real intuitions.174 The distinction between 
internal and external, the same in representation, must be actively made in order for 
ordinary consciousness to become possible. Thus the philosophical perspective, amid its 
critical work, cannot abandon the idea of a subject aware of itself as self-limiting.  
                                                 
172 Schelling. Treatise Explicatory. p.76-8 (1,364—1,366). 
173 “It is through the free repetition of the original mode of activity—that is, intuition—of the spirit, namely 
in abstraction, that concepts originate. (Schelling. Treatise Explicatory. p.81 (1,370-1)).” 
174 Schelling. Treatise Explicatory. p.82-3 (1,372-3). 
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Schelling’s 1797 Treatise moved toward the more comprehensive, lengthy history of 
consciousness developed in the System of Transcendental Idealism. The I, assumed in all 
thinking, grounds both intuition and intellection as the inner sense becomes outer sense 
through an act of self-limitation.175 Schelling presents this as more fundamental than 
Kant’s a priori view of consciousness as he moved further away from viewing the human 
person as fundamentally rational. Of the I lacked this realization that thought must not be 
taken as primordial, while the Letters failed to ground the more nuanced and free self 
which they intimated. In the Treatise Explicatory, Schelling clarified that both theoretical 
and practical philosophy must be founded in a higher philosophy which is not strictly 
rational: “Now that alone which surpasses all our cognition is our faculty of 
transcendental freedom of the will.”176 The limitation of the cognizant I may be described 
rationally, but the original desire and movement itself cannot be rational. 
 
II. System of Transcendental Idealism 
 
The 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism presents Schelling’s early thought in its 
fullest, most systematic form. It is a key text for understanding the continuity of 
Schelling’s thought, though it delineated an ultimately uneasy and untenable position. 
The System proves especially important to understanding his later works by revealing the 
problems which followed from Schelling’s hesitancy to abandon fundamentally Kantian 
positions. Like the title of the work itself, Schelling’s espoused intention to explicate all 
philosophical knowledge echoes the Critique of Pure Reason: 
                                                 
175 Schelling. Treatise Explicatory. p.85-8 (1,375-80). 
176 Schelling. Treatise Explicatory. p.101 (1,399-400). 
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Now the purpose of the present work is simply this, to enlarge transcendental idealism 
into what it really should be, namely a system of all knowledge. The aim, then, is to 
provide proof of the system […] through the real extension of its principles to all 
possible problems in regard to the main objects of knowledge, whether these have 
already been raised earlier, but not resolved, or have only now been rendered possible 
and have newly come into existence through the system itself [System of 
Transcendental Idealism. p.1-2]. 
 
Like he did with Of the I and the Philosophical Letters, Schelling presented this work 
primarily as “elevating” Kantian philosophy, even while he introduced dramatic 
alteration and stretched its boundaries. The view of philosophy as a history of self 
consciousness pushes the limits of the critical philosophy while still viewing the self-
conscious ‘I’ as fundamentally a rational knower. 
The text retains the Kantian three-fold structure of philosophy—theoretical reason, 
practical reason, and the faculty of judgment—but Schelling modified this into a fourfold 
division by subdividing the faculty of judgment between teleology and aesthetic 
activity.177 This division primarily serves as support of Schelling’s emphasis on art as the 
culmination of philosophy while otherwise keeping the basic structure of the critical 
philosophy intact. While considering the entire text, the following survey focuses 
primarily on the divisions of the text dedicated to theoretical philosophy. The remaining 
three major divisions attract less attention as the text’s account of consciousness is the 
main interest for the present study. 
A. Theoretical Philosophy: The first major division of the text—On the Principle of 
Transcendental Idealism—insists that knowledge requires a “knowing of knowing”, since 
                                                 
177 The 1800 System articulates a version of the critical philosophy which does not rest on a fundamentally 
divided human person: “Schelling’s actual goal lies elsewhere. The question with which transcendental 
philosophy begins is not the place of truth in human existence, but rather how to present knowledge, relate 
ourselves to knowing in such a way that knowledge is ours, at one with that part of ourselves that is clarity 
(Dodd, James. “Philosophy and Art in Schelling’s ‘System des transzendentalen Idealismus.’” p.56).” 
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“what had hitherto been regarded as philosophy is possible only as a science of 
knowledge, and has knowledge, not being as its object.”178 Schelling added two 
qualifications, namely that this principle of knowing is conceptual rather than actual and 
that it is a limiting principle. Schelling followed Kant in emphasizing the rational knower, 
but he departed from the critical philosophy by taking thought as an object for reflection 
independent of intuition. Despite this fundamental shift, he continued to view philosophy 
as a science: 
This new circle, that the science of knowledge is at once the foundation of logic, and 
yet has to be brought about in accordance with logical laws, is to be accounted for on 
the same lines as that exhibited earlier. Since, in the highest principles of knowledge, 
form and content are conditioned by each other, the science of knowledge must be at 
once the law and the most perfect embodiment of scientific form, and be absolutely 
autonomous in both form and content alike [System of Transcendental Idealism. p.21]. 
 
Due to this circularity, the desired principle—the sole ground of all knowledge—must be 
the possibility of mediated knowledge which combines the subjective and objective. This 
principle, in turn, must be contained within the ken of knowledge.179 As only reflective 
thought can explore such a principle, the task and tools of philosophy necessarily exceed 
the simple description of experience. 
Since knowledge of this principle requires that the identity of form and content 
obtain in the knowing self, philosophy must regard the self as an act. This act of self-
consciousness is primarily an epistemic act through which “the self becomes an object to 
itself,”180 though this necessitates a more vigorous view of the self than Kantian 
philosophy allows. Schelling’s “self” exceeds the acting and thinking of experience: 
                                                 
178 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.19. 
179 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.15. 
180 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.36. 
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transcendental philosophy explores the original act of the self, not the self that we are 
aware of at any given point. Understanding self as an act allowed Schelling to maintain 
the Kantian division of theoretical and practical philosophy without accepting a total split 
of the person between these spheres.181 Both theoretical and practical philosophical tasks 
arise from the act of self-limitation: the self is both limited and not limited.182 
The longest single section of the text presents three “epochs” which constitute the 
“history” of this active construction of consciousness. If philosophy can justify its claim 
to be universal, it cannot be restricted to ordinary consciousness with its irreducible 
variations. Instead, it must admit that any philosophical structuring of thought constitutes 
a distinct, derivative sort of thinking. The epochs are a re-creation of the original 
consciousness as philosophical reflection only can be conducted after the full initial 
course of consciousness has been run.183 The epochs trace the path to self consciousness 
from original sensation to productive intuition, from there to reflection, and from 
reflection to the absolute act of will. This involves imitating the immediate process of self 
consciousness as a series of distinguishable acts sifted out from their immediate unity. 
                                                 
181 “If, therefore, the system of philosophy itself divides into theoretical and practical, there must be a 
general proof that already in its origin and virtue of its concept, the self cannot be a restricted (albeit free) 
activity without being at the same time an unrestricted one and vice versa (Schelling. System of 
Transcendental Idealism. p.35.)” 
182 The General Deduction, Part Two of the text, focuses on the tension between limitation—as 
becoming—and the unlimited self which knows this limitation. This same “limitation” plays a role in 
knowing, as covered in Part One, On the Principle of Transcendental Idealism. The first part of the text 
presented the core idea, and the second part demonstrated the unity of theoretical and practical reasoning. 
183 “Schelling’s discovery of the idea of science as unfolding the objective order of being, which was to 
become so crucial for Hegel, was itself the result of his realization that the self has a history, that it emerges 
[…] from a nature which in independence of the self as its own innermost possibility. The ecstasy of the 
self into the higher life of reason is made possible by the experience of the higher life of the spirit that 
dwells in the heart of nature (Lawrence. “Schelling as Post-Hegelian and Aristotelian.” p.319).” 
121 
 
 
The resulting reflective understanding of consciousness cannot perfectly resemble, nor 
should it, the ordinary experience which it describes. 
As consciousness is an element of the construction of the self, a complete intuition of 
the self proves impossible in any direct manner.184 The epochs trace the evolving 
relationship between various activities within the self, the elements of which must be 
considered individually as, once separated, elements appear that were not initially 
evident. In fact, the contradiction of subjective and objective activities indicates an 
initially unnoticed and unobservable third activity as these two activities do not cancel 
each other out: “no contradiction can survive, unless it be through the very effort to 
maintain or entertain it, by this third factor itself, there comes about a sort of identity, a 
mutual inter-relation of the two opposing elements therein.”185 This third activity allows 
the first and second activities to be seen as unified, a fact disguised by an externalizing 
pre-conscious projection:186 
The reason why the self finds itself limited in this action cannot lie in the present action, 
but rather in one that is past. So the self in present action is limited without its consent, 
but that it finds itself so limited is also the whole of what is contained in sensation, and 
is the condition of all objectivity in knowledge. So in order that the limitation shall 
appear to us as a thing independent of ourselves, provision is made […] that the act 
whereby all limitation is posited, as the condition of all consciousness, does not itself 
come to consciousness [System of Transcendental Idealism. p.58]. 
 
In the original act of consciousness, sensation is experienced as other. The reflective re-
creation of self-consciousness views sensation as a self-limitation. With such shifting 
perspectives, philosophy cannot be limited in the same manner that ordinary 
consciousness can be criticized and schematized. 
                                                 
184 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.52. 
185 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.45. 
186 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.54-5. 
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The third activity, according to Schelling, must explain how the self can 
simultaneously become both sensed as real object and sensing as ideal subject. The 
distinction between the real and the ideal is an internal limitation that the self must 
determine without itself abolishing or engendering it.187 The first epoch ends as it arrives 
at productive intuition, centered on this contradiction: “The self that is elevated in this 
manner to an intelligence is therefore thrown into a perpetual state of expansion and 
contraction; but this state is precisely that of imaging and producing.”188 Two fixed 
forces are necessary to provide this contradiction. Schelling identified the expansive force 
of matter as the first and the restrictive force as the second.189 Schelling presents matter, 
as three dimensional, as constructed in three stages: the expansive and limiting force 
thought of as united, the opposite forces presented “as completely external to each other 
and separated by the boundary,” and the restored unity of the cleaved forces.190 
The second epoch investigates intuition as two activities: inner activity remaining in 
the self, and an outer activity that over-steps the boundary of self.191 This distinction 
undermines the Kantian presentation of consciousness as a synthesis of intuition and 
intellection: from the perspective of ordinary consciousness, the external cannot be 
distinguished in kind from the internal. The self, as Schelling developed the idea, must 
recognize itself in what seems completely other. The first epoch covers the self’s 
                                                 
187 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.61-3. Schelling describes this third, productive activity 
unfolding through five intermediary terms. First, the self intuits itself as limited by overstepping the limit. 
Second, the limit-exceeding activity becomes an object to the self (p.67). Third, something beyond the limit 
appears and explains the limit (p.69) which, fourth, is found to exist absolutely as it is neither in the self nor 
the thing (p.71). Fifth, there is an intuition of the second order, a productive intuiting (p.72). 
188 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.75-6. 
189 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.83. 
190 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.86-8, quote on p.87. 
191 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.97. 
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realization of these dual activities, the second epoch describes the process of the self 
realizing this duality as a productive act—how it becomes an object of its own inner 
sense.192 The boundary between self and thing cannot be ignored and the self cannot 
return to the first epoch: self-awareness depends on this opposition between self and 
thing. The reflective speculation used in transcendental idealism does not ignore the 
limits of thought, as it might seem to from the Kantian perspective, it reinterprets them. 
As the limiting boundary of self and object establishes the self in the present, thus 
preventing a return to a past unity, philosophical self-understanding must be creatively 
produced rather than described or restored. The grounds of the current division of 
intuitive forces lie in the unconscious act of producing rather than in conscious 
thinking.193 Current, ordinary consciousness follows an unconscious fracturing which 
provides a desire to restore a lost unity: 
The self is neither originally productive, nor is it even so by choice. It is a primary 
opposition, whereby the essence and nature of intelligence are constituted. But now the 
self originally is a pure and absolute identity, to which it must constantly seek to return; 
yet the return to this identity is yoked to the original duality, as to a condition never 
wholly overcome [System of Transcendental Idealism. p.113]. 
 
Thus, the self somehow must come to understand how present consciousness already 
involves an overcoming of its limitation as present. The critical philosophy attempted to 
describe philosophical knowing, transcendental idealism shows that such knowing must 
be created.  Rather than return to previous unity, a free producing—reflective 
consciousness—must be reached. If the succession of production is to become an object 
of consciousness, there must be a free limiting which sees present constraints as the result 
                                                 
192 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.100. 
193 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.107. 
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of a previous act.194 While Schelling still expressed his system in Kantian terms, the task 
he gave to philosophy can no longer work within the limits established by Kant’s system. 
The third epoch traces the development of self-consciousness from reflection to the 
absolute act of will. Synthetic acts are no longer possible as the confines of present 
thought have been suspended. Further progress can be made only through abstraction that 
allows producing itself, separate from the product, to become an object of thought. Such 
a separation always will be opposed by judgment, the faculty that forms the schematisms 
by which we recognize objects.195 Thus, empirical abstraction requires a higher schema, 
and a higher order of abstraction: 
Hence transcendental abstraction will also be superseded again by a schematism, which 
in distinction from that deduced earlier we shall term transcendental schematism. The 
empirical schema was explained as the sensorily intuited rule whereby an object can be 
brought forth empirically. The transcendental schema will thus be the sensory intuition 
of the rule whereby an object can be brought forth as such, or transcendentally [System 
of Transcendental Idealism. p.142-43]. 
 
This fluctuation between schematism and abstraction explains how speculation remains 
grounded in the present rules of consciousness, even as it transcends the apparent 
confines of strict experience. Transcendental abstraction is the condition of judgment: 
only through this higher abstraction can the self consider more than the objects of direct 
experience. Nevertheless, this transcendental action can enter consciousness only after 
judgment has shaped the conditions of experience.196 The epochs, then, both retrace the 
development of consciousness and enact self-consciousness for the first time as a proper 
possession of the philosopher. 
                                                 
194 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. pp.130-2. 
195 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. pp.134-7. 
196 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.148-9. 
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The ambiguous primacy of judgment relative to abstraction raises doubt that the 
development of consciousness can be traced effectively through an a priori account of a 
temporal development. In fact, the text fails to clarify how a philosophical account of the 
becoming of consciousness relates to the traditional, apparently a priori work that 
constitutes the philosopher’s more typical focus. While Kant’s a priori treatment of the 
self poses significant problems, Schelling’s immediate effort to understand the self as 
historical failed to fully redress those problems as the 1800 System emphasizes the 
rational self even while presenting the self as volitional act. Schelling’s attempt at a more 
foundational Kantianism exposes the need for an entirely different philosophical 
anthropology. 
B. Practical Philosophy: The epochs are a distinctive feature of the text, though 
they depend on the remainder of the System to accomplish Schelling’s full goal. The view 
of self uncovered through the epochs does not lead to a theory related to consciousness as 
directly experienced. Ordinary consciousness is set decidedly in the present, and a 
reflective perspective cannot unmoor self-consciousness from such limitation directly: 
ordinary thought and philosophical reflection invariably work from different perspectives 
that cannot be ignored when constructing a philosophical system. Schelling’s later works 
turned to alternative methods of understanding how consciousness developed, the System 
struggles precisely because he relied on a thoroughly Kantian approach to develop a 
radically alternative conception of philosophy. 
Having outlined how an acting self can become reflectively aware of itself as acting, 
Schelling turned to describe the experience of free action. As in the critical philosophy, 
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moral philosophy follows the exhaustion of theoretical philosophy and primarily 
investigates the thinkability of moral concepts.197 The explicability of free action rests on 
three moral propositions, according to Schelling, the first of which is that the absolute 
abstraction of theoretical philosophy is possible only as a self-determining act of willing. 
He presented autonomy as a common principle between theoretical and practical 
philosophy, rather than as a suppositional bridge between the two.198 That is, only in 
moral freedom can theoretical philosophy be developed: the account of the three epochs 
presupposes a philosopher free to enact both the original development of consciousness 
and the derivative schematization thereof. Neither the act of theoretical nor practical 
philosophizing constitutes the original act, but ethics proves the more original half of 
theory once the two are distinguished. 
The second proposition maintains that the free, self-determining act of the self “can 
be explained only by the determinate action of an intelligence external to it.”199 This 
means that philosophy cannot be a science of pure reason as the acts of abstraction and 
schematization can only occur and be known within a social context. Rather than positing 
a kingdom of ends as a final goal, Schelling understood philosophical work as following 
from a social context that can be developed and improved, though this milieu undeniably 
exists separately from philosophical reasoning and exercises its own influence over 
philosophy. A truly universal a priori science is impossible since philosophy is inherently 
(if not initially evidently) social. Even if any and all social contexts give rise to 
                                                 
197 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.155. 
198 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. pp.156-7. 
199 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.161. 
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consciousness along the same structures, those cultures will shape how the structures of 
consciousness will be used. 
The third proposition of moral thought extrapolates the essential incompleteness of 
philosophy from the field’s inherently social context. Because “Willing, at the outset, is 
necessarily directed upon an external object”,200 the ordinary prejudice that external 
impressions are both actual and shared between all individuals ultimately finds 
confirmation in Schelling’s 1800 System. As neither theoretical nor practical philosophy 
are possible without an objective world and social context, philosophy must be historical 
and, thus, never completed. This also means that while the physical world can be 
schematically understood, it always remains as something distinct and apart from this 
schematic interpretation. 
This point clarifies that freedom need not be defined against Newtonian determinism 
as was the case in the critical philosophy. While presented in terms similar to the critical 
philosophy, Schelling’s presentation of human freedom—as the original point shared by 
both theoretical and practical philosophy (rather than a postulation added in order to 
maintain a semblance of systematic connection)—significantly shifts Kantian 
assumptions. As theoretical philosophy is made to depend on social moral thought, the 
rhetoric of an a priori universal science of reason must be abandoned. Thus the critical 
philosophy needs more than a refounding as its goals and methods direct philosophy 
falsely. While Schelling did not seem interested in restarting his systematic construction 
                                                 
200 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.175. 
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from this point, the 1800 System does presage his concern for mythology and revelation 
as a social, external record of the development of human consciousness and theory.201 
C. Intellectual Intuition and Reflective Philosophy: A defining accomplishment of 
the 1800 System, and Schelling’s early works generally, is the development of a more 
robust “I” based on the internal needs of the critical philosophy. The epochs outline a 
view of the thinking agent as a complex entity that uses reason in completing an act of 
will. The introduction of temporal succession allows the discrete analysis of the various 
components of this process and begins a dramatic reinterpretation of Kantian critical 
philosophy. However, the text’s structure and occupation with the synthesis of subjective 
and objective indicate how thoroughly Schelling considered the System of Transcendental 
Idealism to be a revision of the critical philosophy, rather than a true critical alternative. 
This contributes to general problems of interpreting the text, and it helps to contextualize 
the negative reception of Schelling by those working within the general assumptions of 
the Kantian framework, as well as those largely dismissive of Kant. 
Within the Kantian frame, perhaps the biggest stumbling block to Schelling’s 
reception has been his use of the Fichtean term “intellectual intuition” at a key moment of 
his argument. The term was rejected unequivocally by Kant as an incoherent concept 
without a referent within empirical experience,202 an argument that seems to provide a 
                                                 
201 A full consideration of the final part of the text, and Schelling’s aesthetic end of philosophy, lies beyond 
the boundaries of the present study. In passing, it bears mentioning that this move follows—in broad 
strokes, at least—the general idea of Kant’s third Critique, further indicating the degree to which Schelling 
understood his account of the self-as-act as qualifying and completing Kant's work. 
202 Critique of Pure Reason, B68-70; The term “intellectual intuition” does not have a single clear meaning 
in Kant, let alone all of German Idealism: “The problem of intellectual intuition in post-Kantian German 
idealism is not unitary. […] Kant uses one designation to cover three very different issues, but historians of 
ideas have wrongly assumed that he is discussing only one doctrine (Gram. “Intellectual Intuition: The 
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sufficient reason for philosophers to dismiss Schellingian philosophy. If philosophy is 
allowed to interpret the intellect’s operation without an identifiable empirical referent 
(which the critical philosophy considers impossible), the discipline may be given over to 
all manner of speculative indulgence. Werner Marx argued that Schelling adopted this 
problematic term in order to emphasize a free act that is also pre-reflective, and thus it 
must serve as a substrate for philosophizing. However, this makes philosophy a 
productive act of imagination that remains beyond direct consciousness, a view that fits 
poorly with many conceptions of philosophy.203 As long as philosophy analyzes objective 
experience, the subjective act of thinking remains out of reach. As such, alternative 
conceptions of philosophy appear regressive, as refusals to accept the limits of synthetic 
thought. 
As critical interpretations have emphasized, Schelling seemed, by intellectual 
intuition, to suggest a special capacity which only some individuals hold.204 Critiquing 
                                                                                                                                                 
Continuity Thesis.” p.288).” Gram stresses the absurdity of the view that “intellectual intuition” is an 
inherently contradictory term, a view often attributed to Kant (ibid, p.294-5). Tilliette notes that, learning 
from the criticisms made by Hegel, Schelling abandoned the intellectual intuition: “Quant à l'intuition 
intellectuelle il l'avait abandonnée en cours de route et il a beau jeu de montrer que l'exposition canonique 
de son système (le traité inachevé de 1801) ne la suppose pas. Il l'a omise à cause des équivoques qu'elle 
engendrait, il n'empêche que la chose elle-même demeure et qu'il faut bien quelque intuition au départ, 
qu'on l'appelle étonnement, extase ou foi (“L’absolu et la philosophie de Schelling.” p.209).” 
203 Marx, Werner. The Philosophy of F.W.J. Schelling. p.36-43. It also must be noted that the intellectual 
intuition and the ego considered by philosophy, if the intellectual intuition is truly a pre-reflective free 
production, differ. Despite the Kantian form and wording, Schelling’s use of this phrase System of 
Transcendental Idealism should not be confused with its Kantian meaning (ibid, p.47-48). 
 Wirth also defends Schelling’s terminology: “The intellectual Intuition is not mystical, at least not 
in the sense of offering privileged access to divine truths. It is an intimation, an Ahnung, of the abyss of 
freedom. It is a percept of death as akin to the unfathomable depths of the past as they re-intimate 
themselves as the future (The Conspiracy of Life, p.114).” The fourth chapter of Wirth’s book explores 
intellectual intuition as an attempt to formalize the unsayable born from need and nothingness, a Buddhist 
interpretation that concludes by looking to Nishida Kitarō (“Direct Experience,” esp. pp.106-29). 
204 Heine, in his survey of Fichte, characterized intellectual intuition as a “monkey seated on the hearth 
before a copper kettle cooking its own tail; for it is of opinion that the true art of cookery consists not 
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those confused by the term and openly dismissive of its use, Schelling insisted that “all 
the alleged non-comprehension of this philosophizing is due, not to its own 
unintelligibility, but to a want of the organ required to comprehend it.”205 Taken at face 
value, this suggests that only an unusual mind, or at least only a subset of people, can 
properly philosophize. Further, this statement seemingly amounts to a bald refusal to 
explain a challenging point by insisting that it is simply too hard for many people to 
understand. 
The System of Transcendental Idealism, as a whole, does little to directly alleviate 
concerns over the implication that a special, extra-philosophical insight is required to 
understand its argument. Thankfully, Schelling defended his use of “intellectual 
intuition” more clearly in Of the I where he directly acknowledged his departure from the 
specific limits drawn by Kant: 
I know very well that Kant denied all intellectual intuition, but I also know the context 
in which he denied it. It was in an investigation which only presupposes the absolute I 
at every step and which […] determines only the empirically conditioned I and the not-I 
in its synthesis with that I. I also know that the intellectual intuition must be completely 
incomprehensible as soon as one tries to liken it to sensuous intuition. […] The attempt 
to refute it from the standpoint of consciousness must fail just as surely as the attempt to 
give it objective reality through consciousness, which would mean to do away with it 
altogether [Of the I. p.85 (181-2)]. 
 
Intellectual intuition means something different from the reflective perspective of 
Transcendental Idealism than from within Kant’s analytic project.206 Schelling did not 
                                                                                                                                                 
merely in the objective act of cooking, but also in the subjective consciousness of the process of cooking 
(Religion and Philosophy in Germany. p.124).” 
205 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.73. 
206 A further hindrance to the interpretation of this point lies in Schelling’s rejection of the Enlightenment 
belief in the unassailable functioning of reason: his use of “intellectual intuition” assumes a view of the 
human intellect as fractured and lost (Tilliette. « L’absolu et la philosophie de Schelling » pp.207-208). 
This assumption undermines any strict rationalism, and thus makes Schelling’s position difficult to follow 
from the perspective of modern philosophies that assume reason is a perfect instrument. As Schelling 
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intend to revive the rational psychology of Wolff and Leibniz by positing an intellectual 
intuition. Rather, he sought to clarify the distinct philosophical standpoint which allows 
for an integral understanding of the person. 
German Idealism is associated closely with a reflexive type of thinking that notes the 
inescapable relation between subject and object in thought and seeks to use this structure 
as a reflection of the ego’s activity. Schelling used this reflective perspective to develop 
the critical philosophy beyond its initial problems, but he did not avoid the problems of 
this view within the System. The problems of reflective philosophy are of a pair with 
those of analytic philosophy: the relation between abstract argument and experience 
grows even more problematic once the inexhaustible capacity for self-reflection has been 
uncovered. While a fuller account of the self proved possible by switching from analytic 
to reflective philosophical perspective, this account entailed a fatal limitation in that a 
philosophy of the reflective agent (subject aware of itself through objectifying its 
subjective activity) prevents a clear articulation of the relationship between being and 
thought, theory and existence. 
Within the System, Schelling argued that the intellectual intuition is not a simple 
object of a presenting faculty. Though we seek unconditional knowledge, this highest 
principle cannot be properly deduced: “So if there is to be certainty in synthetic 
propositions—and thereby in all our knowledge—they must be traced back to an 
unconditional certainty, that is, to the identity of thinking as such, which is, however, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
responded to Hegel’s critiques of the “intellectual intuition” and moved away from the early reliance on the 
idea, objections should only apply to his earliest work (ibid. p.209). 
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contradiction.”207 Such a “tracing back” assumes that the conditions of thinking are 
themselves knowable through a type of mental excavation. The intellectual intuition 
reached by such a retrospective is not reified, as Kantian structures of thought would 
insist. At no point, since the argument pertains to a unity of presented and that which 
presents,208 did Schelling posit intellectual intuition as an object of representation. 
The System of 1800 started to express the major revisions required of modern 
philosophical assumptions by Schelling’s critiques while maintaining much of the form 
of the critical philosophy. Rather than the intellectual intuition, this point serves as the 
largest stumbling block to understanding the text: historicizing reason necessitates a 
severe revision of how philosophy is practiced and conceived. The System acknowledges 
its departure from standard assumptions of philosophy as historically conditioned 
philosophy cannot be a priori in such a way that maintains the rhetoric of universal and 
indifferent reason.209 In short, philosophical reason insufficiently separates itself from the 
reason that it critiques to qualify as universal. Reason, operating through Schelling’s 
epochs, becomes one of several forces of human life and culture. 
While this aspect of Schelling’s critique has grown popular in the last century, the 
specific direction he pursued has not. The religious, mystical, and theological sources 
Schelling turned to in the early nineteenth century often strike contemporary readers as 
regressive, as they are bound to seem like an arbitrary affront to science without a careful 
                                                 
207 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.22. 
208 Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.24. 
209 “The only possible objection to our procedure is that the task so defined is not a philosophical task, and 
its outcome not philosophy (Schelling. System of Transcendental Idealism. p.18.).” 
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critique of the pervasive assumptions of Enlightenment and critical philosophy.210 As 
twentieth century philosophy tended toward empiricist assumptions and frameworks, 
major trends in theology emphasized revelation as a category not only distinct from 
philosophy, but entirely antagonistic toward it.211 
As Schelling advanced an anthropology of person-as-act, he clearly abandoned the 
confines of Enlightenment rationalism. While criticisms of the Enlightenment have 
become common, the general framework and consequent problems posed by the 
lionization of reason remain due to un-criticized assumptions of modern philosophy. 
However, the insistence on an exclusively a priori structure of philosophy prevented the 
full realization of a robust philosophical anthropology and a better relation between 
philosophy and other disciplines. The first step in overcoming this limit was to expand 
the scope of philosophical anthropology from the exclusively human to a transcendent 
God manifested through the act of creating humanity. 
 
III. The Failings of Rational Anthropology 
 
If philosophy must be conducted as a science, then Kant was correct that reason must 
be limited exactly in order to function. The appeal of a scientific philosophy rests in its 
potential to connect all individuals under one systematic and fair authority that avoids the 
                                                 
210 Alan White framed Schelling’s retreat from his own existential insights as a retreat to the metaphysical 
project that was already ending; see Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom. p.1-2); Heine 
considered the poetic and mystical turn in Schelling’s late works to be an abandoning of the path of 
philosophy (Religion and Philosophy in Germany. p.151-52); Royce dismissed Schelling’s “poetical 
speculations” that followed the identity-philosophy as “largely ineffective” (The Spirit of Modern 
Philosophy. p.194). 
211 Barth, and the neo-orthodox movement generally, criticized liberal Christian theology for acquiescing to 
the views of modern science. Christian fundamentalism typically considers Biblical inerrancy to be a 
central Christian doctrine and authoritative over the conclusions of modern science. Both views deserve 
greater consideration, but here should be mentioned only as prominent examples. 
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limitations of particular political or religious traditions with their institutional biases and 
failings. And it is certainly the case that rational criticism, if it is to bear social benefit, 
must distinguish itself from the simple affirmation of an established order. However, this 
need cannot be satisfied within the specific limits Kant drew as they quarantine 
philosophy from other sciences and general culture. Only if humanity is purely rational 
could a critique of pure reason deliver on its promise of properly curtailing empty 
speculation and promoting a rationally structured society. 
Schelling’s early works amount to a critique of Kant in which he struggled and failed 
to distinguish his own premises from those of the critical philosophy. These works, 
nevertheless, laid the foundation for an anthropology that extends beyond the narrow 
concerns of pure reason. These early works hinted at revisions to Kant’s fundamental 
conception of philosophy as a more nuanced account of the self than an indifferent 
knower invariably leads out of the Enlightenment tradition. While Kant was not a 
rationalist, his philosophical anthropology pushed his system toward rationalist 
conclusions. This requires explicit consideration of a distinct other for reason, and the 
resulting dialectic with this other, as a need for philosophical investigation; philosophy is 
restricted not by itself, but by other types of thoughtfulness, perspectives which 
philosophy needs but cannot supply. Schelling’s early idealist works did not succeed, in 
part, because they worked toward a revised conception of philosophy without directly 
engaging these needed “others” for philosophy.212 
                                                 
212 This is not a simple charge. Desmond notes that there is a tension in the double exigency of philosophy 
to be true to its own type of mindfulness while also remaining open to the otherness of Being; see 
Philosophy and its Others. pp.6-9.  
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While hinting at future developments, Schelling’s critique of Kant shared the 
assumption that philosophy must define the human person as, essentially, a rational 
knower. The inability of reason to overcome its inherently conditional view suggests that 
the subject can only know itself through the limits of reason. Schelling argued that this 
failure of conditioned reasoning uncovers the Absolute I beyond the ken of finite reason: 
That is, Schelling believes  he  has  shown  that  the  very  process  whereby reason discovers  
its own incapacity to  reach  the object  of  its longing  (the unconditioned) at  the  level  of  
conscious  reflection  is  itself  a manifestation  of  the  unconditioned  Absolute  I's  own 
prereflective,  unconscious, erotic striving to  intuit  itself [Linker. “From Kant to Schelling: 
Counter-Enlightenment in the Name of Reason.” p.359.]. 
 
A self-contained account of the self fails to transcend Kant’s formulation of the concepts 
of pure reason and the rational knower. The person cannot explain itself without some 
further conditioning ground not given by reason. 
While his execution remained incomplete, Schelling addressed the problematic 
lacunae of the Critique of Pure Reason by reconsidering the concepts of pure reason and 
the nature of philosophy: the relation between the critique and the knowledge it 
delineated. Specifically, Schelling’s effort to re-ground the critical philosophy resulted in 
a view of the discipline as a reflective project—a thinking about thinking—distinct from 
ordinary consciousness.213 Once acknowledged as fundamentally different, these early 
critiques of Kant opened a reappraisal of the value of religious thought, historical 
contingency, and volition. Following the problems of the System of Transcendental 
Idealism, it is clear that an account of the self free from the limitation of rationality also 
involves a fuller account of the person within history. As a view of humanity limited to 
reason proves incomplete, the proper relation of philosophy to other perspectives 
                                                 
213 See Linker. “From Kant to Schelling.” especially p.352-53. 
136 
 
 
becomes a pressing question not for the application, but for the establishing of 
philosophy. 
While not universally accepted, Kantian anthropology has left a mark on alternative 
interpretations of human experience. Even as just a foil for diverse critical alternatives, 
the Kantian division of subject and object exerts an influence in unexpected contexts, as 
illustrated by the Jewish existentialist position of Buber’s I and Thou. In outlining basic 
mental stances toward experience, Buber criticized the impoverished account of human 
experience implied in Kantian subject-object epistemology: 
The I of the basic word I-It, the I that is not bodily confronted by a You but surrounded 
by a multitude of “contents,” has only a past and no present. In other words: insofar as a 
human being makes do with the things that he experiences and uses, he lives in the past, 
and his moment has no presence. […] What is essential is lived in the present, objects in 
the past [I and Thou. p.63-4]. 
 
The ratiocinated world of pure reason, centered on the relation of subject and object, 
misses the definitive experiential act of the person. It misses the full person which is only 
actualized in relation to other persons. Thus, an account of the person requires a 
reciprocal morality that exceeds the Kantian notion of moral freedom: 
Relation is reciprocity. My You acts on me as I act on it. Our students teach us, our 
works form us. The ‘wicked’ become a revelation when they are touched by the sacred 
basic word. How are we educated by children, by animals! Inscrutably involved, we 
live in the currents of universal reciprocity [I and Thou. p.67]. 
 
Freedom carved out from within a deterministic world may preserve a minimal 
framework for the accountability of human agents, but it fails to consider the true 
diversity of human freedom. True morality does not admit of a pure object, nor can it be 
confined to universal axioms. Broader cultural and religious structures are needed to 
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schematize tentatively the type of reciprocal freedom to which Buber’s work drew 
attention. 
The primacy given to the rational knower by Kant altered what his moral theory 
could consider, and resultantly limited his understanding of religion. While Kant 
certainly understood both the morally acting agent and theoretical knower to be 
ultimately one subject, the division of his system works against a sufficiently complex 
account of this complete self. Rather than simply delineate an additional element of the 
person, as Schleiermacher’s approach offered, Buber indicated the need to approach the 
complexity of the person as a dynamic entity. Such a dynamic conception challenges any 
simplistic attempt to define a singular essence of the person, yet it also can contextualize 
such attempts so that they can be developed to their best end. 
A similar point follows from Cassirer’s The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, a work 
that self-consciously follows the critical philosophy.214 Briefly, Cassirer introduced the 
system of symbolic forms as a necessary context for any contemplation of the categories 
of space and time; such sophisticated categories are only accessible to reflection after 
they can be labeled and thus brought into cultural history (and no longer pure a priori): 
This differentiation and fixation of certain contents by words, not only designates a 
definite intellectual quality through them, but actually endows them with such a quality, 
by virtue of which they are now raised above the mere immediacy of so-called sensory 
qualities. Thus language becomes one of the human spirit’s basic implements, by which 
                                                 
214 Krois explored Cassirer’s connection to the Marburg School and concluded that Cassirer certainly 
looked beyond the neo-Kantian horizon, yet still ought to be considered as a part of that tradition 
(“Cassirer, Neo-Kantianism, and Metaphysics.” esp. pp.452-53). Köhnke listed Cassirer at the end of the 
neo-Kantian tradition (The Rise of Neo-Kantianism. pp.199, 280). An alternative reading has been 
advanced by Verene, who argues that Cassirer worked from and on a Hegelian framework far more than a 
Kantian one (“Kant, Hegel, and Cassirer: The Origins of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”), though his 
argument stresses a counterproductive either/or that even Verene must dismiss (see p.36). A more accurate 
description may emphasize Cassirer as bringing neo-Kantianism to its end by reworking it through the 
German Idealist framework (rather than an exclusively Hegelian view). 
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we progress from the world of mere sensation to the world of intuition and ideas [The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. pp.87-88]. 
 
Acknowledging this, Cassirer pointed to an anthropology that includes, but is in no way 
limited to, simple rationality. Admittedly, abandoning the rhetoric of the universal 
applicability of a priori reason diminishes the ability of philosophy to serve as a 
definitive judge of human culture. Surrendering this ideal, however, makes possible an 
inherently incomplete philosophy that can be agile enough to accept the changing nature 
of culture, thought, and social order. 
Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms presents an ideal for contemporary work in 
the philosophy of religion, similar to what Schelling suggested in his later works, that 
remains a relevant challenge for contemporary scholarship. Specifically, the discipline 
should provide a non-reductive dialectic between the various contexts in which truth is a 
meaningful category while acknowledging that the same concept has different meanings 
as it shifts between spheres: 
The scientific concept of truth and reality is different from that of religion—similarily, 
each sphere not only designates but actually creates its particular and irreducible basic 
relation between “inside” and “outside,” between the I and the world. […] The 
achievement of each one must be measured by itself, and not by the standards and aims 
of any other […] [The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. p.91]. 
 
The importance of language and the insufficiency of philosophy as a sole survey of 
human experience were major themes of Schelling’s late philosophy. These points mark a 
connection between the positive philosophy and the philosophy of symbolic forms, as 
well as the continuing relevance of Schelling’s work even at a time when his thought was 
largely neglected. Cassirer’s perspective also clarifies Schelling’s philosophy of religion 
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as they each disagreed significantly regarding the nature and role of religion within the 
philosophy of culture. 
These alternatives to Kantian anthropology, even in summary, challenge the 
delineation of any philosophical faculty from both other faculties and the social 
employment of reason. Surrendering the pretense of a pure a priori perspective opens a 
more nuanced view of religious thought which can no longer be distinguished, in kind, as 
contingent and a posteriori compared to the supposedly a priori philosophy. The danger 
of allowing the philosophical perspective to dominate and take over the religious 
perspective(s) remains in the philosophy of symbolic forms. Nevertheless, a possible path 
toward a philosophical anthropology that accounts for a full person has opened and will 
help clarify the comportment of philosophy toward other disciplines. 
Once culture is adopted as the proper scope of philosophy, singular essential claims 
as to the nature of humanity, rationality, and society become untenable. An effective 
solution to the abstract problem—accounting for the nuanced multiplicity of the person—
will be possible only when addressed in specific manifestations of that problem. The 
concluding chapter of this study will turn to the contributions of German Idealism, the 
German Enlightenment, and specifically Schelling’s On University Studies in the shaping 
of modern university structures. These brief considerations will connect the abstract 
discussion of how religion and philosophy are manifested in a specific cultural 
institution. The goal will be to show that abstract philosophical issues not only have 
practical ramifications, but that philosophers ought to abandon models of their discipline 
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that emphasize pure abstraction and conduct philosophy as both abstract and practical at 
the same time. 
Rather than surrender any meaningful attempt to delineate faculties, the philosophy 
of religion can look for a philosophical perspective that can acknowledge the artifice of 
an isolated account of reason without dismissing it: a perspective in which the artificiality 
of specific distinctions between religious and philosophical thought can be identified as 
an explicit good. By engaging the Enlightenment assumptions which seem to dismiss 
religion, philosophy of religion can serve as an arena for conflicting yet connected 
interpretative stances to interact. A philosophy of religion must reimagine the posture of 
modern philosophy. This reimagining must preserve the integrity of rational critique 
while admitting that it does judge other types of thoughtfulness, only without serving as 
the sole or final arbiter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Hegelianism, Negative Philosophy, and the 
Inadequacy of a Single System 
 
 
 
Critiques of modern philosophy often characterize the tradition as lionizing 
autonomous rationality, a description meant to encompass multiple distinctive 
phenomena—the cogito of Descartes, the social contract of Hobbes and Rousseau, the 
Copernican revolution and Galileo’s trial, Kant’s cosmopolitan morality—as 
manifestations of a single movement. Blumenberg’s influential The Legitimacy of the 
Modern Age uses this characterization clearly: 
The modern age has understood itself as the age in which reason, and thus man’s 
natural vocation, definitively prevailed. […] In the Enlightenment’s understanding of 
history, the relation between the Middle Ages and the modern Age is characteristically 
dualistic, and this is expressed more than anywhere else in the conceptualization 
formulated by Descartes of an absolute, radical new beginning, whose only 
prerequisites lay in the rational subject’s making sure of itself [pp.377-78]. 
 
This emphasis on rational autonomy led to depictions of religious theories as incomplete 
philosophy; modern philosophers’ expectation that the external differences between 
religions would give way to a cosmopolitan philosophy is only one example of the 
project of rationalization’s reach beyond philosophical studies.215 Though widely 
criticized, the ideal of autonomous reason remains influential.216 
                                                 
215 This promise seems increasingly unlikely, but it is entangled with modern philosophy of religion: see 
RwBMR, Part Three (esp. p.127 [6:121]). Rousseau (The Social Contract. Trans. Scott. pp.263-72) and 
Tocqueville (Democracy in America. p.511) used the term “civil religion” for the interdenominational 
concerns that constitutes the sole public relevance of citizens’ beliefs, a term that classifies religious 
difference as a private matter. Even if theorists assume that religions share a core religion, the divergent 
religious traditions resist homogenization in practice. 
216 See the introduction for a consideration of Rorty’s critique of “scientific” conceptualizations of 
philosophy (“Philosophy as Science, as Metaphor, and as Politics.”); that essay usefully schematizes 
modern approaches to philosophy and demonstrates the continuing need to criticize the characterization of 
philosophy as a rational science. 
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The pervasive emphasis on rational autonomy encourages a conceptualization of 
philosophy as both professionally and theoretically independent. Modernity’s abstract 
rhetoric of self-invention obscures the otherwise obvious point that philosophical reason 
needs external content given through experience, a dependency that exposes a gap 
between the discipline’s self-definition and its professional reality.217 No longer seeking 
to establish itself as a distinct university faculty as in the early modern period, philosophy 
is tied to a distinct professional standpoint. The inability of any theory to provide its own 
ground emphasizes the interdependence of theoretical frameworks, both abstractly and in 
the more concrete context of a functioning university. 
 
I. The Hegelian Narrative of Modern Philosophy and Re-appropriating 
Schelling. 
 
The oppositional stance that modern philosophical rhetoric takes regarding religion 
makes sense when philosophers needed to establish a viable cultural place for 
themselves. Both philosophical and religious thought make competing absolutizing 
claims that have made it necessary for each to criticize the other; as philosophy resists 
being made an ecclesiastical tool, so too religion irrepressibly insists on its claims against 
those of philosophical criticism.218 This opposition must be mitigated as philosophy 
cannot ignore that which resists purely rational interpretation. If the human person cannot 
be understood through abstract reflection on the reasoning individual alone, then 
                                                 
217 The critical philosophy, for example, understood that empirical experience is needed for the operations 
of reason, yet isolated reason from experience and non-rational mental faculties. While it is absurd to argue 
that Kant failed to realize this point, his rhetoric did suppress this idea. 
218 Tillich captured this point by defining faith as “the state of being ultimately concerned” which matches 
an ultimate demand to the “promise of ultimate fulfillment” for the faithful individual (Dynamics of Faith. 
pp.1-2). 
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philosophy defined strictly as an autonomous science of reason cannot access the creative 
forces of culture through rational criticism alone.219 To avoid problematic Enlightenment 
assumptions, the philosophy of religion must criticize reason’s pretense of self-
sufficiency and consider the context in which philosophy functions. 
A. Philosophy without a Definitive Standpoint: Through the critical analysis of 
German Idealism, a specific aim for a philosophy of religion has begun to come into 
focus: to delineate multiple perspectives that, while remaining distinct, together outline 
an alternative framework from which to address the opposition modernity has created 
between religion and philosophy. This promises to be a difficult task, in part because 
theological systems have proven at least equally capable of static dogmatism; simply 
asserting two dogmatic views does not establish the desired dialectic. Further, as this goal 
comes into focus as a corrective measure to an overly simplistic view, it might imply the 
very sense of systematic “completing” that needs to be dismissed. As one theoretical 
perspective proves incomplete, the confluence of alternative theories offers a tempting 
promise of a completed account. A corrective multi-perspectival philosophy of religion 
must resist claims of dialectic finality so that it can emphasize a context and the self-
conscious placing of distinct theories relative to each other within this milieu. 
The failure to “place” philosophy relative to other perspectives lies at the core of the 
above criticism of Kant and Hegel. If philosophy proves problematic when denying the 
                                                 
219 Hegel (despite criticism above that he failed to follow through on this point) noted the same problem 
with the modern philosophical project: “Reason had already gone to seed in and for itself when it envisaged 
religion merely as something positive and not idealistically. And after its battle with religion the best that 
Reason could manage was to look at itself and come to self-awareness. Reason, having in this way become 
mere intellect, acknowledges its own nothingness by placing that which is better than it in a faith outside 
and above itself, as a beyond [to be believed in]. […] Philosophy has made itself the handmaid of a faith 
once more (Faith and Knowledge. pp.55-56).” 
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autonomy of religious theory and its full relevance for philosophy, then the Hegelian 
alternative illustrates that the confusion of the two types of mindfulness largely repeats 
the problems of the critical philosophy that are the interest of the present study. While 
Hegel valorized religion as a key moment in the unfolding of philosophy, his view erodes 
the difference between religious and philosophical theory and allows only one final 
theoretical voice within the dialectic of Geist. The dialectical structure is so closely 
identified with philosophy itself that other perspectives are ultimately homogenized as 
halting articulations of the absolute viewpoint. Such a meta-interpretive theory needs to 
acknowledge the limits drawn by external views in order to formally recognize its own 
inability to ground itself. 
Schelling, through his critique of Hegel, developed a standpoint from which 
mysticism, mythology, and religious theory can be viewed as contributing to, and 
engaging with, philosophy as separate theoretical perspectives. This makes his work a 
promising resource for the philosophy of religion. His philosophy has been criticized as 
disjointed, in part, because he did not insist on a definite methodological perspective that 
could orient a reader among these various interests. This chapter will survey his mature 
history of modern philosophy, and the critique of Hegel contained therein, as reworking 
his early views into a new philosophical stance—the positive philosophy—that helps to 
connect his seemingly disparate works. The full possibilities of this perspective will be 
explored in the subsequent chapter while the present focus will be on how this position 
resists the absolutizing tendencies illustrated by Hegel (in Schelling’s interpretation). 
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Schelling’s early works demonstrate the difficulty of overcoming a one-dimensional 
view of human rationality without expanding philosophy’s scope beyond universal a 
priori conditions of reason. If the religious concepts dismissed by Kant are merely 
reintegrated into philosophy without attentively maintaining their otherness, the borders 
of pure reason simply would shift and the problems of lionized rationality would be 
complicated rather than alleviated. The critical philosophy correctly asserted the alterity 
of religion against modern scholasticism such as that of Wolff, yet Kant’s perspective 
faltered in accepting the resulting heterogeneity of theory. Without a perspective that can 
mutually engage philosophy, philosophy adopts a self-understanding that both narrows 
itself and yet asks too much of itself. Schelling’s mature thought, once disentangled from 
common interpretative tendencies, can help clarify the standpoint of philosophy relative 
to other academic positions. 
B. The Hegelian Narrative and Schelling: Schelling’s work exercised a slow, often 
subterranean, influence over modern philosophy and theory. His late work attracted such 
strong criticism initially that his corpus was frequently overlooked and dismissed as 
ungrounded speculation by subsequent generations.220 This opinion led historians to treat 
him as a mere stage in the development from Kantian critical philosophy to Hegelian 
dialectic, a narrative that originated with Hegel’s claim, in the Differenzschrift, that his 
system completed what Schelling and Fichte were only able to begin: 
                                                 
220 Neo-Kantian philosophers often adopted such a view: Leibman’s call for a “return to Kant” insisted on 
the need to get around the idealist developments of the critical philosophy; see also Stokes. “Going Back to 
Kant.” pp.280-81. Schelling’s influence on the noteworthy attendees of his late lectures has been obscured 
by their derisive characterizations of his work: see Frank. “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel and the 
Beginnings of Marxian Dialectics.” pp.252-55; Schopenhauer, among Schelling’s contemporaries, 
dismissed the association of his system with Schelling (Parerga and Paralipomena. p.157). 
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As sciences [Fichte’s and Schelling’s systems] are objective totalities and proceed from 
one limited item to another. But each limited item is itself in the Absolute and is thus 
internally unlimited. It loses its external limitedness by being placed in the systematic 
context of the objective totality. In this totality it has truth even as a limited item, and to 
determine its place is to know it [The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s 
System of Philosophy. p.166]. 
 
Hegel convinced many later scholars that he gave definitive formulation to the idealist 
project; intervening figures could thus be dismissed as only marginally important. This 
interpretation has proven persistent and even recent positive reassessments of Schelling’s 
work approach him as an alternative to this totalizing Hegelian dialectic.221  
As interpretations of Schelling have become entwined with Hegelian categories—
even while challenging those very categories—many studies invariably ignore or dismiss 
aspects of Schelling’s thought that do not easily fit Hegelian assumptions.222 The revival 
of interest in Schelling during the twentieth century produced multiple challenges to this 
Hegelian distortion; some scholars continued to frame his work through Hegel by 
presenting Schelling as an antidote to Hegelian absolutism and post-Enlightenment 
irrationalism;223 Schelling’s concern with freedom, volition, and the limits of reason led 
                                                 
221 This interpretive approach has served various narratives: “Most recent work on Schelling has continued 
to regard him as an adjunct to Hegel. This has meant that he is understood either as the target of Hegel’s 
revelation of previous philosophy’s failure to overcome ‘immediacy’, the failure to articulate the 
relationship of being and thinking within philosophy, or as merely an episode in the story which sees Hegel 
as definitive of all that happens in philosophy until Nietzsche and Heidegger begin the real process of 
liberation from ‘Western metaphysics’ (Bowie. Schelling and Modern European Philosophy. p.1).” See 
also: Lawrence argues that Schelling, not Hegel, was the true conclusion of German Idealism (“Schelling 
as Post-Hegelian and as Aristotelian.” pp.315-16); Henrich Between Kant and Hegel (esp. p.9) offers an 
alternative to the interpretation of German Idealism as a series of steps. 
222 Hayes offers a brief survey of several efforts to dismiss this view, efforts that indicate the continual 
influence of Hegel’s narrative (“Schelling: Persistent Legends, Improving Image.” p.64-66). W. Marx 
considers the differences between Schelling’s and Hegel’s conceptions of the task of philosophy that have 
been obscured due to scholars assuming a Hegelian perspective while interpreting Schelling (The 
Philosophy of F.W.J. Schelling, pp.56-57). 
223 White sees in Schelling an imperfect but influential criticism of Hegel that shaped Marxist and 
existential philosophies and ultimately points back to the viability of Hegel’s project (Schelling: An 
Introduction to the System of Freedom. pp.187-90). Wirth considers how Schelling criticized Hegel to self-
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other scholars to see him as a precursor of existentialism;224 others portray the revival of 
interest in German Idealism as an effort to overcome the analytic tradition’s empirical 
assumptions without returning to fully “metaphysical” interests.225 Such approaches 
merely substitute the goals and concerns of twentieth century thinkers for those of Hegel. 
Though these efforts shift Schelling studies away from Hegel’s narrative, they do not 
address the fundamental disinterest in Schelling’s espoused goals. 
The Hegelian narrative has proven persistent, in part, due to the fractured nature of 
Schelling’s work and his tendency to carve his own thought into distinct periods. This 
fueled the view that his work was incoherent on its own as he identified, labeled, and 
criticized different interests within his thought. The lectures On Modern Philosophy, for 
example, identify his early ‘Fichtean’ period226 and his Naturphilosophie as positions that 
his mature standpoint overcame and replaced. Such passages tempt interpreters with an 
excuse to ignore the full sweep of Schelling’s thought and focus on specific, delineable 
concerns as defined from an external perspective. This made it necessary for critics to 
                                                                                                                                                 
consciously move beyond him (The Conspiracy of Life. pp.11-23). Bowie (Schelling and Modern European 
Philosophy. pp.127-77) considers Schelling’s critique of Hegel at length and with nuance. Noteworthy, at 
present, is the opening claim of that chapter: “The later Schelling’s significance in the history of philosophy 
depends on the reasons for his critique of Hegel (ibid. p.127).” Snow presents Schelling as resisting both 
Enlightenment lionization of reason and the subsequent turns to the irrational will as the absolute principle 
(Schelling and the End of Idealism. pp.213-15). 
224 See Tillich (“Schelling und die Anfänge des existentialistischen Protestes”) and Marcel (“Schelling fut-il 
un précurseur de la philosophie de l’existence?”) 
225 Gardner approaches 20th century Anglophone philosophy through the opposition of Naturalist and 
Idealist stances (“The Limits of Naturalism and the Metaphysics of German Idealism” p.23); he argues 
against interpretations of German Idealism which ignore its metaphysical aspects (ibid, pp. 35-44). His 
essay appears in German Idealism: Contemporary Perspectives (Hammer, ed.) with related articles (esp. 
Bowie. “German Idealism’s Contested Heritage.”); see also Frank, “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel and the 
Beginnings of Marxian Dialectics.” 
226 “This exposition of Fichtean idealism is contained in my System of Transcendental Idealism, which 
appeared in the year 1800. […] In it [the reader] will already recognize, under the exterior of Fichtean 
thinking, the new system, which sooner or later had to break through this exterior (Schelling. On the 
History of Modern Philosophy. p.111).” 
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note correctively that Schelling emphasized an inner unity in his corpus that constituted 
his original accomplishment.227 Ignoring this unity allows interpreters to present disparate 
and irreconcilable positions within Schelling’s corpus, a characterization that helps to 
narrow philosophy’s ken and confine Schelling’s work to the perspective he criticized. 
In order to avoid such skewing of Schelling’s corpus, this study intentionally breaks 
from a strict chronological reading of his work. Royce’s The Spirit of Modern Philosophy 
surveyed Schelling’s rapid progression through various philosophical systems and shows 
how such an approach characteristically disserves Schelling’s work. He settled on the 
Identity philosophy as Schelling’s definitive statement, though he viewed it as an 
unsuccessful attempt to give the systematic form to philosophy and a stumbling step 
toward the Hegelian viewpoint; the later works are simply dismissed.228 Though such a 
chronological approach could ideally allow Schelling to set the agenda for interpreting 
his mature works, the attention such an approach must give to the details of his 
intellectual development forces overwhelming interpretive choices that complicate the 
attempt to delineate Schelling’s mature position. While recent studies typically avoid 
one-dimensionally Hegelian accounts of Schelling, the trend remains sufficiently 
                                                 
227 Fackenheim (The God Within. p.110-11); Heidegger (Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human 
Freedom. p.6). See also Pfau (“Critical Introduction.” Idealism and the Endgame of Theory. p.2). 
228 Royce. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. pp.193-94: “Philosophy must become a system, or else remain 
naught. This thought Schelling found present in Hegel’s mind […]. Largely ineffective, however, 
Schelling’s best efforts remained henceforth. We shall do well, therefore, to turn at once to the more 
successful systematizer of the idealistic scheme, namely, Hegel (ibid. p.194).” This criticism is common: 
Rosenkrantz dismissively notes that “[Schelling] imitates Hegel's dialectic, but conceals the imitation by 
calling the categories potencies which set themselves in opposing tension as positive and negative 
(“Hegel’s Relation to His Philosophical Contemporaries.” p.400);” Kroner uses poetic imagery to 
characterize Hegel as the true fruit of idealism: “The metaphor of a tree may be permitted to compare Kant 
with its root, Fichte with its stem, Schelling with its leaves and blossoms and Hegel with its fruit (“The 
Year 1800 in the Development of German Idealism.” p.5).” 
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influential as to merit caution.229 This chapter considers Schelling’s late lectures on 
modern philosophy as a promising point of access for understanding the incomplete and 
esoteric middle and late works: the perspective provided by these lectures helps to clarify 
Schelling’s goals, independent of the various interpretive projects applied to his work. 
The lectures On the History of Modern Philosophy (hereafter On Modern 
Philosophy) clarify how Schelling’s distinctive concern with metaphysics and religious 
ideas followed from his critique of modern philosophy. The lectures provide a clear 
indication of how his early “negative philosophy” and the later “positive philosophy” are 
meant to form a whole. This unity, counter-intuitively, proves less evident through a 
chronological narrative of Schelling’s career.230 Nevertheless, this approach repeats the 
troubling habit of splitting Schelling’s corpus into various periods unless the focus on his 
late thought emphasizes the inner unity of Schelling’s various philosophical 
developments. The approach that fractures his corpus made it difficult to acknowledge 
Schelling’s coherence, as Fackenheim summarized: 
In practically any history of philosophy which bothers with Schelling at all one can find 
this threefold condemnation of his work: that it consists of a number of more or less 
disconnected systems; that none of these is properly worked out; and that from 1804 on, 
they got worse and worse [The God Within. p.109].231 
                                                 
229 See: Ford. “The Controversy between Schelling and Jacobi.” p.75-76; Laughland, Schelling versus 
Hegel (which works through Schelling’s corpus in a largely chronological manner while focusing primarily 
on Schelling’s relation to Christian theology); Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling (which likewise 
follows a chronological development, though it makes no claim to comprehensiveness); White, Schelling: 
An Introduction to the System of Freedom. pp.93, 144-45 (using chronological developments to make sense 
of Schelling’s overall philosophy). 
230 Others have noted this same problem: “Much of the problem in interpreting the later Schelling 
satisfactorily is […] that of relating the various texts chronologically, since Schelling himself jigsawed 
them together to form to combine two different patterns (Reardon. “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel.” 
p.554).” 
231 See Hayes (“Schelling: Persistent Legends, Improving Image.” pp.66-69) for a survey of this tendency 
and Bowie (Schelling and Modern European Philosophy. pp.12-4) for a six-fold division of Schelling’s 
corpus. Royce provides an emblematic example of this rhetoric: “Only to the end, while Schelling became 
the firmest of believers in a supreme and substantial order of things, which impresses itself upon our reason 
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Problematically, this division and dismissal of Schelling’s corpus as consisting of various 
incomplete outlooks—a Romantic poet, a Fichtean idealist, and pre-modern mystic, for 
example—serves to dismiss Schelling’s internal motives and encourage reading Schelling 
through the framework initially set by Hegel. 
The delineation of a “later” Schelling avoids the problems of carving Schelling’s 
work into multiple eras by emphasizing a core concern driving his occasionally erratic 
development: his own division between positive and negative philosophy. Each 
supposedly distinct period shares an underlying harmony insofar as they assume similar 
goals, a relation Schelling emphasized through his schematization of philosophy as 
consisting of two foci. This seemingly could present two Schellings, as Tillich has 
suggested: 
The reduction of the seven periods to two is the presupposition of every inner 
understanding of Schelling’s development. […] [I]t may appear justified to speak of 
Schelling I and Schelling II. However, the transition is not external but dialectical 
[Mysticism and Guilt-Conciousness in Schelling’s Philosophical Development. p.24]. 
 
This distinction is common in Schelling’s latter works and was used to insist on the inner 
consistency of his frequently changing styles. While it proves central to his thought, the 
division defies clear demarcation as he used it to various ends that defy a single meaning. 
Despite the obscurities entailed by the division, understanding what Schelling means by 
positive philosophy clarifies the relation between texts of any period. On Modern 
                                                                                                                                                 
from above, and which we are all forced to obey and to accept, his method remains wayward, imaginative, 
and, with all his genius, immature (The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. p.181).” This approach was adopted 
by Windelband also, though his criticism is far more measured and considers Schelling’s own motivations 
(History of Modern Philosophy. p.616-20). 
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Philosophy presents the critique of negative philosophy clearly and establish good critical 
expectations for exploring Schelling’s positive philosophy in the following chapter. 
This single division provides an interpretive key that ultimately provides more 
immediate insight into Schelling’s work than the multiple divisions. While numerous 
disconnected Schellings are difficult to track, the instinct behind such views proves 
simple to grasp: Schelling was overwhelmed by whichever of his diverse influences he 
had most recently studied. This assumption justifies ignoring texts typically deemed 
obscure and reaffirms the reduction of Schelling to a stage between Kant and Hegel by 
multiplying the number of “steps.” Nevertheless, as Schelling’s mature view increasingly 
emphasized, the history of philosophy is a necessary portal to doing philosophy: 
Science (wissenschaft) is also a product of time and constantly develops. Everyone who 
thinks he is in a position to advance science a big or small step forward will tend to his 
own accord to show his relationship to what precedes him, in order to make clear from 
which point of development or standstill he is taking up science and towards which 
subsequent goal he intends to advance it [Schelling. On Modern Philosophy. p.41]. 
 
Philosophy not only accidentally depends on previous incarnations and iterations; it must 
abstractly accept that it is not an a priori science. The division of Schelling’s corpus into 
positive and negative periods helps to emphasize the incomplete nature of philosophical 
system, and it thus helps to remove Schelling from the shadow of the more widely known 
figures in modern philosophy. The increased emphasis on conceiving of philosophy as 
positive explains why Kant was reduced in importance to a part of the tradition of 
modern philosophy. Schelling developed the schematization of philosophy between 
positive and negative expressions as his critical attention shifted from Kant to Hegel and 
his conviction that philosophy has a metaphysical grounding grew. Schelling was 
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preoccupied with criticizing Hegel, beyond his personal animus that many interpreters 
have emphasized, due to the seeming overlap of their projects.  
 
II. Lectures On the History of Modern Philosophy. 
 
Schelling’s criticism of Hegel is tied to his interpretation of modern philosophical 
history and should be approached in this context. The posthumously published lectures 
On the History of Modern Philosophy differ from Schelling’s earlier essays that were the 
focus of the previous chapter; they were addressed to a small audience in a specific 
context and not intended for publication. Schelling delivered these lectures after his 
youthful public prominence faded and during a period of public silence in the 1830’s,232 
thus they prove invaluable for connecting his earlier published works to the final system 
of the Berlin lectures. Yet, as posthumously published and originally private, the lectures 
lack an explicit central claim and interpretive efforts must identify the argumentative 
project and implied thesis of the lectures through their narrative momentum. 
A. The Origins of Modern Philosophy: Like most historical surveys of philosophy, 
Schelling’s lectures present Descartes as the origin point for modern philosophy, an era 
commonly dated to his rejection of scholasticism.233 By emphasizing the subjective 
character of Cartesianism, however, Schelling quickly distinguished his interpretation 
from others through a specific critique of the cogito: 
                                                 
232 See Bowie for dating of the manuscripts (“Translator’s Introduction.” On the History of Modern 
Philosophy. p.1). 
233 Descartes “began by breaking off all connection with earlier philosophy […] and by building it up again 
from the beginning, as if no one had ever philosophised before he did (Schelling, F.W.J. On Modern 
Philosophy. p.42.)” Gilson contextualizes Descartes’ philosophical foundation relative to other attempts to 
provide a scientific method (Modern Philosophy. esp. pp.85-86); Russell surveys the larger context of the 
early modern period (A History of Western Philosophy. pp.491-93), but affirms the judgment that Descartes 
founded modern philosophy (ibid. p.557). 
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But obviously the proposition: I am is at the most the starting point for me—and only 
for me; the connection which results from the attachment to this proposition or to the 
immediate consciousness of one’s own being can, therefore, always only be a 
subjectively logical one, i.e. I can always only infer: to the extent to which I certainly 
am, I must assume as certainly that A, B, C, etc., are. But how A, B, and C are really 
connected to each other, or with their true principle, or even how they are connected to 
the I am itself, is not shown at all [On Modern Philosophy. p.42-3]. 
 
Descartes’ subjective starting point quickly becomes problematic for common sense 
views of external reality. Cartesianism takes such a strong stance against common sense 
that it must irrevocably isolate individuals as the sole force connecting subjective 
experience, disconnected from objective reality; it promises a solipsistic conclusion. 
Schelling’s concern, as demonstrated with this criticism, was with a perceived 
narrative of modern philosophy rather than fidelity to the details of the Cartesian 
schematic.234 This focus is evident most clearly in his presentation of Cartesian doubt: 
I cannot believe these things which are knowable through the senses to be in that sense 
in which the original being—being through itself—is; […] we see in them something 
which has become; and to the extent that everything which has become is only 
dependently and as such doubtfully real, one can say they have in themselves a doubtful 
existence, or it is their nature to waver between being and not-being [On Modern 
Philosophy. p.43]. 
 
The argument of the Meditations rests on the presumed radicalism of its doubt; if its 
methodological doubt is not total, it can only obtain inconclusive results. On Schelling’s 
reading, Descartes merely cast direct empirical experience into doubt rather than all 
                                                 
234 Marquet, exploring Schelling’s shifting interpretation of Cartesianism, notes his misrepresentation of 
Descartes: “Mais une telle solution ne pouvait se présenter chez Descartes, et cela pour deux raisons. Tout 
d'abord, Dieu n'est chez lui qu'une conclusion, et non le point de départ d'un développement; en second 
lieu, et surtout, l'existence nécessaire a chez lui un tout autre sens que dans la philosophie positive 
(“Schelling et Descartes.” p.248).” Such misrepresentations are inescapable for any schematic critique of 
modern philosophy, as Marquet opened the article acknowledging: “Pour un grand philosophe, tout autre 
philosophe tend à se réduire (ou à s'exhalter) à une image mythique; le rapport de Schelling à Descartes ne 
fait pas exception à cette règle générale (ibid. p.237).” 
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possible knowledge. Cartesian doubt, resting on empirical uncertainty, grounds the cogito 
which expresses the basic emphasis of modern thought: the “autonomy” of philosophy.235 
Schelling identified several problems that follow directly from Descartes’ connection 
of the cogito with his radicalized doubt. First, Cartesian rationalism proves problematic 
as thought and being cannot be identified as simply as Descartes claimed: 
Besides this, Sum cogitans cannot mean that it is as though I were nothing but thinking, 
as if I were only there in thinking or as if thinking were the substance of my being, 
indeed, the Cogitans even only means “I am in the state of thinking”. The state of real 
thinking is, as is well known, a very rare, transitory, indeed unnatural state for most 
people, from which they usually seek to emerge as quickly as possible [On Modern 
Philosophy. p.46]. 
 
That is, even if the act of thinking demonstrates that something exists, it does not follow 
that the existing thing is exhausted or effectively characterized by the act of thought. This 
fundamental critique, developed through the rest of the Lectures, applies to all modern 
philosophy in Schelling’s view as he thought that Descartes was often followed 
uncritically on this point.236 
While Descartes clearly understood the thinking self to be multifaceted, his system 
forced a certain “flattening” of the person. The complexity of human experience, as 
considered in the Second Meditations, reduces to the “thinking thing”: 
But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, 
affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions. 
This is a considerable list, if everything on it belongs to me. But does it? Is it not one 
and the same ‘I’ who is now doubting almost everything, who nonetheless understands 
some things, who affirms that this one thing is true, denies everything else, desires to 
                                                 
235 According to Schelling, the cogito “[…] worked like a spell by which philosophy was caught in the 
realm of the subjective and of the fact of the solely subjective consciousness. […] in this decision lay the 
most decisive breaking away from all authority, the freedom of philosophy was achieved thereby, which it 
could not lose from this moment on [On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.45]. 
236 Marquet. “Schelling et Descartes.” pp.241, 243, 246. 
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know more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things even involuntarily, and 
is aware of many things which apparently come from the senses? [Meditations. p.19]237 
 
The Meditations not only present thought as a category that collects disparate activities, 
the method of radical doubt also prevents Descartes from seeing sensation and 
imagination as anything more than ancillary mental functions. This Cartesian turn was a 
key source of the rationalist assumption that marks the work of Kant and Hegel; by 
bringing this problem into the foreground, Schelling’s historical survey of modern 
philosophy engaged the same problematic identified by this study. 
Second, Schelling criticized the inadequate and improper distinction of the general 
Cartesian cogito and the Absolute I. Descartes’ general cogito only manages to clarify 
that something is, it does not describe or characterize existence. However, following the 
Second Meditation, Descartes presented the full realm of experience as defined by and 
reducible to the cogito. The Third Meditation presented the idea of God as necessarily 
including actualized perfection and thus undermined the initial motivation to exercise 
radical doubt symbolized in the malicious demon of the First Meditation. Thus Cartesian 
doubt produces only a very narrow swath of experience that can be trusted: thought as 
existent. Schelling argued that Descartes, rather than deductively determine what sort of 
being the “I am” is, has silently resorted to a naïve perspective defined entirely by the 
finite mind. The common sense position, which Descartes clearly sought to restore, 
remains at odds with the radical criticism his project employed. 
Finally, the cogito is a reflective and synthetic—rather than an immediate—principle 
that identifies the doubting self with the self-reflecting upon this doubt. According to 
                                                 
237 In Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes Vol.2. Eds. Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdock. 
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Schelling, this limits the field of philosophy to the necessity of given ideas, rather than 
things themselves, by tying all other knowledge to the I am. Descartes emphasized 
thought, at the expense of physical experience, as the reliable ken of philosophy in the 
subsequent developments of the Meditations. This raises the same question which was 
the focus of much of Kant’s first Critique: whether anything external corresponds to our 
ideas.238 His presentation of Cartesianism, therefore, provided Schelling with an occasion 
to reevaluate his early criticism of Kant while also establishing a point of continuity—a 
divorce of thought from reality—among the disparate expressions of modern philosophy. 
This critique of the cogito opens up and necessitates a further criticism of the 
Cartesian conception of God. Like Kant, Descartes posited God to forestall the seemingly 
necessary idealist conclusion of his work. The subjective certainty of the cogito could 
ground a fuller epistemic certainty, capable of accepting ordinary experience, if the 
ground for radical doubt (the deceiving demon) could be dismissed. Thus, Descartes 
returned to more carefully consider the malicious but all-powerful deceiver, used in place 
of a traditional conception of God to remind him not to trust unreflective experience. 
Since the thinking self has an idea of perfection, and is itself a flawed and limited entity, 
Descartes argued that the notion must apply to a being both outside of the cogito and 
necessarily existing.239 While this argument attempts to restore the facticity of the 
                                                 
238 “Once I want to attach everything to the ‘I am’, I must give up ever getting any further than to this 
necessity of the idea of everything else; it can also, if I am the focus of all knowledge to myself, be 
completely indifferent to me whether that which I am compelled to imagine is there independently of 
imagining it or not, since it […] is completely indifferent to the dreamer as long as he is dreaming 
(Schelling. On Modern Philosophy. p.48).” 
239 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.48-9. 
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commonly experienced world, it does so only on the basis of the thinking self; Descartes 
effectively limited philosophy to the confines of thought alone. 
On Schelling’s reading, Descartes’ proof for the existence of God determined the 
general possibilities of modern philosophy.240 The main consequence of this was to 
bequeath, to subsequent philosophers, an antinomy between God-as-necessity and the 
concept of a freely creating God. On Cartesian principles, God was conceived as a logical 
necessity that placed philosophical understanding in opposition to the common religious 
view of God as freely departing “from His own being in order to posit another being.”241 
The bare, abstract notion of being which follows from the Cartesian understanding of 
God threatens self-contradiction when presented, as it must be, as something: 
What Is is […] the concept of all concepts, for in every concept I only think what Is, not 
being. […] But I cannot keep it in this abstraction […]—it is impossible that what is the 
entitlement, the precondition, the beginning for all being should not also be—this “be” 
taken in the sense of existence, i.e. of being also outside the concept. The concept now 
immediately turns itself around for us, into its opposite—we find that which we had 
determined as being itself now also as being, but as being in a completely different—
namely only in the predicative or, as we can also say, objective—sense, where formerly 
we thought it as being in the primary sense [On Modern Philosophy. p.52-3.]. 
 
The failure of Descartes’ concept of God is the essential problem of what Schelling labels 
negative, merely logical, philosophy. The highest point of a systematic understanding of 
being dictates how all other beings are thought; if God is a logical principle that unites 
                                                 
240 The subsequent lectures primarily must demonstrate this problem’s recurrence; “philosophy is still now 
occupied with disentangling and explaining the misunderstandings to which this argument gave rise (On 
Modern Philosophy. p.49),” in part because of the Cartesian innovation that took god as a “perfect being.” 
This critique of Descartes rests on the notion of God—as the “perfect being” which “necessarily exists”—
that establishes only that if God exists, “then He always exists necessarily, i.e., not contingently. But it is 
clear that His existence is not proven thereby (ibid. p.51).” Modern philosophy suppresses the fundamental 
distinction between logical deduction and existence. 
241 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.56. 
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the consideration of all beings, as Descartes posited, then all beings fall under the 
category of necessity. 
A necessary being undermines any philosophical account of the free consciousness 
of contingent beings. Thus, a philosophy that conceives of God in such terms becomes 
blind to all existence as, once “necessity” is applied to Being, systematic explanation and 
experience collapse into one. Further, as Schelling argued, the identification of such a 
necessary being with God makes God “rigid, immovable, absolutely unfree, incapable of 
any free action, progression or going out of himself.”242 The Cartesian God proves to be a 
philosophical principle at odds with the religious concept it mirrors. Using theological 
language of creation—philosophically rather than as a theologically revealed concept—
Schelling argued that if the concepts of God and necessary being are identified, 
philosophy becomes incapable of thinking of any actual existence at all. 
Spinoza, despite clearly distinguishing his system from that of Descartes,243 
reiterates this problematic determinism. As Schelling argued, while Spinoza transformed 
Descartes’ philosophical dualism of mind and body into expressions of an underlying 
single substance, he retained the Cartesian conception of being-as-necessary: 
God was for him only the necessarily existing being; he cut off all reflections in 
Descartes which preceded this concept, and began at once with a definition of 
substance, by which he understood precisely, ad cujus naturam pertinent existere [to 
whose nature it belongs to exist], or id, quod cogitari non potest nisi extistens [that 
which cannot be thought if it does not exist], that which cannot at all, without there 
being a contradiction, be thought as not being [On Modern Philosophy. p.64]. 
 
While repeating the same problem, Spinoza’s work imprisoned modern philosophy even 
more thoroughly; Descartes considered God external to thought, Spinoza conceived God 
                                                 
242 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.54. See §III.B below. 
243 Spinoza. “Ethics: Book V, Preface.” In Collected Works. pp.363-65. 
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as equal to infinite thought and infinite extension. Even though interpreted differently, the 
linchpin of negative philosophy—necessary Being—recurs. Spinoza simply clarified and 
strengthened the problematic tendency which reduced existence to thought.244 
Schelling’s critique of Spinoza deserves criticism as, at points, a shallow 
misrepresentation. Philosophers are often guilty of such distortions though, since Spinoza 
was a major influence and continual dialogical influence for Schelling, this particular 
misrepresentation is jarring and potentially problematic for an intellectual history: 
And, as with all caricature, it leaves out what is fundamental. Not only is the picture of 
Spinoza highly distorted (what happens to his entire system once the concept of 
"power" is removed?), but the same can be said for the picture Schelling gives of his 
own philosophy. For how has the thinker of the "dark ground" now suddenly been 
transformed into a philosopher of "free will," defending a conception of will as self-
grounded self-assertion, an act that emerges from no ground whatsoever, purely ex 
nihilo? [Lawrence. “Spinoza in Schelling: Appropriation through Critique.” p.189] 
 
Such caricatures prove difficult to avoid for Schelling (and other historians of 
philosophy), an issue that casts doubt on attempts to develop a philosophy capable of 
fairly respecting history. Yet within these Lectures, this misrepresentation can be seen as 
an intentional choice that served Schelling’s claim that Spinoza has imprisoned modern 
philosophy by formalizing its core problematic most clearly. In this context, the 
misrepresentation of Spinoza only becomes a problem if it skews the characterization of 
the core assumptions of modern thought shared by various prominent philosophers. 
Schelling’s survey argues that the Cartesian opposition of mind and body, and the 
connected opposition of a free and a necessary God, determined the form of subsequent 
philosophy. This Cartesian influence, strengthened by Spinoza, effectively divorced 
                                                 
244 Thus Schelling’s insistence that philosophy can advance only through Spinozism (On Modern 
Philosophy. p.66). 
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philosophical theory from experience. Presumably, this critique can cover all modern 
philosophy as it applies to the core assumptions that subsequent philosophers adopted. 
Spinozism and Cartesianism remain recognizable even as they are skewed by Schelling’s 
rhetorical goal; each philosopher, and subsequent interpretations of their work, presents 
diverse possibilities not specifically covered by Schelling’s critique as they are irrelevant 
to his immediate point. His criticism aims to capture the core point from which modern 
theory developed rather than exhaust its peripheral possibilities. 
Schelling’s initial critique of modern philosophy not only involves interpretative 
violence, it seems to abandon the proper purview of philosophy and pass over into 
theology. Schelling adopted an increasingly greater interest in theological concerns but it 
cannot be concluded that he abandoned philosophy (in effect, if not intent) as his critique 
does not rely on revealed religious doctrines, follow ecclesiastical dogmas, or advance a 
fideistic conclusion. The positive philosophy does not reduce philosophy to theology (nor 
elevate it to theology, as some scholastics held); it calls attention to their relation in order 
to avoid the confusion of the two types of mindfulness. Schelling’s focus on the 
philosophical doctrine of God demonstrates the inadequacy of philosophy as an 
interpreter of religious thought, which overlaps with, but do not originate in, reason. His 
historical survey undercuts the autonomy of philosophy (abstractly, as it maintains the 
distinct professional identity of philosophy) and thus justifies the focus in the remaining 
lectures on modern philosophy’s grounding in reason and its conception of God. 
B. German Enlightenment and Idealism: German Enlightenment and Idealist 
thought remain vital for contemporary philosophy, in part, because of their influence on 
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the institutionalization of modern philosophy. Schelling’s historical survey accepts 
Descartes and Spinoza as exemplars of modern thought, a view that is only possible 
retrospectively, once subsequent opinion has institutionalized and homogenized the 
tradition’s initial impetus. Such homogenization was necessitated by modern 
philosophers’ professional move from private research to university appointments. The 
professionalization of “modern” philosophy necessarily emphasized the similarities that 
connect otherwise disparate philosophical systems, and such formalizations allowed 
Schelling to interpret Leibnizianism as a stunted Spinozism245 and Wolff as a popularizer 
of Leibniz. As Descartes and Spinoza established the language of modern philosophy, 
Leibniz and Wolff reworked the assumptions and theories of the early modern republic of 
letters into a scholastic form at home within the modern university. 
i. Leibniz and Wolff: Schelling argued that Leibniz did not produce a substantially 
different philosophical position capable of avoiding the problems of the Cartesian and 
Spinozistic system. Like Spinoza, Leibniz assumed several substances as well as one 
ultimate substance. In fact, Leibniz’s schematization of reality through the simple and 
spiritual monad can be seen as a regression to a pre-Cartesian monism that emphasizes 
necessity at the cost of freedom.246 This judgment—that Leibniz took a step back—stems 
                                                 
245 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.75-9. This is an odd assertion as, with it, Schelling 
“insists that Spinoza (with whom he fundamentally disagrees) is a profounder and more important thinker 
than Leibniz (with whom he fundamentally agrees). If thinking must go through Spinoza, it is because the 
bedrock of truth lies at the basis of what can be too flippantly dismissed (especially from the activist 
standpoint of modernity) as a system of quietism and fatalism (Lawrence. “Spinoza in Schelling.” p.177).”  
246 See Monadology, esp. §§ 38, 51, 79 (In Philosophical Essays. pp.217-23). Booth summarizes 
Schelling’s mature interpretation of Leibniz: “From his Freiheit-Schrift onwards, Leibniz appears to 
Schelling often as the anti-dualist, who considered the essence of bodies to be a confusion in the power of 
presentation of the monads themselves. The logic of Leibniz's rational ordering of the monads was 
consistent with his conception of God, seen from inside a theodicy as falling under necessity, postulated 
from an axiomatic inner consistency of his action. Though Leibniz's name is not always mentioned, 
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from the lack of a contradiction between attributes implicit to Spinozism. Schelling 
concluded that, rather than offer a new perspective, Leibniz simply gave a unitarian 
interpretation of Spinozism devoid of the vital contradiction.247 
This “regression” has left an indelible mark over subsequent philosophical theory. 
Schelling argued that the Wolffian schematization and interpretation of Leibniz 
constitutes the most immediate source for the standard “language” of modern philosophy: 
The first theological rationalists were Wolffians to a man, who had emerged in a state in 
which Wolffian philosophy was for a long time, so to speak, the privileged philosophy. 
Leibniz steered back towards old metaphysics and became thereby, it must be said, the 
indirect author, or even the indirect cause, of the form which metaphysics had taken 
before Kant [On Modern Philosophy. p.84]. 
 
The influence of Wolff and Leibniz can be seen in the division of metaphysics into the 
three disciplines that Kant criticized as the concepts of pure reason; from Schelling’s 
perspective, “a great fault of [Wolff’s] metaphysics is that it posited so-called formal 
logic outside itself and left it behind,” resultantly ignoring that “the formal-logical 
differentiation of thought, judgment and inference, and the material differentiation of the 
metaphysical concepts flow from one and the same source.”248 Without an explicit 
connection of how we think and what we think, metaphysics was split between categories 
determined by the object of thought without respect for their ultimate unity.249 This 
                                                                                                                                                 
Schelling proposed, against a philosophy with this logical necessity, an 'historical' philosophy (Booth. 
“Leibniz and Schelling.” p.96).” 
247 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.76, 75-83. He also insists that Leibniz was an 
interpreter, not an opponent of Spinoza (ibid. p.80) and saw his system as “stunted Spinozism” (ibid. p.79). 
248 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.86. 
249 Schelling notes three resulting categories, recognizable as the objects of Kant’s critique of metaphysics: 
an ontology which assumed concepts a priori independently of objects became generally accepted, a 
rational psychology or rational cosmology relying on assumptions derived from tradition (not a priori 
rationality), and a rational theology centered on three proofs (ontological, cosmological, and physio-
logical) for the existence of God. Both the form of metaphysics which Kant criticized and the foundation 
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distinction of the form from content of thought guarantees that philosophy remains 
limited by the confines of negative thought. 
ii. Kant and Fichte: Kant’s rhetorical claim to delineate and criticize pure reason 
sounds inherently troubling once the limits of negative philosophy are identified. 
Philosophical thinking, if confined to a priori rules of logic, cannot satisfactorily account 
for the facticity of the world. Thus an a priori philosophy undermines its own results 
before a pure method can be articulated; a theory divorced from experience misses the 
point of philosophy. Schelling’s mature assessment of Kant involved significantly less 
exertion than his earlier interpretative efforts; his survey of early modern philosophy 
accomplished what technical criticisms of the full critical system could only repeat. 
Kant’s unique role, from Schelling’s mature perspective, was exposing the implied end of 
modern philosophy;250 he completed the project begun by Descartes (and developed by 
the efforts of various modern philosophers through divergent projects), without 
completing philosophy itself, by articulating a logic fully removed from actuality. 
According to Schelling, the basic conviction of Kant’s first Critique—a survey of 
what knowledge is possible independently and separately from the type of knowledge it 
judges—proves far less coherent than Kant assumed: 
At first sight this thought is extremely plausible. Looked at more closely, it is revealed 
that it is here a question of a knowing of knowing, and that this knowing of knowing 
itself is, in turn, precisely a knowing. Accordingly, it would first require an 
                                                                                                                                                 
for his rejection of religious concepts as impossible objects of experience are clear (On the History of 
Modern Philosophy. p.86-7). 
250 “Whilst [Kant] thought that he had brought all knowledge of the supersensuous to an end for all time by 
his critique, he really only caused negative and positive in philosophy to have to separate, but precisely 
because of this positive, now emerging in its complete independence, was able to oppose itself, as positive, 
to the merely negative philosophy as the second side of philosophy as a whole (Schelling. On the History of 
Modern Philosophy. p.95).” 
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investigation of the possibility of such a knowledge of knowing, and in this way one 
could keep on asking into infinity [On Modern Philosophy. p.98]. 
 
This critique echoes a point that was implicit in Schelling’s early works, but here it is 
directly stated. The Philosophical Letters only questioned the finality of Kant’s critique 
of reason’s frailty,251 and Of the I grounded further philosophical investigation of the 
abstract Absolute with little evident concern for the actual, posited world. Yet when 
interpreted through the framework of Schelling’s history of modern philosophy, Kant’s 
accomplishment appears somewhat anticlimactic as he simply brought the problem of 
negative philosophy in the Cartesian tradition fully to light. 
Even if Kant gave definitive expression to modern philosophy, subsequent theorists 
do not need to accept the critical philosophy as anything more than a crucial starting 
point. In fact, Schelling saw its position as untenable and argued that the critique of all 
reason limits thought to such an extent that it becomes incomprehensible to itself. The 
thing-in-itself signals, to Schelling, the failure of Kant’s theory of sensation as it ends 
with two ungraspables: the “incomprehensible arrangement of what thinks in us”, and the 
“incomprehensible outside-us.” Any theory that cannot account in some manner for these 
ideas will inevitably fail: a truly unknowable remainder proves unthinkable, despite the 
obvious presence of what these ungraspables are meant to describe. Within a system 
demanding a self-contained account of the elements of reason, essential components 
                                                 
251 Schelling. Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. p.161. 
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cannot be characterized as entirely foreign. Thus, despite Kant’s desire to develop a 
critical philosophy, his work was objective and dogmatic on this vital point.252 
Schelling presented Fichtean idealism as a development of Kant’s dogmatic turn 
from the objective to the subjective as the starting point for philosophy. As an 
improvement, rather than a true alternative, to the critical philosophy, Fichte’s idealism 
repeated the Kantian failure to account for freedom: 
The absolute idealist cannot avoid thinking of the I as dependent in relation to its ideas 
if the external world—even if it is not dependent on a thing in itself, as Kant called it, or 
on a cause outside itself, is at least dependent on an inner necessity, and if Fichte 
attributes a production of those ideas to the I, then this must at least be a production 
which is blind and not grounded in the will but rather in the nature of the I [On Modern 
Philosophy. p.108]. 
 
Schelling again glossed over the differences between philosophers in order to emphasize 
the problem shared by disparate systems. The problem of negative philosophy allowed 
the diversity of modern philosophy to be schematized as a single tradition that reiterates 
the same problem in multiple guises.253 Though this interpretation does not exhaust the 
possible readings of either Kant or Fichte, it does not need to be comprehensive; 
identifying a central problem shared by diverse expressions of modern philosophy is 
meant to bring a connection into focus that otherwise is not evident. Whether a 
philosophical narrative covers all possible meanings of each system it considers proves 
                                                 
252 Schelling, of course, was not alone in criticizing this point of the critical philosophy. Franks provides a 
detailed account of this problem and its influence on the reception of the critical philosophy (All or 
Nothing. esp. pp.336-83).  
253 “Ever since Descartes, and extending all the way through the early Fichte, reflection has structurally 
embodied the very Fall from which it purports to redeem the human subject; for reflection invariably sets 
consciousness in a relation of opposition and dissociation to its object, and thus its syntheses can never 
reconstitute but merely presuppose the Being of a lost unity; as Schelling puts it, ‘mere reflection is thus a 
mental disorder of man’ and we can only concede it a ‘negative quality’ (Pfau. “Critical Introduction.” 
Idealism and the Endgame of Theory. p.26).” 
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relatively unimportant, such a critique simply must emphasize a pervasive tendency 
within the seemingly disparate tradition of modern thought. 
Schelling was merely following the practice of modern philosophy in advancing his 
own view through a misrepresentation of his predecessors. As a self-delineated era, 
modernity invites such appropriations since the tradition made broad critique and 
reinterpretation central to its own identity. Individual theorists, such as Descartes or 
Spinoza, pursued their own agendas in a manner that has indelibly marked subsequent 
philosophy, but modern philosophy has staked its identity to reason’s freedom from the 
confines of an established canon. There is thus a contradictory pull—to depend on 
predecessors’ work yet to refuse to accept that work on its own terms—inherent to 
modern philosophy that leads philosophers to use the work of their predecessors as a sort 
of grist for their mill. This is not entirely new (philosophers have articulated their views 
through criticizing their predecessors since at least Aristotle’s Metaphysics), but the 
modern period has heightened this approach as the assertion of the autonomy of reason 
undermines strong claims of authorial intent and encourages re-appropriation. 
Through his characterization of Kant and Fichte as deterministic idealists, Schelling 
ultimately distinguished his mature goals from those of his early thought. Specifically, he 
distanced himself from the idealist presentation of the world; the phenomenal world is 
not explicable solely through logical thought, which the psycho-logical construction of 
transcendental idealism appears to assert.254 Schelling’s critique of the idealism of his 
youth rests on the conviction that philosophy may challenge and deepen common sense, 
                                                 
254 A gloss of the System of Transcendental Idealism suggests such a position, even if it is not the precise 
argument. 
167 
 
 
but it cannot dismiss the facticity of the external world which serves as foundational to 
common sense.255 Of course Kant and Fichte, like the idealist Schelling, never explicitly 
presented the ~I as an immediate fantastical postulation of the I. By misrepresenting this 
point, Schelling emphasized that both Kantian dogmatism and the idealism of his early 
works fail to fully engage the positivity of experience regardless of intent. Rather than an 
actual error, his criticism emphasizes the incomplete nature of their perspectives once 
viewed through the positive philosophy. The additional needs indicated by the “positive” 
philosophy help to justify the reduction of opposing systems to one, with “idealism” used 
to characterize a shared assumption of modern philosophy otherwise easy to overlook: 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Wolff, Kant, Fichte, and Schelling’s System of 
Transcendental Idealism all treat nature as a subjective determination. 
Through his critical survey of modern philosophers, Schelling developed an 
argument about the basis that philosophy must adopt. When beginning with the self as a 
first principle, philosophy always posits the world as the result of thought rather than 
something in excess of thought. The Naturphilosophie and Hegel lectures demonstrate the 
challenge of representing beings beyond the confines of negative philosophy; these 
lectures must articulate a philosophical view that exceeds the confines of the logical, 
negative philosophy. Yet while distinct, the positive philosophy proves unsustainable in 
separation from what has been criticized. Just as lionized reason cannot deliver on its 
promise of closed theory, neither can the positive philosophy complete itself. Neither 
philosophical perspective is what it should be in isolation from what it is not. 
                                                 
255 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.109. 
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C. Naturphilosophie, Hegel, and the Trap of Rationalism: Schelling continued his 
lectures by reconsidering his youthful Naturphilosophie256 and arguing that a 
philosophical system’s approach to nature determines whether it will be able to overstep 
the boundaries of negative philosophy. Any view that does not understand and value the 
material world as organic cannot overcome the negative limits inherent to modern 
thought; Schelling maintained the basic conviction of his early work that contingency, 
attraction, and force are the essential ideas for understanding any living subject.257 Like 
Spinoza, he approached nature first through the infinite subject which never ceases being 
a subject and thus cannot exist objectively. Unlike Spinoza, Schelling considered this 
abstraction as self-objectifying, an infinitely self-positing process rather than a static 
entity.258 The tension and opposition created by a subject positing itself, and thus 
becoming an object, hints that the opposition between contingent and eternal alone can 
make knowledge of the Absolute Subject, which grounds all knowledge, possible.259 
                                                 
256 Schelling’s youthful Naturphilosophie attracts scholarly interest as it “introduced the idea of a 
philosophy of nature into classical German philosophy in the form of a ‘prehistory’ of reason (Sturma. 
“The Nature of Subjectivity.” p.217).” This explains why the lectures focus so strongly on this period of his 
youthful work. 
257 The details are not important here as Schelling abandoned the presentation of Naturphilosophie as an 
empirical science. By 1800, the goal of the Naturphilosophie could be stated without a scientific guise: 
“What Schelling is rejecting is the notion of a ‘block universe,’ […]—one devoid of real possibility. Thus, 
‘no matter how one pictures to oneself the procession of creatures from God, it can never be a mechanical 
production’; particularly in the more complex natural forms we can see that an ‘irrational and accidental 
element,’ and not ‘a geometric necessity’ has operated in their emergence. And so God ‘is not a system, but 
a life’ (Esposito. Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature. p.158.).” See also Rajan. “First Outline of 
a System of Theory.” 
258 Laughland summarizes this move, made in the earlier Naturphilosophie: “His idea, then, was to 
introduce a higher realism into the philosophy of idealism trying to give back to the natural world that self-
sufficiency which he felt Fichte had taken away from it. […] Schelling’s basic idea in the Nature 
Philosophy was that all nature should be thought of in terms of ‘productivity’ (Schelling versus Hegel. 
p.45).” 
259 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.116. 
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This leads to a second stage, or potency,260 in which the subject posits itself as an 
essence in such a way that it becomes an other. The essential, logical core of a being 
cannot be taken as simply identical with the existence of that being: 
In this form it is no longer just A, but as A, as A because the possibility of being not-A is 
already excluded. But A which is posited as A is no longer simple A, but rather A which 
is A, not—is and is not, but emphatically is. A which is A is A which is duplicated with 
itself…, thus A which is posited as A is no longer simple but duplicated A, which we 
(after the concept has been explained) can call A2 for the sake of brevity, and we now 
have on the one side A which has become B, on the other in opposition and in tension 
with this… A2 [On Modern Philosophy. p.117]. 
 
As the act positing something is not the same as the thing posited, Schelling used this 
schema to draw attention to the gaps between logic, being, and reality that are evident 
within logical analyses of thought. He applied this to the subject and insisted that this 
retrospective schema reveals an actual duplicity of the thinking agent: the first stage—the 
Real—is something; the second stage recognizes the real and is thus the Ideal. Schelling’s 
conception of Nature—a self-positing of the Absolute subject—requires that Nature is 
irreducible to objectivity, the view commonly adopted within empirical sciences. 
Schelling presented these potencies as stages in a progression anticipating humanity, 
the point at which “nature as such is completed and a new world, a completely new 
sequence of developments begins.”261 The new sequence, in which the relation of infinite 
knowledge and finite being gives rise to necessary ideas, leads to an opposition with 
                                                 
260 The wording at this point is reminiscent of the lengthy central section of the System of Transcendental 
Idealism. A fuller discussion of the Potencies in Schelling’s mature thought follows in the fifth chapter. 
261 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.124. 
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freedom.262 By positing an opposition of necessity and freedom, thus moving philosophy 
into “the sphere of action”, the Naturphilosophie became a philosophy of history: 
Here, then, philosophy came to that last subject which was victorious over everything, 
which itself no longer becomes objective, but instead always remains subject, and 
which man can no longer recognize, as he could in knowledge, as himself, but instead as 
above himself and for precisely that reason as above everything, to which finally 
everything is subordinated and which now, not as at the first beginning, just is spirit and 
Providence, but also declares itself to be Providence, and shows at the end what already 
was at the beginning [On Modern Philosophy. p.127]. 
 
The philosophy of history, as Schelling develops it, presents historical contingency as 
manifesting a priori philosophical assumptions in order to verify them. This realization—
the major difference between the early Naturphilosophie works and Schelling’s mature 
reflections on them—is a major challenge for Schelling’s positive philosophy: in what 
sense can history be presented as a manifestation of a pre-historical event and remain an 
historical investigation? The positive philosophy, building upon the Naturphilosophie, 
must establish a way—not immediately evident—to take history as an object. 
Schelling’s critique of negative philosophy reached its fullest manifestation in his 
analysis of Hegel. The lectures show that this critique should not be separated from his 
general interpretation of modern philosophy; Schelling understood Hegel’s absolute 
dialectic as the fullest and best expression of the negative perspective shared by all 
modern philosophy, not as an isolated target. By demanding that philosophy concern 
itself only with pure thinking—the concept—Hegel presented logical, negative 
philosophy as all encompassing. Schelling identified this as Hegel’s fundamental error as 
he was so committed to the negative that, if Hegel remained consistent in “renouncing 
                                                 
262 “Necessity is what man is concerned with in his knowing, to which he is subordinated in his cognition; 
freedom is freedom of action and doing; all action presupposes cognition […] what in knowing was subject 
becomes in action an object, a tool, an organ (On Modern Philosophy. p.126).” 
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everything positive, then he would have brought about the decisive transition to the 
positive philosophy, for the Negative, the negative pole can never be there in pure form 
without immediately calling for the positive pole.”263 The structure of this critique shows 
that Schelling’s well documented personal animus against Hegel should not overshadow 
the specific philosophical argument that Schelling advanced. 
Specifically, his critique of Hegel repeats his fundamental criticism of Cartesian, 
Spinozistic, and Kantian thought as made evident in his appraisal of the Hegelian view of 
God. Following the modern philosophical emphasis on autonomy, theological thought 
was characterized as a philosophical result rather than an independent theoretical voice: 
What position did God have in the philosophy just presented? Initially the position of a 
mere result, of the highest and last thought which brings everything to a conclusion—
completely in accordance with the position which he also had in previous metaphysics, 
and which Kant as well, for whom God was just the necessary though for the formal 
conclusion of human knowledge, had left to Him [On Modern Philosophy. p.132]. 
 
The Hegelian claim—to achieve a complete knowledge of God through his system—
follows from the belief that the concept is everything, such that no remainder lies beyond 
reason.264 Hegel chose the concept least susceptible to subjective determination, the 
concept of pure being, as his basis for achieving this result that follows from the 
movement from the objective to the subjective.265 
                                                 
263 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.134. 
264 “[F]or [Hegel] the concept had the meaning that it was God (Schelling. On Modern Philosophy. p.135).” 
This calls attention to a vital point in Schelling’s Hegel critique: at no point does his criticism dismiss 
Hegelian dialectic as superfluous, the criticism is of its absolute and final claims: “A travers son activité 
rapportée immédiatement et aveuglément à l'être, la raison déduit bien un Dieu-à-la-fin mais elle conçoit 
mal son pouvoir. Cette démarche vers Dieu n'est pas fausse, mais c'est une démarche nécessaire, qui 
requiert le développement immanent de la raison (Laffoucriere. « Schelling et les Puissances. » p.176).” 
265 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.136-8. 
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Schelling accused Hegel of reducing reality to the pure concept due to his mistaken 
insistence that the logical concept determines itself.266 Hegel began his dialectic with 
Being as such but, as there is no existing Being as such, the dialectic can only start as a 
purely conceptual exercise: as Bracken noted, Schelling insisted that the initial term 
ought to be the “transcendent Subject of Being in its initial state of indeterminacy.”267 
Hegel understood pure being to be compelled to become concrete being since thought 
finds it impossible to stop at an abstract concept. That is, something cannot be thought 
without the concept also existing in some form. This substituted a purely abstract concept 
for thought mobilized by an actual thinking subject, making the contingency of historical 
development into a necessary process.268 Schelling accepted Hegel’s portrayal of these 
concepts, but insisted that he confused the subjective and objective concepts that 
philosophy needs. Hegel assumed that the concept is super-sensuous (encompassing all 
reality), and this assumption lead him to neglect issues which lay outside of 
methodology.269 This critique betrays Schelling’s assumption (not shared by Hegel) that 
apart from experience thought can only understand what is possible, not what exists.270 
                                                 
266 This is a controversial point. Lawrence presents Schelling as fundamentally correct on this point: 
“according to Hegel, the Absolute becomes fully mediated in thought, that its absolute nature does not exist 
apart from its classification in a universally valid and universally comprehensible science, is what is here at 
issue. Schelling […] had never presented his philosophy in the form of such an absolute science (“Schelling 
as Post-Hegelian and as Aristotelian.” p.320).” Likewise, Flam contrasts Schelling and Hegel: “Schelling 
has put the problem and solved it in this way: that it is the individual in his own existence who absorbs the 
history of mankind. Hegel will consider the individual as a nothingness […] absorbed by universal history 
(“Schelling’s Romantic Dialectic,” p.300).” Houlgate argues that Schelling’s influential view is erroneous 
(“Schelling’s Critique of Hegel’s ‘Science of Logic’”). Such contemporary critiques resemble Schelling’s 
and Hegel’s disagreement as, sharing a similar goal, they expressed their disagreements rather viciously 
(Benz. The Mystical Sources of German Romantic Philosophy. pp.41-42). 
267 Bracken. “The ‘Late’ Schelling’s Critique of Hegel in the Matter of Dialectic.” p.510. 
268 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.138-9. 
269 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.146-7. 
270 This is the basis of Houlgate’s argument that Schelling’s critique misrepresents rather than engages 
Hegel’s position (“Schelling’s Critique of Hegel’s ‘Science of Logic’.” pp.116-7). This creates some 
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Schelling argued the common sense point that while all experience “lies, so to speak, 
in the nets of the understanding or of reason” nevertheless “there is obviously something 
other and something more than mere reason in the world.”271 While obvious, the 
combination of technical argumentation and abstract reasoning—especially in a system 
such as Hegel’s—can often lead philosophy to inadvertently oppose or overshadow such 
common sense. Schelling’s interpretation treats Hegel as the fullest embodiment of the 
modern philosophical tendency to substitute a second-order theory for experience itself. 
According to Schelling, Hegel transcended the position of earlier modern metaphysics by 
positing a double becoming—both a logical and a real one—though nevertheless failed 
to establish this real beginning.272 The rhetoric of totality and completion in Hegel’s 
system obscures the relationship between theory and experience. 
The failure of the Hegelian dialectic reveals the need for an explicit, fundamental 
basis of philosophy in the non-dialectical relationship of freedom. Since purely logical 
inquiry cannot reach existential things, an account of freedom is only possible by non-
dialectical means. Such a means is available through the investigation of actualized 
                                                                                                                                                 
critical space between Hegel and Schelling’s critique (ibid, pp.99-101) but it does not, as Houlgate argued, 
free Hegel from Schelling’s criticism. His contention that “From Hegel’s perspective, however, Schelling’s 
criticism that Hegel is logocentric relies itself on the questionable assumption that thought in itself is 
restricted to what is conceivable and possible […]. For Hegel, being itself does not merely reside outside 
thought, but is brought before the mind or intuited by thought itself (ibid, p.124).” This view differs from 
what Schelling criticized, but not immune to the criticism. 
271 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.147. 
272 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.147, 149. Frank summarizes: “Schelling makes the 
claim […] that [Hegel’s] Logic fails to accomplish its own program. The program was to resolve the 
conflict between concepts of opposition and of unity by arranging them within the concept as an 
overarching unity that bridged the conflict itself, what Hegel described in the chapter on the Idea as the 
‘identity of the real and the ideal.’ According to Schelling, the place of this existing idea remains vacant as 
long as the term of reality lacks sensuality, for sensual existence is necessary to actually, rather than merely 
conceptually, differentiate it from its correlative concept, the ideal (“Schelling’s Critique of Hegel.” 
p.261).” 
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freedom, that is, a historical philosophy that considers the record of human thought as a 
manifestation of humanity’s creative freedom. As the relation Hegel mapped between 
God and Nature cannot exist at any particular moment, Schelling argues that 
Hegelianism negates everything historical.273 Positive philosophy differs from the 
negative most significantly in this willingness to revise the rhetoric of a priori logical 
necessity according to the contingent record of philosophy, religion, and mythology. 
This ultimate argumentative focus clarifies the interpretive choices driving 
Schelling’s critique of the major figures of the modern philosophical canon. While he 
skewed each author’s particular positions—selecting the works and views most 
suggestive of the problems he deemed noteworthy despite the authors’ original intents—
his critique nevertheless focused on a shared assumption across the diversity of modern 
systems. The assumption that reason operates indifferently, universally, and a priori 
echoes Enlightenment assumptions, but has roots well outside of the historical 
assumptions of the Enlightenment era. By challenging this assumption directly, Schelling 
radicalized his criticism to the point that challenging Enlightenment assumptions required 
an entirely different conception of philosophy. 
 
III. The Challenges of Delineating a Positive Philosophy. 
 
A single-minded critique of the modern philosophical tradition invariably ignores 
significant nuances of its fractured and disparate systems while providing a singular focus 
that makes the critique applicable beyond a single modern philosopher. This raises the 
stakes of the intellectual history above that of a mere interpretive exercise as it plays a 
                                                 
273 Schelling. On the History of Modern Philosophy. p.159-60. 
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role in engaging contemporary culture. For this reason, the present study approaches 
Schelling’s critique of Hegel as a part of his response to modern philosophy generally.274 
This lessens the need to disentangle personal animosity from philosophical motivations. 
Without ignoring the centrality of Hegel for Schelling’s articulation of the “positive” 
philosophy, it is best to focus on the larger project—questioning the general stance of 
modern philosophy—rather than any private bitterness that fueled that effort.275 
A. Defining Positive and Negative Philosophy: The distinction between positive 
and negative philosophy provides a framework through which the diverse styles and 
concerns of his corpus—Naturphilosophie, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, theosophy, 
mythology, etc.—can be seen as unified. Yet despite internal markers that indicate 
discrete eras of his thought, each period points to the problems and goals of the others: 
Schelling’s early idealist explorations of the self underscored the need for rational 
thought to transcend its own limits in order to properly ground rational activity; the 
Naturphilosophie and 1800 System anticipated the need to exceed subject and object 
dualism; the mythological and religious ideas, increasingly prominent in the mature 
                                                 
274 Bracken notes: “His comments on Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Fichte are, however, illuminating for 
his critique both of Hegel and of his own Philosophy of Identity and should therefore be treated in 
summary manner” before interpreting Schelling’s critique of Hegel (“The ‘Late’ Schelling’s Critique of 
Hegel in the Matter of Dialectic,” p.509). Bracken’s emphasis nevertheless remained on Schelling’s 
relation to Hegel. Others press this further and insist that Schelling’s critique of modernity reveals a 
crippling obsession with Hegel: “Behind this ‘positive’ philosophy there lurks, then, the shade—one might 
well say the bogey—of Hegel. For with Schelling his great rival—the man, his system, his influence—had 
become an obsession (Reardon. “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel.” p.545).” This is grounds, according to 
Rosenkrantz, to dismiss Schelling’s latter work: “We will not go further into this sad history, for it was 
possible only for a passionate rivalry so to misapprehend and disparage the author of the “Phenomenology” 
(“Hegel’s Relation to his Philosophical Contemporaries,” p.403).” 
275 Seebohm critically surveys Schelling’s departure from Hegel particularly by elucidating the general 
philosophical stance Schelling was working out through the negative critical work: acknowledging that the 
deduction of categories presupposes a “relation to a standpoint of consciousness and the process of its 
emergence as real historical emergence in time,” a task that involves a rejection of post-Kantian speculation 
while raising questions impossible for Kant to formulate (“Schelling’s ‘Kantian’ Critique of Hegel’s 
Deduction of Categories” pp.253-54). 
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works, provide both the multiplicity of perspectives and the record of historical 
contingency needed to ground abstract reflection beyond the limits of negative 
philosophy. In the positive philosophy, Schelling was able to connect philosophical 
concerns that otherwise seem to split his corpus into various eras.276 
The negative perspective remains vital to philosophy as more than preparation for 
the positive; philosophers must actively articulate the negative, logical perspective in 
order to prevent a turn to religion from simply reasserting pre-critical rational theology. 
As such, the final consideration of Schelling’s corpus must start from this distinction 
between the positive and negative in philosophy. Restated apart from the survey of 
modern philosophy, this distinction emphasizes the difference between what is thought 
only (according to necessary logical laws), and what exists in excess of a posteriori 
attempts to theorize it.277 Schelling’s assertion that the positive and the negative depend 
upon each other indicates an ongoing dialectic between critical analysis and empirical 
experience that exceeds any single characterization. The distinction between thought and 
reality is obvious but, as Schelling’s lectures show, the pervasive tendency of modern 
                                                 
276 As discussed by Bowie (Schelling and Modern European Philosophy. pp.12-14); Fackenheim considers 
the crisis of idealism that led Schelling, as he became increasingly critical of this crisis, to a “leap of faith” 
while also valuing reason (The God Within. p.99-106, 110). 
277 This is the schema most typically adopted by commentators (See Bracken. “Schelling’s Conception of 
the Positive and Negative Philosophies in His Lectures at Munich in 1832/33.” p.639; Fackenheim. The 
God Within. p.112). Frank  argued that the positive philosophy served as a precursor to Materialism—
noting specific influences on Feuerbach (“Schelling’s Critique of Hegel and the Beginnings of Marxian 
Dialectics.” pp.259, 261) and Marx (ibid. p.269)—that pushes the standard understanding of the 
negative/positive distinction to unexpected extremes. Vetö insisted that the positive/negative distinction 
separates “fallen” reason from practical reason with “the option for good.” His view correctly criticizes the 
danger of understanding the distinction as solely formal (“La Primauté du Pratique selon Schelling.” 
p.229),” but his emphasis on the doctrine of the fall (and Reformation mistrust of reason) confuses the 
results made possible by the positive/negative distinction with the core distinction itself (ibid. p.233). To 
understand Schelling’s distinction and its current relevance, it is best to resist collapsing the 
positive/negative distinction and the concepts of God and creation that played such a vital role in 
articulating the distinction. 
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philosophy overlooks this point in effect, if not intent. For Schelling, only by presenting 
two irreducible attitudes within philosophy could the limitation of reason be 
acknowledged and preserved. 
Of course, a distinction between thought and reality must itself be grounded in 
thought and thus seems confined to the very limits it means to overcome; the positive 
philosophy not only needs the negative philosophy, it must be expressed in the same 
medium that it criticizes. Schelling seems bound to the same problem he expounded 
through his interpretive criticism of Hegel. Yet even if this limitation is unavoidable, it 
can be schematized and addressed differently.278 The difference between the negative and 
the positive perspectives lie in their respective interpretations of this mental locus: the 
negative sees this limitation as a reflection of reality, the positive philosophy rests on 
seeing this as a limitation which places philosophy in dialogue with other disciplines.279 
Schelling criticized Hegel for sublating the distinction and thus illustrating the 
homogenization of thought and being that the “positive” critique attempts to avoid. 
In light of the limitations of the Enlightenment conception of philosophy, a new 
project—delineating philosophy as both contingent and logical a priori arguments—is 
needed for the discipline to renew its self-understanding. Several challenges follow from 
this project and thus must be considered before turning, in the next chapter, to the various 
                                                 
278 Reardon captures this nicely: “The issue between [Schelling and Hegel] is the fundamental one of 
whether the realm of ‘pure’ thought, of the Idea, is logically self-realized, attained in and of itself alone, by 
a kind of automediation, before its manifestation, and indeed ‘alienation’, in the world and nature. Hegel 
was plainly confident that it would be and is […]. Schelling, on the contrary, denies this: thought has no 
such absolute autonomy; its powers must be tried and tested in experience, thus committing it sooner or 
later to radical self-examination (“Schelling’s Critique of Hegel. p.553).” 
279 Certainly the limits of thought should not be taken as characterizing all of reality: “The unification 
between the ideal and the real is internal to the self, but it is not constituted by the self; it is always already 
given, without the self having anything to do with it (Lawrence. “Spinoza in Schelling.” p.184).” 
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works which constitute the “positive” period of Schelling’s thought. First, the positive 
philosophy can be easily dismissed as abandoning philosophy proper, if not carefully 
elucidated. A critic could reasonably argue that, even if philosophy is embroiled in such 
extra-rational concerns, the positive perspective skews philosophical concerns too far into 
the ken of other disciplines; specifically that it leaves philosophy for theological methods 
and questions. Thus, the development of such a perspective should be left by 
philosophers to other disciplines as it recreates a theological meta-interpretation. 
Though it indicates the discipline’s limitations, the failure of the negative perspective 
proves to be an internal problem for modern philosophy. The characterization of the 
discipline as autonomous, a basic assumption in the modern era, leads philosophy to this 
negative perspective. It also points beyond negative philosophy as logical argumentation 
requires both raw input and some epistemic impulse that itself cannot be reduced to 
reason. Rhetoric of strict autonomy isolates philosophy from the experience that it must 
engage in order to have any form or function. Thus, the failure of negative philosophy is 
not only manifest in questions about the divine along the border of philosophy and 
theology. If philosophy is to reflect on the fact that there is a world at all, it must free 
itself from the constraints of a priori logical necessity. An investigation into the physical 
properties of the world, or a retraced chain of effects and causes that identifies an original 
cause, cannot fully comprehend the world as it is. No theoretical method can exhaust or 
portray a full outline of the ground of theory. The early modern critique of the scholastic 
views that acknowledged complex relationships between philosophy and other meta-
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interpretive disciplines proved too simplistic: philosophy has an essential need for other 
interpretive theories. 
This internal failing of modern philosophy points to the importance of Schelling’s 
presentation of the positive philosophy as adding to negative philosophy, rather than 
being opposed to it. In fact, Schelling insisted that they require each other: the negative 
treatment of experience shows that the empirical world cannot be explained simply by 
logic, but it is also impossible to discuss the fact of the empirical world without recourse 
to a logical description of what it is.280 The mutual need of the negative and the positive, 
a need that requires each to remain distinct, clarifies the symbolic importance of 
Hegelianism for Schelling. Hegelian dialectic emphasized the sublation of difference, and 
thus works directly against the possibility of a positive philosophy. Philosophy must 
counteract, though not entirely dismiss, its own sublating tendency with attention to the 
diversity of mental perspectives needed to understand human culture and experience. 
B. Irrationalism and Theology as Problematic Alternatives: This critique of the 
philosophical fixation with a priori logic might suggest that Schelling adopted an 
irrationalist perspective in his late works. His rejection of Jacobi’s appeal to an extra-
rational intuition, and Jacobi’s subsequent critique of philosophy, shows that Schelling 
certainly did not view himself as an irrationalist in any direct sense.281 Still, his critique 
                                                 
280 Hayes summarized this point effectively in his survey of the later Philosophy of Mythology and 
Revelation: “from a What one cannot deduce a That. The negative philosophy cannot explain the existent 
world. Its deduction of the world is not a deduction of existents but only of what things must be if they 
exist (Schelling’s Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation. p.136).” 
281 For a summary of Jacobi’s argument and his influence over German Idealist conceptions of rationalism 
and Spinoza, see: Ford. “The Controversy Between Schelling and Jacobi.” p.78-80. 
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of Hegel anticipates and resembles more severe denouncements of philosophical 
authority: 
Every time reason greatly desires something, is someone bound immediately to furnish 
whatever it demands? Are we really obliged to flatter all of reason’s desires and 
forbidden to irritate it? Should not reason, on the contrary, be forced to satisfy us and to 
avoid in any way arousing our irritation? Kant could not resolve to ‘criticize’ reason in 
this way and the Kantian critique of reason does not ask such questions, just as the pre-
critical philosophy never asked them [Shestov. Athens and Jerusalem. p.51]. 
 
Shestov’s rejection of the autonomy of philosophy challenges the relations drawn 
between theoretical frameworks by modern rhetoric and raises the specter of a re-
marginalization of philosophy as a “handmaiden of theology”, a troubling turn for the 
tradition built on the rejection of such a role.282 In their criticisms of autonomous reason, 
Shestov and Schelling might seem to dismiss it all together. 
Like Schelling, Shestov considered Kant and Hegel equally complicit in the 
lionization of reason as self-sufficient. Modern philosophers’ view of religion follows as 
a manifestation of this problematic view of reason, so the criticism that philosophy of 
religion makes understandable suppresses the differences that distinguish each theorist: 
Kant is considered the destroyer of metaphysics, while Hegel is regarded as the 
philosopher who gave back to metaphysics the rights that Kant had torn away from it. 
In reality Hegel only completed Kant’s work. The conviction that faith is knowledge, 
the hostility to Holy Scripture carefully hidden under the appearance of respect, the 
denial of the very possibility of any other participation in truth than that which science 
offers—all these sufficiently testify to the goal that Hegel had set for himself [Athens 
and Jerusalem. p.131]. 
 
This claim that Hegel’s system completed Kant’s work can be criticized as ungrounded 
and exaggerated. From his perspective, that of a philosophy of religion, Shestov not only 
was unconcerned with the complex differences of philosopher’s system, he had to be. 
                                                 
282 See Introduction §I.D. Hegel criticized Enlightenment philosophy of religion for inadvertently returning 
philosophy to this supporting role (Faith and Knowledge. p.56). 
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Like Schelling, he challenged a shared assumption of how philosophy defines itself rather 
than develop a philosophy of religion within the self-understanding of modernity; a self-
understanding that forces religious thought into the role of a conquered antagonist. 
However, by flattening philosophical differences, such a critique not only challenges 
the efficacy of modern conceptions of philosophy, it challenges the value of philosophy 
all together. The more philosophy is conceptualized as a distinct abstract agent, the more 
any criticism seems likewise pitched at a conceptual and essential level. Shestov did little 
to indicate how philosophy might contribute to a more nuanced and existentially viable 
theory of experience (even as his work uses sophisticated philosophical argumentation). 
Schelling, with his schematic division of negative and positive philosophy, used the 
weaknesses of philosophy to clarify its strengths.283 That criticisms of philosophy can 
share an emphasis on the irrational without sharing a similar outlook is not surprising, but 
this difference between these authors’ critical stances is particularly noteworthy; 
Schelling always remained rather optimistic regarding reason’s authority and power, even 
while criticizing the modern presentation of it as self-sufficient. His “irrationalism” called 
attention to a vital aspect of thought that Enlightenment rhetoric ignored rather than reject 
the entirety of the project. That is, the limits of reason constitute an aspect of what 
philosophy must reconsider rather than a final judgment against the field.284 
                                                 
283 Flam’s characterization is apt: “Schelling’s dialectics is, in this sense, essentially dialectical, it tends to 
integrate the irrational into the rational, while aware that it is impossible (“Schelling’s Romantic Dialectic,” 
p.304). 
284 « Ce qu'on a pu appeler irrationnel chez Schelling est donc plus exactement le premier moment de mise 
à disposition de soi dans son schéma anthropologique. Et, considéré dans son ensemble, le schéma 
anthropologique de Schelling assume les exigences de la raison, mais en les orientant vers 
l'accomplissement du travail réalisé idéalement dans la créativité historique autonormée (Maesschalk. 
« Philosophie et Mythologie dans la Dernière Philosophie de Schelling. » p.188). » 
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Even if Schelling’s critique of philosophical reason is not as exaggerated as it may 
seem, the openly theological interests of his later works are likely to turn off many 
philosophical readers. As rhetoric of a priori and universal reason forces other types of 
mindfulness to appear as rivals to reason, there is a connection between the apparent 
irrationalism of the positive philosophy and its theological elements. The foundational 
importance of the rejection of scholasticism for modern thought has often led 
philosophers to consider transcendence—such as religious claims to give extra-ordinary 
or exceptional insight to the finite individual—to lie outside of philosophy’s proper 
domain. Yet, despite his criticism of modern philosophical conceptions of God as a 
necessary being of beings, Schelling often seemed to make a similar type of argument 
and describe a transcendent being with definitive dogmatic statements: 
God as such is, of course, not just the necessarily or blindly existing being, […] as God 
he is at the same time that which can negate this His own being which is dependent 
upon Him, can transform His necessary being into contingent being, namely into a 
being posited by itself, so that it in fact always fundamentally persists, be effectively or 
in fact is converted into an other, or as follows: necessary being does always lie at the 
foundation of that self-posited being, but without the effective, the real being of God 
just being this necessary being [On Modern Philosophy. p.55]. 
 
This sentiment is expressed in a less “theological” conclusion immediately following, a 
juxtaposition that demonstrates the ambivalence between negative philosophical views 
and other perspectives Schelling perused in his later works: 
Life consists precisely in the freedom to negate its own being as immediate, posited 
independently of itself, and to be able to transform it into a being posited by itself. What 
is dead in nature, e.g., has no freedom to change its being; it is as it is—at no moment 
of its existence is its being self-determined [On Modern Philosophy. p.55]. 
 
The positive philosophy is not defined by modern philosophical boundaries, neither in 
following nor by rejecting them. It neither lionizes reason as absolute nor discards it. In 
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order for his positive philosophy to accomplish its own goals, and to meet the 
requirements sought in this study, it must avoid taking the professional division of 
philosophy from theology as representing an abstract and essential division of the two 
types of mindfulness. It must also resist the urge to present theology as a monolithic 
entity, instead acknowledging the variety of theologies across religious traditions.285 
C. The Positive Philosophy and Christianity: As his survey of Descartes exhibited, 
Schelling adopted a more markedly Christian perspective in his late work. He particularly 
grew interested in the difference between the philosophical and the Christian conception 
of God. This distinction is one concern that helps to clarify why he pursued diverse 
interests and how they connected to form a focused perspective; he was increasingly 
concerned with the multiplicity of perspectives needed to delimit the sweeping concerns 
that philosophy claims to address. Nevertheless, as “modern” philosophy rejected the 
scholastic synchronization of philosophy and Christianity, Schelling’s explicit turn to 
traditional Christian thought made his mature work unpalatable within traditional modern 
philosophy.286 This tension, as much as the turn away from idealism after Hegel’s death, 
fueled the generally negative reception of Schelling. 
This close identification with a specific religious tradition casts into doubt whether 
the positive philosophy can meet the ideal of a philosophy of religion that engenders 
                                                 
285 Of course “theology” is strongly associated with the Christian tradition. The word is used here to 
indicate a broad range of systematic religious thought regardless of which denomination authors it. Here, 
“religious studies” and “theology” are used as nearly interchangeable even though their differences are 
important; the term “theology” is preferable as it denotes the clearest historic institutional rival for 
philosophy inside of universities. 
286 Certainly the young Hegelians, revolutionaries, and orthodox theologians all found extra-philosophical 
reasons to dismiss his work leading up to the revolutions of 1848 (O’Meara. Romantic Idealism and Roman 
Catholicism. p.184-85; Frank. “Schelling’s Critique of Hegel and the Beginnings of Marxian Dialectics.” 
p.254). 
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dialogue between incomplete perspectives and various disciplines. Such a critical arena 
cannot function as an apologetic for one religion; an apologetic instrumentalizes various 
ways of thinking to support the absolute claims of its adopted fundamental view. The 
positive philosophy must maintain rather than relieve the distinctness of historical 
religions and abstract systems of thought. Since Schelling presented the positive 
philosophy as a systematic philosophy which avoids the absolutizing claims of pure 
reason, this constitutes an explicit internal need for his mature work. Schelling failed to 
achieve his goals if the positive philosophy cannot facilitate multiple meta-interpretations 
of experience all engaging each other as equals. The development of his thought, 
however, follows a clear path towards Christian doctrines and theological concerns. 
Laughland, in Schelling versus Hegel, has presented Schelling’s maturation as an 
abandoning of Gnostic and neo-Platonic thought explicitly for orthodox Christian 
philosophy.287 By presenting philosophy as turning to religion to address its own 
incompletion and shortcomings, Laughland’s view seemingly complements the present 
interpretation. It must, however, be considered a rival interpretation; Laughland presents 
Schelling as restoring a medieval harmonization of faith and reason: 
Schelling thus insisted that positive philosophy must include Christianity within it, just 
as it included nature—although it would not be philosophy if it were not there 
independently of Christianity itself. Schelling claimed that this idea made his 
philosophy special, but this was also St Thomas Aquinas’ position. Aquinas always 
emphasized that reason could achieve nearly everything independently of faith. Indeed, 
Schelling seemed to call explicitly on Scholastic vocabulary when, having discussed 
                                                 
287 He describes Schelling’s incarnational language to present idealism as the soul of philosophy and 
realism as its body: “It is difficult to think of a more explicit nod toward Christian metaphysics than this, 
and Schelling seems to have understood that he was groping his way back to an ontological scheme which 
could explain the Incarnation of God as man (Laughland. Schelling versus Hegel. p.74).” This 
interpretation builds on a survey of the Jesuit scholarship of Kaspar, Tilliete, O’Meara, and Brito (see 
pp.37-8, 61). 
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being in general, he turned to the question of God’s being and quoted the-well know 
Latin formula: ‘In Deo essentia et existentia unum idemque sunt.’ [Schelling versus 
Hegel. p.131]288 
 
The first insistence—that positive philosophy includes Christianity—is correct and will 
be explored in the subsequent chapter. The link drawn with Thomism, however, indicates 
an interpretive goal that must be challenged in order to explore Schelling’s continued 
relevance. As the Thomistic synthesis emphasized the harmonization of reason and 
revelation, it raises the same issues which Hegel’s philosophy of religion suggested. 
Laughland traces a similar development through Schelling’s works as the present 
study, though he emphasizes texts predominantly from Schelling’s middle period in the 
early 1800s at the expense of his mature work on religion and mythology. This 
transitional period of Schelling’s career was marked by an increasing exploration of 
doctrines of creation and the fall. Schelling’s philosophy certainly adopted a more 
Christian expression during this period, though he also grew more explicit in addressing 
how philosophy and revelation connect only in the late works. On Laughland’s reading, 
the Philosophy and Religion essay proved decisive: 
[T]his stark emphasis on the fall began to corrode Schelling’s former harmonizing 
conception of his own philosophy, according to which the Nature Philosophy and the 
transcendental philosophy were the ‘real’ and ‘ideal’ sides of the same coin, without 
any transition or rupture between them. His new conviction that the transition from the 
infinite to the finite was inexplicable would separate him radically from Hegel, who by 
contrast tried to portray the development of determination out of the Absolute as a 
seamless, comprehensible and necessary logical dialectic [Schelling versus Hegel. 
pp.56-7]. 
 
                                                 
288 Overall, Laughland’s book has the clear objective of presenting Schelling as a Catholic philosophical 
theologian and implying that such a position provides a needed response to the problems of modern 
philosophy. His closing statement captures this: “Although it cannot be denied that Schelling’s idealist 
heritage continued to shine through his thought right until the very death […] nonetheless, it was no doubt 
indeed ‘a sign of fate’ that a Catholic priest read prayers over the Lutheran Schelling’s open grave 
(Schelling versus Hegel. p.150).” 
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This view casts Schelling’s opposition to Hegel as caused by his theological convictions. 
This is an understandable interpretation considering Schelling’s frequent moves between 
Catholic and Protestant states; his teaching appointments within schools obligated to 
support the state religion—according to cuius regio, eius religio—would certainly have 
led him to give increasing care in formulating his religiously charged philosophy.289 
The ease with which Schelling’s development can be characterized as a move toward 
orthodox theology demonstrates the ease with which the philosophy of religion can be 
confused with theology. This confusion stresses the need to criticize the role Schelling’s 
religious assumptions serve in his mature thought. Careful criticism of his reliance on 
Christian doctrine is necessary, but the characterization of his late thought as affirming 
conservative theology must be rejected immediately. Laughland offers insight into 
Schelling’s thought, but he skews the overall body of work. Specifically, Laughland’s 
view fails to note that Schelling’s critique of Hegel and modern philosophy centered on 
the absolutizing claims of rationality. This certainly was expressed through the critique of 
the Cartesian view of God which influenced Kant and Hegel, but it was not directly a 
theological objection. Laughland correctly acknowledges that: 
Schelling’s relationship with Christianity was far from straightforward. He did not steer 
a direct course towards a union of religion and philosophy. Rather, he navigated 
somewhat uneasily between conflicting and treacherous doctrines, some of which 
threatened to wreck the whole enterprise [Schelling versus Hegel. p.38]. 
 
This does not, however, ground Laughland’s attempt to read the disagreement between 
Schelling and Hegel as the opposition of heterodox and orthodox Christian philosophies. 
                                                 
289 O’Meara traced Schelling’s moves between Catholic and Protestant territories and the effect these 
moves had on the perception of his work (Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism. esp. pp.68-73, 90-
93). 
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While Schelling’s development away from idealism was accompanied by a move toward 
religious thought, Laughland miscast the relation which religion and philosophy are 
meant to hold as a result: “Schelling was seeking to make theology philosophical and 
philosophy theological and, in doing so, turning against two centuries of philosophical 
secularism.”290 This presents Schelling as repeating the core problematic sublation of 
theoretical difference that Hegel’s philosophy of religion posed. 
Laughland’s survey also presumes that Schelling’s religious philosophy should be 
read through the Neo-Thomist dichotomy of restored scholasticism and modernity. While 
the positive philosophy directly opposes the construal of philosophy as an autonomous 
entity, it also requires that philosophy remains distinct from the other types of thinking 
with which it engages in dialogue. That is, it can neither be approached as self-sufficient 
and self-contained, nor as reducible to a different science. This requires an openness to 
the influence of other disciplines, such as theology, that Laughland misrepresented as an 
explicit theological concern.291 Though his book characterizes Schellingian philosophy as 
opposed to the Hegelian Absolute Knowledge, Laughland’s assessment of his philosophy 
of religion effectively represents Schelling as accomplishing the same result—for the 
concerns of a philosophy of religion—as the Hegelian view. 
While effectively tracing an aspect of Schelling’s philosophical development, 
Laughland makes two mistakes which underscore the concern the following chapter must 
address. First, he views the critique of Hegel as a theological rather than philosophical 
                                                 
290 Laughland, p.79. 
291 At least as a concern that’s primary importance lies in its usefulness for theologians: “This is why 
Schelling’s influence on Catholic theologians of the period was important. Unlike Hegel, who was 
distinctly anti-Catholic, Schelling provided his Catholic disciples with a way of conceiving their theology 
and philosophy in the style of the nineteenth century [Laughland. Schelling versus Hegel. p.116].” 
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argument. The positive perspective indicates philosophy’s need for the contributions of 
other sciences without itself abandoning the general confines of philosophy. Second, 
Laughland characterizes Schelling’s opposition to Hegel as a rejection of the 
demonstrability of the unconditioned, and an “obsession” with free creation rather than 
the Hegelian (deterministic) dialectic.292 “In other words, it was precisely the differences 
between Schelling and Hegel over the meaning of God’s revelation which drove them 
apart.”293 Each characterization raises an important point, though they miss the main 
upshot of the alternative each philosopher offers. Laughland claims: 
Schelling’s whole purpose in the Stuttgart Lectures—a conceived in the Freedom essay 
and developed in the late philosophy—was to return from this dead modern philosophy 
back to traditions which had been obliterated by modern thought [Schelling versus 
Hegel. p.100]. 
 
Schelling acknowledged this obliteration but sought to move forward rather than return to 
pre-modern views. His thought did grow closer to traditional Christian theology in some 
manners but it did not return to medieval schemas relating theology and philosophy. 
Despite tracing a clear narrative and offering important insights, Laughland’s 
problematic assertion that Schelling became, functionally, a theologian poses a challenge 
that the following chapter must address. While interpreting the 1809 Essence of Human 
Freedom and the late lectures on the philosophy of revelation, special attention must be 
given to the question of whether Schelling’s articulation of the positive philosophy 
simply overlaps with Christian views, or if he eliminates the distinction between 
philosophy and religion (as well as that between religion and religions). Laughland, with 
his focus on the Catholic theologians’ reading of Schelling, has clarified the critical 
                                                 
292 Laughland, p.93-4. 
293 Laughland, p.140. 
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importance of distinguishing a true positive philosophy from any single tradition. His 
work also hints that such a distinction may never be fully maintained by individuals who, 
due to the necessities of academic culture, are invariably part of distinct traditions.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Religion and the Positive Philosophy 
 
 
 
The positive philosophy, as shown above, entails a constructive project—engaging 
the facticity of experience as it lies beyond the necessary relations of systematic logic—
that, together with its critical project, make any distinct or final doctrine impossible. The 
ongoing project requires distinct perspectives that allow for the continual re-articulation 
of a dynamic relationship. For such a dynamic relation to develop among academic fields 
that are given to absolutizing their own perspective, theorists must actively consider how 
alternate meta-interpretations can interact and mutually determine boundaries. For 
philosophy, religion offers an important alternative to immanent rationalizing as it often 
adopts transcendental perspectives that limit reason to an instrumental, rather than 
absolute, role. A philosophy of religion that navigates the confluence of these two 
perspectives holds central importance for any attempt at a positive philosophy. 
The philosophy of religion must avoid the problems represented by Kant and Hegel 
if it is to offer a framework that allows for a dynamic relation between the two distinct 
disciplines. The criticism of each figure’s interpretation of religion in the first chapter 
provides a guideline for outlining an alternative. First, the field must overcome the 
philosophical tendency to dismiss religious concepts as irrelevant for theoretical reason: 
any definitive barrier erected between the two disciplines ultimately will undermine both. 
Simultaneously, the field must avoid the absolutizing tendencies of abstract speculation 
and the sublation of religion into philosophy: a fully syncretic approach undermines the 
unique contribution each field offers. The fact that such a relation finds very specific 
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expression in university structures suggests that it cannot be settled, ultimately, by 
theoretical argumentation alone (even as theory delimits the problem). 
Though the problem exceeds pure theory, several theoretical aspects of the problem 
must be addressed in delineating a positive philosophy. Specifically, in order to avoid the 
confusion of philosophy, religion, and religions, theorists must reject the persistent 
presentation of philosophy and religion as rational and irrational ways of schematizing 
experience. Such a division stymies attempts to negotiate the dynamic relation between 
these types of mindfulness. By prioritizing freedom and volition rather than reason, 
Schelling opened philosophy to contingent experience in a more direct manner while 
rejecting the perceived self-sufficiency of reason. This included a move away from 
defining religion through philosophy, the very approach criticized in this study: 
The philosophical religion, far from having the right, through its position, to cancel 
the preceding religions, would thus through precisely this position have the task, and 
through its content the means, to comprehend those religions independent of reason, 
and indeed as such, and, accordingly, in their whole truth and actuality [Schelling. 
Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. p.174.].294 
 
Schelling’s late works—especially The Essence of Human Freedom, the Stuttgart 
Seminars, and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation—criticize the 
same concerns described in this study and explore religion without recourse to the simple 
dichotomy that opposes the rational with the irrational. They reveal the full challenge of 
navigating the relation between each abstract discipline without implicitly adopting one 
perspective or the other. 
                                                 
294 Schelling presented this as a challenge rather than as a description of the fields current state, and he 
elaborated on this point by characterizing nineteenth century philosophy of religion as failing this 
challenge, either dismissing or transforming religious thought. When discussing Schelling as a philosopher 
of religion, it is important to distinguish his idealized understanding of the field, which he saw as 
unrealized, from its typical meaning within philosophical discussions of his time. 
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I. The Essence of Human Freedom and the Relation of Reason to its Ground. 
 
The 1809 Essence of Human Freedom exhibits how a philosophy of religion can 
transcend the logical abstraction of philosophy without simultaneously rejecting 
philosophical dialectic. While predating the full distinction between positive and negative 
philosophy used in the lectures On the History of Modern Philosophy, the Essence essay 
helped to ground that distinction by navigating the tension between systematic 
philosophy and the human freedom that it is meant to describe. The essay poses 
interpretive challenges, in part, because it employs Kantian terminology while rejecting 
the basic Kantian premise that theoretical system and freedom can and should be 
understood separately. The above consideration of Schelling’s early works established 
that those works failed precisely because they ignored the radical regrounding that they 
suggested and which the 1809 essay finally attempted. 
A. Jacobi, Hegel, and Idolatrous Concepts: In using openly religious terminology, 
the Essence of Human Freedom seemingly disregards the limits drawn around philosophy 
by Kant’s Critique, limits that render modern philosophy as an immanent field. Any 
specific religious concept—historically conditioned and accessible only from within a 
particular revealed tradition—invariably conflicts with a philosophical perspective that 
understands itself as an a priori and universal science. Further, adopting specific religious 
ideas as philosophical terms complicates any attempt to delineate private belief from 
rational public discourse. By transgressing these assumed boundaries, Schelling 
attempted to reconceptualize modern philosophy apart from the limits drawn by the 
critical philosophy. By simultaneously using both theological and philosophical 
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terminology, he revealed his concern with two separate problematic alternatives to the 
Kantian philosophy of religion: those of Jacobi and Hegel.295 
Jacobi was deeply critical of the capabilities of reason and what he saw as the 
presumptuous character of Enlightenment ideals.296 His critique exercised significant 
influence that was most pronounced in the Pantheism controversy and perceptions of 
Spinoza whose philosophy, through the Recollections of Conversations with Lessing, he 
presented as the definitive rational system that reveals philosophy’s full threat to religious 
piety.297 Jacobi’s view—Spinoza’s Ethics leads to fatalistic and atheistic conclusions—
was widely shared and encapsulates the perceived threat religious thinkers saw in 
rationalism and modern philosophy. Jacobi identified the essential spirit of Spinozism as 
the rejection of any change in the infinite which, defined in entirely immanent terms, is 
no more than nature itself. This turned the free operation of the will, for finite individuals 
and the infinite alike, into an illusion. Finding this conclusion unacceptable, Jacobi 
insisted that the source of thought and action are unknowable and that reason must be 
limited far more severely than Kant had allowed in order to “make room for faith.”298 
                                                 
295 As noted in the previous chapter, Schelling’s personal animus against Hegel has been over-emphasized 
in some studies. The importance of Jacobi, however, is less commonly noted. Schelling’s 1812 polemic 
review, Schrift gegen Jacobi, has not been translated and has attracted little attention in English. Lovejoy’s 
The Great Chain of Being bases much of its interpretation of Schelling on this work (see chapter 11, 
pp.321—26), as Ford noted (“The Controversy Between Schelling and Jacobi,” p.85-89). O’Meara noted 
that Schelling’s and Jacobi’s engagement had overtones of the Protestant and Catholic division within the 
German states (Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism. p.87-88). 
296 Larkin surveyed Jacobi’s life and work with the goal of presenting him less as a religious irrationalist 
and more as a proto-existentialist. His reading opens insights that otherwise may be missed, but the 
irrational fideistic elements of his thought are too prominent to overlook (“Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: The 
End of Reason and the Void”). 
297 For a brief survey of the Pantheism Controversy, and Schelling’s reception of Jacobi’s argument, see: 
Ford. “The Controversy Between Schelling and Jacobi.” esp. pp.78-80. Wirth summarizes the Pantheism 
Controversy at greater length, with specific attention to its influence on Schelling (The Conspiracy of Life, 
pp.42-64). 
298 Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. p.117 [Bxxx]. 
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This position removes the concept of God from the field of direct inquiry, creating a 
theological idol that Schelling refused to accept. The intended nuances of Jacobi’s 
position are undermined by his insistence on a “leap of faith” that ultimately reiterates the 
enlightenment conviction he sought to critique:299 he accepted that an a priori universal 
science of reason stands in opposition to religious faith, and merely affirmed the side 
rejected by modern philosophers. Schelling eschewed such a lionization of faith which 
disconnects both divine and human freedom from theory and experience, an approach 
that renders theory useless. By noting the need for cooperation between religious and 
philosophical thought, Schelling’s criticism of modern theory did not necessitate the 
rejection of philosophy. Schelling refused to promote only one theoretical perspective at 
the expense of the other. Despite its dependence on Christian theology, the Essence of 
Human Freedom does not abandon the purview of critical reason. 
While rejecting the theological idolatry advanced by Jacobi, the Essence of Human 
Freedom also strove to avoid the philosophical idol stemming from Hegel’s over-
rationalization of experience. Hegel’s “negative philosophy” undercut the struggle 
between theology and philosophy and reduced inscrutable transcendence to the 
determinate categories of logic; within Hegel’s philosophy of religion, philosophy served 
as the only final authority over the interpretation of human thought and experience. 
Schelling combined philosophical and religious terminology in such a way that allowed 
                                                 
299 Laughland summarizes: “Jacobi and Schelling had fallen out, precisely because Jacobi thought that all 
knowledge was fatalist, so he appealed to feeling and mystical intuition instead. In Schelling’s view, this 
total abandonment of rationalism paradoxically meant that Jacobi was himself a kind of rationalist, who 
accepted the validity of rationalist arguments, but used mysticism as a means to escape the conclusions 
(Schelling versus Hegel. p.117).” Laughland interprets this break as a Catholic-Protestant divide (p.117ff), 
an interpretation not followed here. 
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him to articulate an inter-determined relation between the two modes of thinking.300 This 
effort—to avoid both theological and philosophical dangers with one project—indicates 
Schelling’s motivation for eventually developing a philosophy of mythology and 
revelation: philosophy, to perform its own task, requires other types of thoughtfulness. 
As a philosopher of religion, Schelling considered both theology and philosophy to be 
simultaneously engaged in related theoretical inquiry without becoming confused. 
B. Freedom and Necessity Supplanting Nature and Spirit: Schelling’s 1809 essay 
signaled a renewed approach to philosophy which deemphasizes the common dichotomy 
between Spirit and Nature (as the subjective and the objective) in modern philosophy; the 
essay shifted focus to the dichotomy of freedom and necessity.301 This switch proved 
vital for navigating between the absolutizing claims of both modern philosophy and 
theology as the competing authority guiding each field determines the path that 
theologians’ and philosophers’ work must follow. The text undermines the Jacobian 
critique of systematic philosophy—that it inevitably denies freedom—by noting that each 
side of the opposition of freedom and necessity requires the other. Unless it is possible to 
discern the compatibility of systematic reason and freedom, “necessary” philosophy will 
be useless and “free” theology will simply constitute a retreat from problems of human 
understanding.302 Systematic thinking and free action only appear incompatible due to the 
abstraction adopted by most philosophy: a philosophy of freedom must consider real 
                                                 
300 This tension clarifies Schelling’s note regarding the dialogical character of the 1809 Essence essay 
(p.71-72.); readers are wrong to consider philosophy in general, and Schelling’s essay in particular, as a 
single and completed system. Wirth discussed the importance of style for Schelling in the “middle period” 
(the Freedom essay, Clara, and Ages of the World) and the vitality of the inherent incompleteness of 
dialogue for avoiding constraining philosophy to mere polemics (The Conspiracy of Life. pp.158-64). 
301 Brown. The Later Philosophy of Schelling. p.116-17. 
302 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.9-11. 
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beings that make choices which can be known even if they exceed reason. Schelling took 
dependent beings that are volitionally independent of an eternal ground as a given; for 
human experience, freedom and necessity are always experienced together.303 
For Schelling, the concepts of freedom and volition entail the possibility of good and 
evil rather than choice between options of equal value. Both good and evil must be a part 
of the substance of reality if the finite agent is capable of choosing between the two 
options; evil must exist in some manner, views that categorize evil as privation prove 
insufficient. Schelling used the metaphor of disease to emphasize both the reality of evil 
and its nature as a misuse of freedom.304 As everything positive in a creature must be 
attributed ultimately to its creator, according to Schelling, evil must be grounded 
absolutely in God. This necessitates a view of God as real and which transcends 
abstraction.305 
In consciously attempting to delineate an understanding of God as real, Schelling 
emphasized the ground on which such a being could be situated. His argument works 
from an interpretation of Boehme’s dark ground in God that is not itself God; Schelling 
attempted to identify the ground of divine existence as a distinct principle which must be 
within God as nothing is prior to him.306 Human choice between good or evil uniquely 
                                                 
303 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.17. 
304 Essence of Human Freedom. p.34; see Wirth. The Conspiracy of Life. pp.172-74. 
305 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.23-26. An ambiguity should be noted: Schelling vacillates in 
latter works between the decidedly religious concept of God and the philosophical concept of the Absolute. 
This ambiguity requires criticism, though the basic conviction behind this confusion can be affirmed: 
Schelling considered each concept to share the same referent, even if he failed to fully respect the 
difference of each term relative to their distinct perspectival use. 
306 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.27. Schelling was not alone in this inspiration: German 
Idealism found much of its vocabulary in the mystical traditions of Boehme and Eckhart (Benz. The 
Mystical Sources of German Romantic Philosophy. pp.10, 21-25). Nor was this turn to mystical and 
theosophistical sources as dramatic of a break from his earlier works as it may seem: Schelling’s interest in 
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reveals this “dark” force as separable from the “light” creative force, though they exist 
indistinguishably in God. That is, human choices reveal the full potential of the dark will 
within God which the act of creation overcame and hid. Good and evil are, as Brown 
summarizes, centered on an eternal act: 
A person’s act of self-constitution is eternal or transcendent (meaning “outside time,” 
not “prior to time”). This nontemporal act conditions all of that self’s concrete acts in 
the temporal series of events, although he is not directly conscious of it for it precedes 
and shapes ordinary consciousness [The Later Philosophy of Schelling. p.137]. 
 
Human existence, in this view, is incomplete as the false harmonization of the two 
principles is a necessary condition for finite existence. As creation, comprised of existing 
finite beings, cannot remain ambiguous, these divergent urges must be enacted and 
humanity must actualize either good or evil. These individual choices reveal the general 
evil which otherwise never reaches realization.307 
Using this framework, Schelling described a unity of volition and understanding in 
God which becomes distinct in finite beings, thus rendering good and evil possible as 
separate expressions of the Absolute. As free, humanity manifests the divine through 
actions which are distinct from God: 
It is will that beholds itself in complete freedom, being no longer an instrument of the 
productive universal will in nature, but rather above and outside of all nature. Spirit is 
above the light as in nature it raises itself above the unity of the light and the dark 
principle. Since it is spirit, selfhood is therefore free from both principles [Essence of 
Human Freedom. p.33]. 
                                                                                                                                                 
philosophy was always joined with such interests even if less radically so (Tilliette. « L’absolu et la 
philosophie de Schelling. » p.206). 
307 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.47. Lawrence neatly summarizes the importance of this issue 
for both Schelling specifically and philosophy generally: “But the primary problem of this middle period is 
how to account for the reality of evil: in this single problem one confronts the riddle which actual human 
history seems to unfold apart from and outside of the orderly progression of absolute reason. It is a riddle 
which Hegel’s philosophy of history failed to acknowledge. Instead of explaining away the apparent 
irrationality of history, Schelling sees in it the primary proof of the reality of human freedom (“Schelling as 
Post-Hegelian and as Aristotelian,” p.324).” 
198 
 
 
 
The human will can remain balanced as the divine is balanced, or it can be misused and 
introduce disorder among the two principles. Neither imperfection nor finitude is the 
common characteristic of evil, rather evil is this division of forces which follows the 
positive expression of selfhood.308 
This conception of evil, central to Schelling’s account of freedom, indicates an 
important departure from the Kantian notion of freedom.309 In the critical philosophy, 
moral freedom entails acknowledging the axioms of practical reason. Such a view ignores 
volitional activity which exceeds, and precedes, philosophical moral reflection: 
According to these notions, the sole ground of evil lies in sensuality or animality, or in 
the earthly principle, as they do not oppose heaven with hell, as is fitting, but with the 
earth. This notion is a natural consequence of the doctrine according to which freedom 
consists in the mere rule of the intelligent principle over sensual desires and tendencies, 
and the good comes from pure reason; accordingly, it is understandable that there is no 
freedom for evil (in so far as sensual tendencies predominate)—to speak more 
correctly, however, evil is completely abolished [Essence of Human Freedom. p.39]. 
 
Kantian radical evil can only be an a-temporal theory while the Schellingian concept of 
evil can relate to and explain actual evil events within contingent history. Only with this 
understanding of the will as free to choose between realizable alternatives can the 
adoption of moral maxims truly have any meaning and value. 
This view of freedom, articulated independently of the typical philosophical focus on 
the relation of subjectivity and objectivity, grounds the distinction between ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ philosophy. The negative, merely abstract view approaches philosophical 
problems through logical necessity and neglects freedom, a concept that can be 
considered only through the record of its historically enacted choices. Thus while 
                                                 
308 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. pp.34-38. 
309 Wirth compares both author’s understanding of evil: The Conspiracy of Life, pp.165-68. 
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Essence of Human Freedom uses “positivity” and “negativity” to denote forces of 
cohesion and disruption, this use of these terms does not conflict with the later positive 
philosophy. In fact, only with attention to the context of actualized time—history—can 
these cohesive and disruptive forces of will be distinguished. Despite the seeming 
contradiction of terminology, the 1809 essay grounds the positive/negative distinction 
which is central to the later philosophy of Schelling. 
C. Evil and Creation: Though he explicitly dismissed the apparent determinism of 
pantheism, Schelling’s anthropology seemingly makes human action the direct result of a 
necessary divine compulsion and raises the old theological problem of divine knowledge 
and future contingents. Eschewing traditional attempts at theodicy, only necessary for 
abstract conceptions of God,310 Schelling presented God’s self-revelation through 
creation as neither lessened nor marred by the reality of evil:  
For that reason it also does not require in any way a reconstruction of evil to goodness 
(of the return of all things) for realization of the idea of a final, all-encompassing 
perfection; for evil is only evil to the extent that it exceeds potentiality, but, reduced to 
non-Being or the state of potency, it is what it always should be, basis, subordinate and, 
as such, no longer in contradiction with God’s holiness or love [Essence of Human 
Freedom. p.67]. 
 
Evil, and human actions generally, does not change the eternal as it is the free choice 
itself which manifests the Absolute. Such a view of evil—as a component of the creative 
act manifesting divine love—makes clear that creation has a final end: to distinguish fully 
good from evil as manifestations of the dark and light principles in God, a process of 
becoming freely adopted through the creative act. 
                                                 
310 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.59. 
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This raises the question of what the divine gains by differentiating its being and the 
basis of its being. Especially as, if Schelling’s view is not ultimately dualistic, the distinct 
being and its basis must share something in common. This original commonality was 
merely “the absolute indifference of both” principles.311 Humanity completes the 
revelation of God by distinguishing the principles completely in distinct finite beings.312 
Only through this distinction does love, which “links such things of which each could 
exist for itself, yet does not and cannot exist without the other”313 become possible. This 
is the advantage gained; creation, as the distinguishing and revealing of the two 
principles, allows the absolute to be posited as more than a point of indifference. The 
possibility of an evil relation of the two drives also allows the new possibility of love as 
well as the possibility of each drive being known. Knowledge, though not disconnected 
from the fundamental forces of life, comes to be seen as a derivative expression that can 
never exhaust the full force of being. 
As evil is not a truly existing entity, but rather an opposition of principles, the 
manifestation of these principles through human choice does not imply that God is or 
creates evil. Schelling’s argument that the possibility of evil stems from the ground that is 
within God, but that ground is not itself evil. Only in humanity can evil be actualized as 
an historical occurrence,314 as only in humanity can each will be expressed freely. Human 
freedom, then, is the possibility of the fall. The possibility of the Fall is the positing of 
                                                 
311 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.68. 
312 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.31. 
313 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.70. 
314 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. pp.40, 53-54. 
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contingency in the world, and thus the possibility of history.315 Kant’s religion of reason 
centered on the fall but removed it from temporality, Schelling’s account emphasized the 
contingency of the act and its historical reality. 
Schelling concluded his Essence essay by reasserting the thoroughly Christian 
character of his view of freedom, humanity, and the Absolute. The process of creation 
began with Nature as the “first testament” between the world and God, where things are 
subjected to law as they are distinguished from God and made capable of choice. 
Humanity began the “new testament” as the redeemer of nature,316 an interpretation of 
creation that exceeds what the Kantian and Hegelian philosophies of religion could 
accept—or even imagine—as rational religion: religion consists of the exercise of agency 
that exceeds the powers of the rational faculty. Schelling’s turn to Christianity, to provide 
and schematize a record of actualized freedom, signals a problem for his late philosophy. 
Unsurprisingly, many Schelling scholars work from explicitly Christian perspectives 
themselves as he seemingly tied his philosophy to conservative Christian values.317 
Nevertheless, his imperfect position provides a basis on which to avoid the problems 
which this study has criticized. No system based on the power of volition can be 
complete without accounting for the multiple ends a given will works towards at once, 
ends that can be harmonized but not made ultimately one: 
                                                 
315 Schelling does not link finitude and contingency to evil; contingency makes both evil and good possible 
and should be linked with the idea of freedom. Brown points out that the seeming association of finitude 
and the Fall stems from a neo-Platonic assumption that this occurs in time. Schelling moved away from 
emphasizing the essentialist question—how do finite beings become ontologically distinct from the 
infinite—to rather view that difference through the distinction of multiple wills (“The Transcendental Fall 
in Kant and Schelling.” p.58-59). 
316 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.72. 
317 McCarthy. “Schelling and Kierkegaard on Freedom and Fall.” p.100 (esp. n22). 
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A system which contradicts the most sacred sentiments and feelings and moral 
consciousness can, at least in these characteristics, never be called a system of reason, 
but rather of unreason. To the contrary, a system in which reason really recognized 
itself, would have to unify all demands of the spirit as well as those of the heart and 
those of the moral feeling as well as those of the most rigorous understanding [Essence 
of Human Freedom pp.74-75]. 
 
Without rejecting scientific reason, Schelling clearly pushed beyond Enlightenment 
conceptions of philosophy. He continued to present dialectical philosophy as uniquely 
independent,318 even as he grew more insistent that it is not self-contained and cannot be 
completed. At this point, his efforts to situate philosophy dialogically were not yet fully 
natural and only partially articulated. 
D. Human Freedom, the Positive Philosophy, and the Non-Rational: Following 
Of Human Freedom, Schelling’s works are marked by new preoccupations: The Deities 
of Samothrace (1815), The Ages of the World (1811-15), and The Philosophy of 
Mythology and Revelation (1841-43) all illustrate a turn to historical investigations based 
on “empirical” records of human thought.319 This turn completed the tendency, within 
Schelling’s earlier works, that moved to blur the boundaries of philosophy and theology, 
even to the point of accepting that philosophy requires a theological grounding. This 
movement, once completed, became an underlying assumption of his latter thought. That 
is, the account given in Of Human Freedom was viewed by Schelling as a satisfactory 
answer to the question—how finitude and the infinite relate—that shaped his earlier 
                                                 
318 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. p.76. 
319 Wirth considers Schelling’s motivation for this turn: “For Schelling history could not be understood or 
aufgehoben or sublated into the general. The latter could only be understood in personal terms, and the 
personal could only be understood in general terms. But the personal is not thereby the general, and the 
general is not thereby the personal. Rather the two belong together, without resolution, in a third, in what 
Schelling called a Wesen, a third that holds together without reconciling opposites. This third, it follows, 
can only be thought—only be revealed—in singular ways (The Conspiracy of Life. p.221-22).” 
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work, as well as a fitting preparation for addressing issues that the positive philosophy 
could not avoid, problems only possible on the ground provided in the freedom essay. 
In resolving the driving concerns of Schelling’s early works, Essence of Human 
Freedom carried through on the earlier promise of re-conceptualizing philosophy. It 
certainly opened new vistas for Schelling; the essay grounds his critique of modern 
philosophy in the Lectures on the History of Modern Philosophy as well as his mature 
philosophical critique of mythology. Specifically, the 1809 essay demands a new 
schematization of philosophy that includes a failing of reason as central to philosophy. 
The prominence of the dark ground and human volition in Schelling’s philosophical 
anthropology necessitates the further reconceptualization of philosophy around a concept 
which cannot be accurately described through reason. The 1809 text, unlike the later 
Lectures, used the positive and negative schematic to denote forces of cohesion and 
disruption rather than reality and logic. While in this text he first presented the leap from 
the negative to positive philosophy as rational, Schelling clearly made a step toward 
delineating philosophy as more than a science of reason and as bound to fail. 
Positive philosophy, as Schelling developed it, does not abandon the rational. Rather, 
it embraces the irrational with the rational. Rationality and irrationality distinctly oppose 
each other, though this is not the fundamental distinction that defines reason. Negative 
thought, presented largely as Kantian critical philosophy, has clear limitations beyond 
which thought becomes irrational. Schelling succeeded, with this essay, in demonstrating 
that Kantian philosophy is not adept to think what it dismisses; the extra-rational can only 
be viewed as a corruption or as unimportant. To overcome this limitation, an irrational 
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leap seems necessary even from a perspective of finitude. Nevertheless, the move beyond 
abstract and universal philosophical abstractions toward religious ideas is not a rejection 
of reason: it is a move made in concert with the failing of finite reasoning in a manner 
that preserves the role of philosophy. 
The positive philosophy, as will become clearer, incorporated the irrational as a 
significant functional element of philosophy that remained distinct from rational 
interpretation. This arose from the philosophical need to leave the realm of strictly 
rational logic and the consequent need to see reason as more multifaceted than 
philosophical abstraction admits. While it is tempting to consider reason as opposed to 
irrationality as an either/or, such a schematic suggests that reason is a singular, universal, 
and abstract unit. The full nuance included in the idea of reason is evidenced by the 
overlapping but distinct forces to which reason is opposed; it is different to assert that 
something is non-rational (distinct from reason), irrational (opposed to the rational), and 
a-rational (lacking reason). Schelling’s formulation of the limits of reason differs from 
Kant’s both because it accepts such equivocity and views reason as a derivative force 
rather than an isolated pure a priori pursuit. 
The prominent Christology of the Essence suggests that Schelling imported Christian 
assumptions into his philosophy of religion uncritically. As this problem recurs 
throughout Schelling’s later works, it should not be ignored. Due to the focus of the 
essay, the tendency must be criticized, even though the understated adoption of Christian 
views clearly was not a problem from Schelling’s perspective. The 1809 Essence essay 
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brought modern philosophy to explicitly Christological themes320 and the Stuttgart 
Lectures, under the guise of the noted potencies doctrine, were even more explicitly 
Christological. While scholarship often notes the explicit and implicit Christian aspects of 
Schelling’s positive philosophy, the problematic guiding the present study makes the 
specifically Christian character of Schelling’s thought a significant issue even while 
accepting the mutual engagement of philosophy with religion. 
The specific danger of uncritically adopting specific religious doctrines is that it will 
make the relation between philosophy and religion static. A static relation of religion and 
philosophy undermines each discipline as each field makes rival absolute claims that, 
ultimately, require negotiation if both are to expressed. Each field requires the other, and 
each field must acknowledge the diversity encapsulated by the theoretically singular 
abstract entity (religion or philosophy). Assuming that an advanced philosophical theory 
can be presented which includes such a mutual determinateness, Schelling’s commitment 
to a Christian philosophical theology ultimately can be deemed a positive feature even for 
those unconnected to the Christian tradition. 
 
II. The Potencies, Trinitarian Philosophy, and a Neutral Philosophy of Religion. 
 
Schelling’s early critique of Kant demonstrated the impossibility of separating 
philosophical anthropology from theological issues entirely. That observation helps in 
interpreting the challenging potencies doctrine of Schelling’s mature work. It is a 
demanding concept, often either ignored or severely criticized, that many nevertheless 
insist is the essential basis of the positive philosophy. Tillich states this view best: 
                                                 
320 Schelling. Essence of Human Freedom. pp.67-68. 
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The task of the present work is to present the construction of the history of religion as 
the focal point of Schelling’s positive philosophy. This, however, is only possible in 
light of the epistemological and metaphysical principles of the whole system. Without 
the doctrine of the potencies one cannot even set foot in the positive philosophy. 
Without the concept of God and the doctrine of man, the concept of religion is 
impossible [The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling’s Positive 
Philosophy. p.41].321 
 
Even many congenial interpreters judge the potencies doctrine to be muddled while 
others consider the doctrine incoherent. As such, Tillich’s emphasis on their central 
importance can overwhelm the current interpretive efforts if not carefully qualified. 
Nevertheless, in order to establish Schelling’s history of mythology as a promising path 
for contemporary philosophy of religion, some account of this challenging concept must 
be offered. 
The potencies doctrine, stated simply, offers a Trinitarian theogony which follows an 
unusual philosophical method. Beach, like Tillich convinced that the potencies are the 
basis of the positive philosophy,322 noted the Potenzenlehre’s unusual method which 
studied the unconscious as something which can be rationally considered without being 
rationalized.323 The potencies require an “empirical” metaphysics which follows the 
record of human thought. Thus, while speculative, the potencies follow a logic detectable 
in various sources that should not be interpreted through Cartesian rationalism or Kantian 
critical philosophy. A definitive account of this challenging point is unnecessary: only 
                                                 
321 Tillich himself emphasized the influence of Schelling that made him, indirectly, one of Schelling’s most 
notable students: “Er war mein Lehrer, obgleich die Anfänge meines Studiums und das Jahr seines Todes 
genau 50 Jahre auseinander liegen; niemals in der Entwicklung meines eigenen Denkens habe ich die 
Abhängigkeit von Schelling vergessen („Schelling und die Anfänge des existentialistischen Protestes,“ 
p.197).” 
322 Beach introduces the potencies as the core idea of which the philosophy of mythology serves to 
demonstrate (The Potencies of God(s). p.xi.); Tillich correctly identified the philosophy of mythology as 
Schelling’s true focal point. 
323 Beach. The Potencies of God(s). p.2. 
207 
 
 
after clarifying Schelling’s specific critique of religion can the full importance of this 
point be considered. 
The 1810 Stuttgart Seminars offer the best opportunity to explore the potenzenlehre 
for the needs of this study. Many identify the Ages of the World texts as Schelling’s main 
project and characterize the 1810 Seminars as only an introduction. That entire, 
incomplete cycle is too large to consider here and the Seminars’ concentrated statement 
of principles proves more immediately insightful apart from a new lengthy inquiry.324 
The private lectures in Stuttgart were delivered to an audience of non-specialists and are 
thus particularly helpful for contextualizing such abstract speculation. The Stuttgart 
Seminars share the view of God advanced in the Essence of Human Freedom, the 
primary difference being that the Seminars explore that doctrine with greater precision.325 
Schelling presented a similar doctrine of God and man in the Essence of Human Freedom 
without recourse to the potencies doctrine, a fact which casts some doubt over Tillich’s 
claim regarding the doctrine’s importance. Nevertheless, the potencies highlight just how 
thoroughly the positive philosophy was shaped by Christian assumptions. 
The Stuttgart Seminars are divided into three sections, the first outlines the system 
that philosophy seeks to uncover: the system of the cosmos which precedes human 
cognition.  This follows the insight, earlier developed in the Essence of Human Freedom, 
that freedom and necessity are united when considered from the proper perspective. The 
                                                 
324 This period in Schelling’s work produced no major texts published until after his death. As a result, 
there is no clear sense of how these writings fit together. As a result, this study departs from others by 
considering the full investigation of the potencies to properly follow the history of mythology and 
revelation: the speculation must be grounded in the historical narrative philosophers are trained to 
disregard. 
325 Brown. The Later Philosophy of Schelling. p.154. 
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Seminars present philosophy as the uncovering of the true system that precedes human 
invention, a system which “must intrinsically rest on a principle that supports itself, a 
principle that consists in an [sic] through itself.”326 Such a system must have a self-
grounding ground that includes all (and thus the system cannot be empirically known), 
within a system. This system rests on the organic unity of the Real and Ideal; that is, the 
unity (A) which posits itself in the Real (B) and the Ideal (C). Philosophy, seeking to 
uncover this system, becomes the progressive demonstration of the absolute, as it cannot 
“prove” the validity of what it takes as its ground.327 
The manifestation of this absolute—an absolute identity—requires opposition, 
separation, and differentiation: the absolute identity (A=A) becomes truly different 
(A=B). This distinction requires a postulation or actualization of the concept that the first 
section of the Seminars traces, though the full meaning of this point is left for the second 
section of the text.328 Rather than cancelling the Absolute identity, Schelling presented 
this need for an actualized opposition as a doubling. The initial essence remains but is not 
the same thing as essence in form: as Being cannot exist for itself, the first potency of the 
Absolute is ( ????)
B in which differentiation makes the essence real. Such a potency cannot 
exist of itself either, and contains a second potency within it, that of A2 or ( ????)
A. Both 
potencies ultimately constitute a unity, expressed in the third potency: ( ??????????). This 
formulation shows that the inferior first formula must be prior to the second superior 
                                                 
326 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.197. 
327 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.198-8. 
328 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.200. 
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potency: the role of history—at least a real succession—in philosophy becomes explicit 
and undeniable even in the form of abstract equations.329 
The second division of the Seminars distinguishes the abstract concept from the 
actual God; this leads to the reconsideration of the idea delineated in the first section as it 
is realized in actuality. In doing this, the potencies doctrine purposefully confuses the 
doctrines of revelation and the ontology of God: 
If we postulate a God whom we are to imagine as a living, personal being, we are 
forced to consider Him altogether human; we must assume that his life bears the 
strictest analogy to that of the human being, and that alongside the eternal Being there 
prevails in him an eternal becoming; in short, [we must assume] that He has everything 
in common with man except for man's dependency [Stuttgart Seminars. p.206]. 
 
As human self-determination involves drawing the unconscious into a state of conscious 
clarity, God creates to bring clarity to his otherwise hidden essence. For this act of 
manifestation, the contraction of what is deemed essential to God brings focus to 
something not initially evident even though always present. 
Schelling takes the human ability to distinguish one’s self from one’s own Being—in 
order to perfect themselves morally and intellectually—as the model for the relation of 
God to what is expelled from God as matter.330 This contraction of the material incudes 
the exclusion of all that is inferior, though only in order to “create from it what 
[eventually] will be similar and cognate to Him.”331 The material is distinguished in order 
to be transformed, and creation rests with humanity as consciousness awakens in the 
material which was initially separated in the manifesting contraction of God. This 
revelation through humanity shows that the first of these two principles “is that whereby 
                                                 
329 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.201-2. 
330 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.208. 
331 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.207. 
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He exists as a particular, unique, and individual essence. We may call this force the 
selfhood [or] the egoism in God.”332 This avoids erroneous views of God as either 
isolated or as identical with Nature.333 The two principles at the core of the second 
section of the Stuttgart Seminars—egoism and love—replace the algebraic abstractions 
of the first division and represent the potencies in terms of the actualization of the world 
which begins with the subordination of egoism under divine love. The potencies are a 
way of accounting for the relation between God, as the Absolute, and the world while 
eschewing pantheism and dogmatic assertions of God’s removal from the world. 
In the third section, Christology becomes the focus as Schelling considers humanity 
as the fullest context for the revelation of God.334 Specifically, it is the human attempts to 
overcome the diversity of the species and achieve a pluralistic unity on which Schelling 
focuses.335 The section re-presents the three potencies as three periods. The unity of 
Nature is lost due to the human fall, presenting the need for a second Nature, the state: 
The natural unity, this second nature superimposed on the first, to which man must 
necessarily take recourse, is the [modern] state; and, to put it bluntly, the [modern] state 
is thus a consequence of the curse that has been placed on humanity. Because man no 
longer has God for his unity, he must submit to a material unity [Stuttgart Seminars. 
p.227].336 
 
                                                 
332 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.210. 
333 Following Schelling’s view, nature is “something divine that has been raised from Nonbeing to Being, 
and that therefore remains separated from the primordially divine that has not been called into Being from 
Nonbeing (Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.212).” 
334 O’Meara neatly summarizes the general concerns of the late philosophy that serve as the general pattern 
the three sections of the Stuttgart Seminars follow: “Schelling’s positive philosophy is always and 
simultaneously describing three things: (1) the life of God as God, through his divine potencies, 
exoterically becoming himself fully; (2) the vital, historical line of finite beings that has its own 
development but also bears inwardly the realization of God; (3) the history of human consciousness, both 
collective and individual, which is bringing nature and spirit to unity in art, religion and their finest 
expression, philosophy. History, religion and theogony are one (Romantic Idealism and Roman 
Catholicism, pp.115-16.).” 
335 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.226-27. 
336 See Allwohn. “Schellings Philosophie der Mythologie.” p.177. 
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The State fails to unify its numerous autonomous citizens because it depends entirely on 
material means to accomplish this spiritual goal. The Church serves as a response to a 
second revelation—Christ—that addresses this failure of politics and uses the inward 
force of religion to unite humanity rather than external force.337 The second period—of 
death—allows the separation of the incompatible principles mixed within nature rather 
than completely end human potency:338 the good person separated from evil remains 
distinct and is not yet transposed into the absolute good. The third period, a final 
judgment, fully separates the good from the evil and is “where all [powers] will be 
subordinate to the absolute Identity.”339 Like the potencies, these three periods of life, 
death, and judgment work toward the full connection of the world of spirit and nature, 
making actual the absolute Life. 
Unlike Tillich and Beach, this study deemphasizes the potencies doctrine and 
presents the Historical Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology and 
Revelation as the best representation of the positive philosophy. The potencies trace the 
divine positing of nature, while related periods follow the human role in the completion 
of this positing: 
The supreme purpose of creation has now been fulfilled: (a) God is now entirely actual, 
visibly corporeal, that is, ?????????? (b) what was most inferior will have become the 
                                                 
337 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.228-9. 
338 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.238. Wirth’s meditation on Schelling’s Clara notes the importance of 
death (“The Haunting.” The Conspiracy of Life. pp.191-218). Schalow notes Schelling’s distinctive 
conception of immortality: “death is a ‘reduction ad essentiam,’ a yielding to what is more concrete and 
determinate in the human essence. That which is immortal transcends death, insofar as the individuality 
proper to each of us becomes a tribute to the Divine. Indeed, the immortal dimension is individuality 
insofar as it stands for or signifies the spark of divinity. Immortality, then, becomes a monument to the 
forms of expression in which the Divine can reveal itself in its inexhaustible plurality (“Traces of Love 
Inscribed by Deeds: The Question of Immortality and Schelling’s Ethics.” p.249).” 
339 Schelling. Stuttgart Seminars. p.242. 
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most superior (a reversal of beginning and end), only that everything which thus far had 
been implicit will now become explicit, (c) especially the mystery of mankind. In man, 
the two utmost extremes have been connected [Stuttgart Seminars. p.243]. 
 
That is, the mediation of God and Nature, through humanity, will be completed as an 
object of faith. The Stuttgart Seminars present a philosophical Christianity centered on 
the Trinitarian potencies. The potencies are vital to the Christian philosophy of religion 
that Schelling developed, but the perspective of one religious tradition must be limited 
and contextualized by others in order to develop a positive philosophy. Schelling’s 
account of mythic humanity does not fully accomplish this goal, but it provides the 
resources needed to meet this goal. 
While Schelling certainly viewed the potencies doctrine as serving a central role in 
his thought, he also hinted at a philosophy of religion transcending any single religious 
tradition. In order to develop this aspect of Schelling’s thought and present it as an 
antidote to modern philosophy’s inadequate view of religion, a distinction must be drawn 
between its philosophical theology and the positive philosophy of religion. For this, the 
Christology of the Stuttgart Seminars must be criticized; if there is an objective, non-
religious viewpoint from which to critique religion, the personal bias of individual 
scholars will always skew how it is understood. A thorough interpretation of religion 
requires various standpoints. If the Christian view defines his philosophy, it signals the 
very collapse of religion and philosophy that Schelling criticized. However, if this move 
is part of a larger religious dialogue, it can help to establish a new schematic of religion 
and philosophy as distinct yet intertwined types of interpreting experience. 
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III. Mythology and the Philosophical Relation to Revelation 
 
The Essay on Human Freedom developed a philosophical anthropology that 
accounts for a historically changing and contingent person. Schelling also saw philosophy 
as a contingent and changing science; reason has an inner guiding necessity, but human 
theory is developed in specific contexts that likewise shape its form. Philosophy must 
view itself as historically conditioned not only because its professional work consists 
largely of commenting on earlier scholarship, but because the field has various 
possibilities limited and renewed by past articulations.340 Even though Schelling thought 
that there were only a few distinct stages, and that most of philosophical history unfolds 
within one era, his view primarily challenges Enlightenment monolithic conceptions of 
philosophy. The stages are not meant to map an intricate history of paradigm shifts. 
Philosophy must accept that it is partially defined by non-philosophical thought which 
may be supplanted but not replaced. Modern rhetoric to the contrary, philosophy must 
accept that the ‘science of reason’ is not strictly an a priori theory. 
A. Philosophers’ Interest in Mythology: Mythology proves particularly essential 
for providing this context since myth logically precedes philosophical interpretations of 
human experience. The critique of mythology remains a central philosophical issue, as it 
has been since Plato’s criticism of Greek religion and mythology, though modern 
philosophy generally dismisses mythology as irrelevant. Many have found in Plato, 
particularly in his expulsion of the poets from the ideal Republic, justification to view 
                                                 
340 Whitehead’s famous aside about Plato’s importance for the history of philosophy captures this point: 
“The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of 
footnotes to Plato (Process and Reality. p.63).” Whitehead’s point differs from the current claim, but it is 
related as it emphasizes the role historical contingency plays in how a supposedly a priori science forms 
and manifests itself. 
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philosophy as a rejection of mythic thinking.341 As such, mythology is seen at most as an 
external object to which philosophy turns its attention. Philosophical reflection, 
nevertheless, involves a critique of mythology in delineating the proper ken of scientific 
reason. The expulsion of the poets does not reflect Plato’s intricate view of role myth 
plays in philosophy, though the belief that he was a demythologizing rationalist has been 
influential even if the dismissal of mythology was never explicitly acknowledged.  
This problematic bias has weakened due to major studies of mythological thinking 
(Eliade, Campbell, Girard, etc.). Yet while the validity of mythology as an independent 
aspect of human culture has been accepted, these studies have not ended the 
philosophical bias that reason demythologizes culture. In fact, in his opening lecture of 
the Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation 
(hereafter Philosophy of Mythology), Schelling felt acutely pressed to address the 
elevation of mythology to a philosophical object. He began by acknowledging the 
                                                 
341 Girard is a recent example of the attempt to characterize Greek philosophy as a rationalist 
demythologizing project: “The evolution of mythology is governed by the determination to eliminate any 
representation of violence. […] Plato’s attitude provides a significant example of this new stage. His 
intention to remove any trace of mythological violence is quite explicit in the Republic (The Scapegoat. 
p.76).” The expulsion of the poets, in Book Ten of the Republic, is the most notable instance of these 
apparent demythologizing efforts: “So we were right not to admit [the poet] into a city that is to be well-
governed, for he arouses, nourishes, and strengthens this part of the soul and so destroys the rational one 
[…]. Similarly, we’ll say that an imitative poet puts a bad constitution in the soul of each individual by 
making images that are far removed from the truth and by gratifying the irrational part (605a-c).” 
Of course, Plato used of myth where rational discourse failed (see the reversed cosmos myth in the 
Statesman at 269cff, the Atlantis myth in the Critias, etc.). Honest interpretation of Plato must acknowledge 
that in such passages Plato challenged the self-sufficiency of rational critique. Modern philosophers, in 
general, accepted Plato’s reputation as a demythologizer; the nuanced relationship between philosophy and 
mythology was suppressed and misrepresented as a consequence of modern philosophy’s self-
conceptualization in distinction from scholasticism and the resulting investment in presenting modern 
philosophy in opposition to pre-modern philosophy. While it is important to reject the erroneous, if 
common, interpretation of Plato as demythologizer, at the moment it is most important to note why this 
view has been widely adopted despite poor textual support. 
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seemingly tangential character suggested by the construct ‘philosophy of’;342 philosophy 
must counteract entrenched bias in order to not take mythology simply as another object, 
but as an essential dialogic partner that remains a distinct theoretical entity. Mythic 
thought, as decidedly past, offers the essential advantage that it remains distinct from 
philosophical consciousness.  
Ernst Cassirer’s Essay on Man, which adopted a project complementary to 
Schelling’s positive philosophy, illustrates the need to continue pursuing a philosophy of 
mythology as a means to address the primary concern for this study: 
Man’s outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark, is not his metaphysical or 
physical nature—but his work. It is this work, it is the system of human activities, 
which defines and determines the circle of “humanity.” Language, myth, religion, art, 
science, history are constituents, the various sectors of this circle. A “philosophy of 
man” would therefore be a philosophy which would give us insight into the 
fundamental structure of each of these human activities, and which at the same time 
would enable us to understand them as an organic whole [Cassirer. An Essay on Man. 
p.68]. 
 
While rational system-building remains a prominent task in this conception of 
philosophy, Cassirer suggested that it should no longer define philosophy as it did in the 
work of Descartes, Spinoza, and Kant.343 The philosophy of symbolic forms, 
                                                 
342 Schelling. Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. p.8; “Die Behauptung, daß 
das mythische Weltbild allmählich vom empirischen abgelöst worden sei, bedeutet eine unzulässige 
Vereinfachung des Geschichtsablaufs. Gewiß ist es in den Aufklärungszeiten so gewesen, daß mythische 
Aussagen von wissenschaftlichen überwunden wurden, aber das konnte nur deshalb geschehen, weil die 
mythischen Aussagen schon ihren Hinweischarakter verloren hatten und als reale Wissensbekundungen 
mißverstanden worden waren (Allwohn. „Schellings Philosophie der Mythologie,” p.179).” 
343 A key point is that Cassirer understands the dialogic character of philosophy as continuously social, 
never reducing to a final unity: “Previously truth might have been conceived to be a sort of ready-made 
thing which could be grasped by an effort of the individual thinker, and readily transferred and 
communicated to others. […] Truth is by nature the offspring of dialectic thought. It cannot be gained, 
therefore, except through a constant cooperation of the subjects in mutual interrogation and reply. It is not 
therefore like an empirical object; it must be understood as the outgrowth of a social act (Cassirer. An Essay 
on Man. p.5).” 
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nevertheless, does not offer the robust philosophy of religion seemingly implied by this 
statement. 
While part of Cassirer’s ambitious philosophical project, mythology is not treated as 
a truly independent theoretical perspective. The particular importance he attributed to 
mythology lies in its ability to bring philosophy beyond its usual confines. In this, he 
followed the general framework developed by Schleiermacher: myth belongs to the 
sphere of feeling rather than thought, and this mythic feeling is the germ of religion.344 
Despite this shared view, he criticized the conclusion Schleiermacher reached: 
Philosophers and anthropologists have often told us that the true and ultimate source of 
religion is man’s feeling of dependency. […] But if this description of religion contains 
any truth it gives us only half the truth. In no one field of human culture can an ‘attitude 
of lowliest prostration’ be thought to be the genuine and decisive impulse. From an 
entirely passive attitude there cannot develop any productive energy [An Essay on Man. 
p.91-92]. 
 
This criticism does not clarify how religious thought and philosophy can differ without 
shifting the locus of religion entirely to the realm of feeling. Cassirer allowed for a 
duality of myths as both conceptual and perceptual, but he still emphasized feeling as the 
proper domain of religion.345  
An Essay on Man shows that the concerns driving the positive philosophy extend 
beyond Schelling’s late works and were active in twentieth century theory. Philosophers 
frequently have challenged popular views of the character and limits of philosophy but 
                                                 
344 Cassirer. An Essay on Man. p.81, 87. 
345 “Myth has, as it were, a double face. On the one hand it shows us a conceptual, on the other hand a 
perceptual structure (An Essay on Man. p.76).” His criticism of Schleiermacher centered on the 
presentation of feeling as purely passive, determining that the “highest” religions express a new ideal of 
human freedom (ibid. p.108). 
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their efforts have not effected a widespread rejection of Enlightenment assumptions.346 
Even while adding significant nuance to the interpretation of the religious phenomena, 
Cassirer accepted the core problem of Kantian philosophy of religion: 
What is given here is not meant to be a theoretical solution to the problem of man. 
Religion cannot offer such a solution. By its adversaries, religion has always been 
accused of darkness and incomprehensibility. But this blame becomes the highest praise 
as soon as we consider its true aim. Religion cannot be clear and rational. […] Religion, 
therefore, never pretends to clarify the mystery of man. It confirms and deepens this 
mystery [An Essay on Man. p.12]. 
 
While avoiding the problematic sublation of religion into philosophy, this view maintains 
the characterization of philosophy as rational and religion as a supplemental concern. In 
order to overcome the Kantian separation of religion from philosophy, the barrier must be 
rendered more permeable. Theorists must abandon the belief that reason and the irrational 
can be clearly and definitively separated, and that an entire type of mindfulness can be 
defined as one or the other. 
B. The “Productive Imagination”: According to Schelling, modern philosophers 
tend to approach mythology as chameleonic: the stories describe either physical or moral 
phenomenon in poetic form. Accounts of this sort proceed without considering the form 
of myth or the particular role that the poetic imagination plays in constructing a universal 
science of reason; the ultimate “ground” of reason must lie outside of discursive 
rationality which can only divide and connect facts which it cannot provide by its own 
efforts. The imagination is needed to uncover and delineate such a ground, as it must in 
part be reconstructed from the divisions that reason employs and cannot overcome. A 
                                                 
346 Rorty’s attempt to dismiss the relevance of this problem (see Chapter One, §I.C) illustrates how 
critiques of this problem have insufficiently addressed the issue. Schelling’s late philosophy is not the only 
resource available for critiquing this tendency of modern philosophy, but it is a needed contribution that 
remains too often neglected. 
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philosophy self-conscious of its own grounding must give a prominent place to the 
productive imagination. For Schelling, mythology allows philosophy to explore the 
productive imagination which, playing a role in all human activity and defying concrete 
demarcation, otherwise cannot be delineated and studied. Schelling approached myth as a 
realized expression of the imagination in a specific era of human consciousness.347 This 
stage, while imaginative, is not arbitrary and cannot be dismissed as pure fantasy so long 
as mythology is accepted and carefully criticized as an “empirical” record. The fantastic 
elements of myth do not conflict with the need for specific and verifiable forms, even as 
literalism proves unacceptable; mythology itself seems unconcerned with the subjective 
inner and objective outer distinction so prevalent in modern philosophy.  
The first three lectures of the course form a unit that criticizes the poetic and 
allegorical interpretations of mythology in order to show that mythology must be viewed 
as an organic product. Schelling argued that the proper interpretation of mythology can 
only become clear through criticizing all incoherent or incomplete accounts of myth. By 
exhausting such views, he brings the whole that is formed by various mythologies into 
focus rather than specific myths, the core without which the pre-historical stories cannot 
be understood. According to its own presentation, Schelling insists, the polytheistic 
system of the gods found in mythology was initially posited as an historical theogony and 
it can only be truly understood as such.348 
The first erroneous interpretation of mythology approaches it as poetry and sees it as 
opposed to truth. This view maintains that myths were developed solely to satisfy a drive 
                                                 
347 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.90. 
348 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.8-10. 
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for creative invention, the authors unconcerned with the resulting doctrinal content. By 
presenting poetry as completely free, this view fails to account for poetry’s dependence 
on ideas taken as true by the audience; this view must acknowledge that mythology 
contains some truth, even if it can admit it is presence only unintentionally.349 Schelling 
argued that, in the case of the theogeny of Hesiod and Homer, poetry cannot be original: 
the history of the gods was not immediately present in the poetic form in which we find 
it. The implicit history could basically well be poetic, but not actually; thus it did not 
emerge into being poetically. The dark foundry of, the first forging place of mythology, 
lies beyond all poesy. The foundation of the history of the gods is not laid by poesy. 
This is the clear result of the words of the historian, if they are considered in their full 
context [Philosophy of Mythology. p.17]. 
 
Poetry constitutes a vital part of mythology, rather than mythology constituting a portion 
of poetry. Poetry always rests on an earlier condition; it never constitutes what is original 
and thus cannot explain mythology.350 
Since the form of myths obscure their meaning, yet some truth must be attributed to 
them, some revise the poetic interpretation and approach mythology as an allegorical 
form. Such attempts, though sophisticated and varied, all fail to justify the problematic 
conviction that myths cannot mean what they seem to say. Such views must maintain that 
mythology corrupts the very doctrines that it expresses. Schelling identified several 
versions of this interpretation, all of which dismiss the role of the gods in mythology out 
of prejudice. For example, Epicurean eumerism sees mythological gods as falsely 
                                                 
349 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.11-3. 
350 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.21. 
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remembered and exaggerated historical persons. Stoicism, alternately, maintains that 
mythology intends the gods only as personifications of natural phenomenon.351 
These views characterize mythology’s audience as naïve and the original author as 
forced to adopt superstitious nonsense, which modern scholars wish to dismiss, as an 
accidental form in which to convey their advancing learning. These interpretations 
require, however, that the authors intentionally presented their insight in a false and 
muddled form, an approach that would make mythology inherently incomprehensible for 
any audience. In these views, mythology must serve modern conceptions of intellectual 
history and posit creative thinkers who used the language of early religion in an attempt 
to bring to an end such religious representations.352 Such views make mythology, serving 
as a rejection of religion, derivative of the very polytheistic beliefs that this critical 
perspective is meant to explain. Thus, even though such views offer valuable insight, they 
fail to uncover the essence of theogonic myths. 
The philosophy of mythology, adopting a retrospective stance, can trace the 
dissolution of mythology into philosophy and poetry. Schelling presented Homer and 
Hesiod as marking these two possibilities, an association that inverts the question of who 
authored mythology: the authors identified with formalizing mythology themselves 
responded to it as already existent. This exposes the hidden belief inherent in these first 
views—mythology is an invention—as an assumption which is no longer tenable.353 Both 
                                                 
351 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.23-7. “Ultimately, both were supplanted by the Neoplatonists, 
who finally saw an actual metaphysics in mythology, and who were obliged to this end mainly in order to 
give the spiritual content of Christianity a counterweight to the one analogical to paganism (ibid, p.27).” 
Still, the Epicurean and Stoic views continue to have a notable influence (ibid, p.28ff). 
352 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.32. 
353 Schelling. Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. p.36-7. 
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the allegorical and poetic interpretations assume that mythology is an invention, though 
an individual constructing an immersive type of consciousness proves unimaginable: 
But, generally speaking, whoever knows what the mythology of a people is to them 
would, as easily as he has its mythology invented by individuals, regard it as possible 
that the language of a people has also emerged into being through the efforts of 
individuals among it. To introduce a mythology is not a matter that proceeds as easily 
as the introduction of school plans, textbooks, catechisms, and so on does for us 
[Philosophy of Mythology. p.43.]. 
 
As language is necessary for consciousness, its original formation proves impossible to 
explain as a product of direct human intent. Like language, mythology unifies various 
peoples and thus can never be a purely contingent invention. Mythology must be tied up 
with the essence of a people, and not the work of an individual. 
However, groups also prove incapable of creating mythology, a point that finally 
eliminates the possible supports of the poetic and allegorical interpretations. The group is 
an abstraction which requires some cohesive principle, and it thus cannot precede its own 
organizing principle. Schelling presented mythological identity as the collective itself: 
Now I ask you, however, if the Hellene is still the Hellene, the Egyptian still the 
Egyptian, if we take away his mythology. Thus he has neither adopted his mythology 
from others nor created it himself after he was a Hellene or Egyptian; he first became a 
Greek or Egyptian with this mythology [Philosophy of Mythology. p.49]. 
 
In Schelling’s view, mythology can be created by neither individuals nor collectives. It is 
itself a producing power, rather than a passive outcome. The attempts to disentangle 
mythology from its own self-understanding come to nothing, and its imaginative products 
must be accepted as “true” moments of human consciousness. 
C. Mythology and Religion: Schelling argued that mythology must be understood 
fundamentally as a history of the gods. As a religious history, the lack of individual or 
group author is not a dead-end: an extra-human force can be seen as the author. 
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According to Schelling, mythological polytheism must be based on an original 
monotheism. The first explanation for how “polytheism could originally take God as its 
basis” is a notitia Dei insista, which is the “vague goal that is strived for and is first 
sought in nature.”354 A notitia insita does not rely on its external referent, instead 
constituting an internal drive with its own immanent and necessary laws. The strength of 
such an instinct means that it must be in some sense actual and that mythology cannot be 
understood as ideal and purely subjective. As a basic psychological instinct, the various 
divinities can be interpreted as differing expressions of the same reality.355 
Schelling acknowledged Hume’s critique of this view, using it to clarify his own 
position. Hume dismissed any universal inborn drive and challenged “the possibility of 
having a religious doctrine precede polytheism and mythology, a doctrine that would 
have distorted itself in both.”356 Schelling identified Hume’s central point as the claim 
that theism requires concepts which are possible only after humanity developed advanced 
reasoning with which to critique polytheism. Problematically, this view makes 
polytheism an atheistic view as it must precede any doctrine of the divine. Thus, counter-
intuitively, Hume’s view forces religious doctrine to be revealed independently of human 
invention if it is possible at all. As revelation assumes a determinate source, Hume’s 
critique required a monotheistic basis for polytheism despite his intentions.357 
                                                 
354 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.56. 
355 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.57-8. O’Meara summarizes: “Not only does myth mirror 
theogenesis, the history of myth records psychogenesis. The human spirit finding its way ahead to full 
freedom is a reflection of God’s own development for freedom (Romantic Idealism and Roman 
Catholicism, p.116).” 
356 Schelling. Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. p.58. 
357 Schelling. Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. p.59-61. 
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Schelling made a leap in connecting mythology’s professed meaning to a 
philosophically deduced monotheism. His scholarly acceptance of mythology (as it 
professes its own meaning) rests on the exhaustive failure of dismissive interpretations, 
whereas the profession of monotheism rests on Christian assumptions regarding how God 
and humanity relate. This leap deserves criticism, even if his assumption was worked out 
more critically in his earlier works.358 Many will find his argument, resting on inherent 
but hidden problems without criticizing his own deeply held assumptions, to be 
unsatisfying as it asserts the philosophical necessity of theological views. Following the 
issues raised with traditional philosophy of religion in the first two chapters, the critique 
of Schelling’s argument on this point should focus on how the use of one specific 
theological framework undermines a dynamic relation between philosophy and religion. 
Though unsurprising, the connection between group identity and mythological 
religion is noteworthy. Schelling developed this view before Durkheim’s early sociology 
more prominently presented early religion as a challenge to abstract philosophical 
interpretations that consider religion only as it appears through rational order. Like 
Durkheim, Schelling understood religion as a connective force more original and more 
active than philosophical abstractions. This understanding precludes any universal a 
priori account of human culture: different religions produce and perpetuate different 
social realities. This does not, however, mean that human societies share no basis which 
                                                 
358 The essay Of the I, particularly, attempts to trace this connection of the finite and the infinite. The 1800 
System of Transcendental Idealism also should be considered as background for Schelling’s understanding 
of the doctrine of God accessible through philosophical reasoning. 
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can ground mutual critique. The commonality of ancient mythologies indicates a 
primordial revelation given to humanity as a whole.359 
D. The Confusion of Nations: The fifth, sixth, and seventh lectures address the rise 
of heterogeneous peoples out of the primordial unity of humanity. Schelling rejected any 
external cause of this fracture as only an internal “indissoluble and irreversible” cause 
could produce mutually excluding groups: language. As a spiritual cause, inherently 
connected to the identity of a people, language accounts for the inner differentiation of 
human groups. As the confusion of language account in Genesis suggests, the separation 
into different groups was sudden and had to “shake consciousness in its principle, in its 
foundation.”360 The heterogeneity of human culture, as Schelling insisted, cannot be 
understood as arising through a slow social evolution as peoples migrated to different 
climates: such accounts imply an original unity but refuse to expressly acknowledge it.361 
The division can be understood best by considering what held humanity together in 
the first place. Only a singular principle, such as God, could dominate and seize 
consciousness in a manner that could provide such a deep sense of unity. Once the 
conception of God fractured, humanity began to splinter into distinct groups: 
The same God that preserved the unity in unshakable self-equality now—itself having 
become mutable, non-identical to itself—had to disperse the human species, just as it 
had previously held it together; and just as in his identity he was the cause of the unity 
of the human species, in his multiplicity he had to become the cause of its separation 
[Philosophy of Mythology. p.76]. 
                                                 
359 Schelling. Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology. p.64. 
360 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.75. 
361 Rousseau’s account of the development of language in the Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of 
Inequality Among Men provides an insightful contrast with Schelling on this point: his account presents the 
development of language as a gradual invention leading natural humanity to the state of savagery (pp.142-
49). Schelling seems to be criticizing such a genealogical view in order to emphasize the ideal unity of 
language. By accepting that language is not exhausted as a human product, any solely materialist account 
of culture becomes suspect. 
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The division of humanity was not a putative move made to prevent human flourishing, as 
it may seem on the first impression of this interpretation.362 The original unity was 
insufficient and needed to be overcome in order to allow a truer unity of humanity, 
making such a division a boon to human flourishing. 
Polytheism served as “the means of cision that was hurled into the homogeneous 
humanity.”363 That is, the splintering of humanity into distinct peoples involves the 
development of distinct mythologies that emerge from a shared monotheism.364 Schelling 
divided polytheism into two types: one that subordinates several contemporaneous gods 
under one highest master, and successive polytheism. Only the latter is truly possibile as 
simultaneous deities are derived from the highest god and thus: “they are in him, he is 
external to them; he is the god that comprehends them but is not comprehended by 
them.”365 Successive polytheism can encompass simultaneous polytheisms, while the 
reverse cannot be true. Accepting this view, all mythologies must be fundamentally 
connected, strengthening the sense that a philosophy of mythology is possible.366 
                                                 
362 The Babel narrative in Genesis has often been read as a simple punishment, a reading which recalls the 
general convictions of Aristophanes’ speech in Plato’s Symposium (see 189c—193e). Schelling saw 
linguistic division, more positively, as an anticipation of the Pentecost event as a reconnection by language 
(Philosophy of Mythology. p.78). 
363 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.76. 
364 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.79. Schelling further connects the origins of mythology to a time 
of property and contracts (p.81), and permanent settlement (p.83). 
365 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.86. 
366 Schelling has been questioned on this point as he assumed that all mythology could be understood 
through Greek mythology: “Convinced that all myths followed a general pattern, Schelling tended to equate 
the various mediating gods of the Near East with the Greek Dionysius (Dupré. “The Role of Mythology in 
Schelling’s Late Philosophy” p. 9);” others argue that Schelling successfully laid the structure of 
mythology bare (Maesschalk. « Philosophie et Mythologie dans la Dernière Philosophie de Schelling. » 
p. 180). The present study adopts both views as Schelling’s bias, which needs to be criticized, does not 
undermine the value of his insight that mythology should be—at least in certain senses—approached as a 
singular tradition. “Schelling tente d'expliquer la logique de l'expérience mythique et de discerner ses 
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The successive element of mythology must be taken as an historical record of 
evolving religious systems; otherwise the existence of several “master” deities would be 
perplexing. Mythology does not present an a priori system; it took shape through human 
history. The confusion regarding how multiple competing gods became a widely held 
view dissipates if the changing pantheon reflects changes in social order: 
Here it is evident that the doctrines of the gods that have appeared only as past ones of 
the earlier peoples; just as, vice-versa, the reigning gods of the earlier peoples are taken 
up in the mythologies of the later peoples only as moments of the past [Philosophy of 
Mythology. p.88]. 
 
Indeed, no myth can be immediately posited as past: the gods (and doctrines regarding 
them) presented as past within a mythological presentation were once present gods for a 
past people. Otherwise, they could never be taken as divine, even for critical purposes. 
Successive polytheism must originate in the explicit move from the real to the actualized.  
The historical character of mythology seemingly conflicts with mythic reality’s 
existence only within consciousness. But a philosopher of mythology need not take 
mythology as historical in the same sense as other chroniclers like Herodotus; mythic 
time is an illud tempus, even as it constitutes an account of human history. While the 
mythic history of the gods is not immediately actual from a modern standpoint, it would 
be wrong to posit human consciousness as simply imagining fictitious gods. Rather, these 
myths are representations of where “the consciousness of humanity has actually 
tarried,”367 as such they provide a record of actual occurrences within human 
consciousness. Thought is a historical force and cannot be divided from extension in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
conséquences pour la conscience. C'est dans ce sens qu'il faut entendre la philosophie de la mythologie 
comme une herméneutique des lois du développement de l'expérience mythique (ibid. p.183).” 
367 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.89. 
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Cartesian manner: it proves to be real and positive just as much as the objects of 
empirical sciences, and neither is actual apart from the other. 
Schelling’s philosophy of mythology employs a retrospective dialectic that differs 
from Hegel’s history of religion. Schelling took the development of mythology as one of 
succession,368 thus he saw true monotheism as possible only after the possibility of 
multiple gods has been eliminated. Mythology traces the history of consciousness from 
the initial relative monotheism, through polytheism, to true monotheism. The 
development of polytheistic systems of gods parallels the development of peoples and 
languages.369 Schelling connected this movement from relative to determinate unity in 
specific examples that typically exceed Hegel’s efforts to ground his interpretations in 
mythic and religious texts: while Schelling may be criticized for assuming a 
philosophical schema in advance of his historical studies, the specifics of his accounts 
show a noteworthy nuance (even if his interpretations are questionable).370 
                                                 
368 “If you think to yourself this God = A initially appearing in consciousness, then consciousness does not 
have a presentiment that a second = B awaits it, which will initially place itself beside—but then quickly 
above—the first. This one thus is up to now not only in general the One, but rather is so in a sense in which 
there can again be no follower. For to God B, God A has already preceded it in consciousness, and to God 
C (for it is assumed as cause that the second, which drives out the first, only makes way for a third), that is, 
to the third one, when it announces itself, A and B have already preceded it in consciousness. (Schelling. 
Philosophy of Mythology. p.90).” 
369 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.94-6. 
370 “Yet what has been most seriously attacked from the beginning is the philosophical scheme, 
insufficiently supported by empirical evidence, within which he has compelled all myths. He thereby 
weakened the success of his intended project, namely, to explore the ‘internal logic’ of the myth (Dupré. 
“The Role of Mythology in Schelling’s Late Philosophy.” p.18).” Even as Schelling’s specific interpretive 
choices deserve criticism, it is too strong of a reaction to dismiss his philosophy of mythology on these 
grounds alone: “Das Grundsätzliche der Schellingschen Metaphysik aber muß deshalb bleibende 
Bedeutung behalten, weil das Verstehen des Mythos an das Wahrnehmen seines spezifisch geschichtlichen 
Charakters geknüpft ist. Der Mythos ist geschichtlich sowohl in seinen Veranschaulichungen wie in seinem 
Inhalt. Er erklärt durch Aufweisung der geschichtlichen Herkunft, bzw. durch Verweisung auf das 
Anwesen des "Ursprünglichen“; er erklärt nicht durch den Nachweis einer in allgemeinen Gesetzen 
begründeten und begriffenen Notwendigkeit. Der Sinn für den Mythos, für dieses Anwesen des 
„Ursprünglichen", und für den sich von hier aus erhebenden Anspruch an die Geschichtlichkeit unserer 
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E. Mythology and the Philosophy of Religion: Schelling presented a true 
monotheism as the fulfillment of human culture; in monotheism, both god and humanity 
are understood as becoming together. During the time of indeterminate unity for 
humanity, the relation to god could not be true and connected to the divine until elevated 
to knowledge: 
Their knowledge of the true God is not a natural one, and for just this reason also not a 
static one, but rather always only becoming because the true God is himself only for 
consciousness not the existing one, but rather always he who is becoming […]. The 
knowledge of the true God remains for this reason always a demand, a command 
[Philosophy of Mythology. p.124]. 
 
Revelation, in so far as it presents true doctrines which can be known, depends on 
mythology. Mythology expresses the crisis that produced distinct peoples capable of 
receiving a revelation.371 In recording human consciousness before it took possession of 
itself, and thus showing the grounds of human consciousness, mythology marks what has 
become hidden to the post-mythological consciousness.372 
The ninth lecture reasserts the driving goal of the argument, asking the “higher 
question” of what the mythological process means itself, objectively.373 According to 
Schelling, mythology developed following humanity’s “fall” from its original place at the 
center of the godhead; it thus provides insight into the supra-historical process other 
accounts cannot access. In this sense, mythology grounds the speculative view developed 
in the Essence of Human Freedom in the historically determinate expressions of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Existenz hat also die Uberwindung der Absolutsetzung wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisweise zur 
Voraussetzung. Es geht hier entscheidend um eine Erweiterung unseres Denkens  (Allwohn. “Schellings 
Philosophie der Mythologie.” p.180).” 
371 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.125-7. 
372 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.130-6. 
373 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.143. 
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imagination. Since the process itself is universal, the science of mythology must be a 
philosophy of mythology.374 
The overall effect of the collective issues covered by a philosophy of mythology 
proves to be a push for philosophy to accept the non-philosophical as truly independent 
of philosophical interpretation, to recognize a relation of mutual determination rather than 
one of simple criticism.375 Rather than a self-contained science of reason, philosophy is 
one expression of the human relation to the absolute that takes shape relative to other 
such perspectives. The tenth lecture brings the investigation to a close by specifically 
considering the relation of philosophy of mythology to other academic disciplines. 
Schelling’s comments on the philosophy of religion are most notable here, as he claims 
that the insights gained through mythology allow the philosophy of religion to distance 
itself from philosophy generally. Mythology provides context for the philosophical 
consideration of religion: 
The revealed religion is in the historical order only just the second, and thus already 
mediated form of the real religion—that is, of the religion independent of reason. This 
independence it has in common with the natural religion; for this reason its difference 
from the philosophical religion is only its generic difference, not its specific difference, 
as one has assumed up to now [Philosophy of Mythology. p.171]. 
 
The difference between natural and revealed religion (in Schelling’s understanding, 
Christianity and everything else) can only be the meaning of the content they both share 
as actual religion.376 For Schelling, the particularities of this revealed religion may shift 
traditional interpretations of the Christian traditions, but it clearly retains its self-
understanding as ultimately singular and the chief religion.  
                                                 
374 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.151. 
375 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.154. 
376 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.173. 
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As this study has sought to navigate a dynamic inter-determination of religion and 
philosophy as distinct ways of interpreting human experience, this separation of rational 
religion from true religion is especially promising. Religion must not be taken as a purely 
rational field but neither can it be taken as an irrational field, especially as it contains 
both rational and irrational elements which are only sensible in relation to each other. 
While Schelling presented the philosophical investigation of mythological and religious 
sources as universal and necessary in the ninth lecture, he clearly conceived of a different 
task or philosophy of religion conceived through his system: 
The philosophical religion, far from having the right, through its position, to cancel the 
preceding religious, would thus through precisely this position have the task, and 
through its content the means, to comprehend those religions independent of reason, 
and indeed as such, and, accordingly, in their whole truth and actuality [Philosophy of 
Mythology. pp.171-74]. 
 
Such a philosophical religion does not exist and must be approached as a goal. The 
process of human consciousness that Schelling charted through mythology grounds an 
unfolding project for the discipline of the philosophy of religion. Thus, even while the 
present critique departs from keys aspects of Schelling’s philosophy of mythology, there 
is a clear affinity between the goals of this study and Schelling’s work. 
The main criticism to bring against the philosophy of mythology is that it disserves 
its own goal (at least it can be easily construed to do so). Schelling understood the need to 
distinguish his later philosophical work from traditional conceptions of philosophy, as 
well as theology: 
The difference between my philosophy and philosophy in general, as well as theology, 
to which it bears an affinity, is that theology is more an abstraction from philosophy; it 
takes God as a particular object, so to speak, whereas philosophy understands God 
simultaneously as the supreme reason for the explanation of all things, thereby opening 
up the idea of God also for all other objects [Stuttgart Seminars. p.199]. 
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That is, the philosophy of religion not only differs from religious theory and philosophy, 
it helps to define the relation between the two meta-interpretive stances. The relation no 
longer needs to be viewed as antagonistic, as this third perspective maintains the 
difference of the two views while also emphasizing their complimentary roles. 
 
IV. Criticisms and Conclusions 
 
In the first chapter, modernity was defined, in part, through its rejection of appeals to 
transcendent values. In this way, modern theorists distinguished themselves from pre-
modern views as well as contemporary alternatives to Western secular humanism. This 
rejection makes a perceived conflict between faith and reason central to modern 
conceptions of religion. Charles Taylor described the perspective which creates this 
conflict as an immanent frame: 
And so we can come to see the growth of civilization, or modernity, as synonymous 
with the laying out of a closed immanent frame; within this civilized values develop, 
and a single-minded focus on the human good, aided by the fuller and fuller use of 
scientific reason, permits the greatest flourishing possible of human beings. Religion 
not only menaces these goals with its fanaticism, but it also undercuts reason, which 
comes to be seen as rigorously requiring scientific materialism [A Secular Age. p.548]. 
 
As individual autonomy has been understood as conflicting with transcendence, a more 
nuanced philosophy of religion is not possible through moderate changes to its typical 
modern expression. The non-rational and non-immanent, forced to exercise only 
subterranean influence, are vital to society and necessitate the continued critique of a 
priori scientific views of philosophy. 
There have been numerous critiques of modernity, especially the Enlightenment, and 
contemporary scholars cannot assume an immanent frame without attracting significant 
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criticism. Nevertheless, such a frame has proven difficult to abandon, as it is entwined 
with modern structures which continue to shape contemporary views of the nature and 
role of religion. Any attempt to criticize the immanent frame must reconsider the relation 
of modern theory to its antecedents, as Gillespie artfully argued: 
The ways in which the Western world misunderstands Islam are complicated by ways 
in which we misunderstand ourselves. This is especially true of our ignorance of the 
theological provenance of our own liberalism. […] But perhaps such a 
misunderstanding is inevitable. After all, modernity is above all things convinced that it 
owes nothing to the past, that it has made itself, and that what matters is happening right 
now. Indeed, this is the meaning of the freedom, power, and progress that we all prize. 
This belief, however, leaves us in a precarious situation. […] For none of us are 
Fortune’s child. We all come from somewhere [The Theological Origins of Modernity. 
pp.293-94]. 
 
The need to reassess cultural assumptions has only been intensified through 
Enlightenment attempts to develop a pure reason. In order to overcome the problems 
which resulted from this, philosophy must abandon the posture of self-sufficiency and 
adopt a perspective which allows for dynamic relations between meta-interpretations. 
Schelling’s positive philosophy offers an alternative way to receive the tradition of 
modern theory in order to enrich our understanding of the dynamic relation between 
religion, religions, and philosophical science. 
Schelling’s accomplishment was presenting mythology and philosophy as constantly 
engaged, yet always distinct, perspectives. He insisted, compellingly, that mythology be 
interpreted on its own terms and as a distinct voice. This approach requires that 
philosophy and mythology always remain distinct, a difference embodied in the historical 
gap between the mythic and philosophical eras. This mythological perspective must 
prove, for the modern scholar, complete and closed to further development and change. 
As mythology remains distinct, it exceeds any single philosophical interpretation and 
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cannot be sublated. Schelling hinted at such a conclusion, but failed to emphasize this 
important result. One significant problem for Schelling’s philosophy of mythology (and 
source of frustration for many critical commentators) is his strong emphasis on a 
singularly Christian interpretation of mythology. 
The very nature of argumentative explication means that meta-interpretive efforts 
tend toward singularizing interpretations. Schelling, in connecting the positive 
philosophy and philosophy of mythology to explicitly Christian views, committed to this 
tendency too fully. While his general convictions oppose this tendency, specific 
statements bring to mind the sublation of the Hegelian dialectic: “The theory of every 
natural or historical object is itself nothing other than a philosophical consideration of it, 
whereby the point is to uncover the living seed, which drives toward development, or to 
uncover the true and actual nature in it.”377 Schelling’s account differed from the 
Hegelian perspective primarily through its measured explication of mythological and 
religious sources, not typically trusted by modern philosophers, according to their own 
terms. This effort provides the grounding to make his philosophical theory properly 
“positive.”378 
Schelling’s positive philosophy proves to be both a success and failure, though a 
failure largely in the sense that it is incomplete. 
                                                 
377 Schelling. Philosophy of Mythology. p.153. 
378 Referring to the introduction to Schelling’s 1809 collected works, Brown noted “that Schelling is not his 
own best interpreter (The Later Philosophy of Schelling. p.117n7).” This sentiment informs the present 
critique of Schelling’s late philosophy. The failure to critique the narrow impositions imposed by his 
Christian assumptions does not dismiss Schelling’s Christian philosophy of religion. Rather, the critique is 
meant to advance the challenging goal he presented without fully achieving. The goal is such that no 
singular speculative effort can likely balance the author’s biases and the need for multiple meta-interpretive 
voices. 
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That is, in sketching the possible real consequences of the decision to create and then in 
seeking to fit the known facts of creation (e.g. the genesis of nature and the religious 
history of mankind) into this a priori scheme Schelling quite unconsciously was 
working once again within the mental framework of the negative philosophy. A truly 
positive philosophy would have to take into account all the data of creation, not merely 
those details that Schelling could easily fit into his a priori scheme [Bracken. 
“Schelling’s Positive Philosophy.” p.329].379 
 
His critique of modern philosophy clarified the need for philosophy to stand in relation to 
distinct academic perspectives. As the philosophical conception of God from Descartes to 
Hegel encapsulated the core problem, the most important external voice is theology. 
However, in order to keep theology and philosophy distinct, the positive philosophy must 
not confuse one religious philosophy with religion generally. This problem cannot be 
answered exhaustively through theory: the success of a theory stems from its ability to 
explain and interpret a great number of experiences through a closed set of assumptions. 
As such, a positive philosophy should not emphasize language of theoretical 
completion.380 
Schelling needed to effectively construct a comparative mythological and religious 
system, but as a means and not as an end in itself. Bracken’s objection correctly points to 
a weakness of the positive philosophy, but misses how that point relates to Schelling’s 
                                                 
379 Bracken raises a related criticism relative to Schelling’s 1809 Freedom essay: “he tried […] to 
determine whether the essence (Wesen) of God’s freedom to create in terms of its projected antecedents in 
the divine consciousness and its known historical consequences in creation. In so proceeding, however, 
Schelling fell, consciously or unconsciously, into a dilemma. For if he truly succeeded in explaining the 
action of God or man in terms of its antecedents and consequences, then his act could no longer be 
regarded as completely free. If on the other hand Schelling insisted on the total freedom of God’s creative 
act and man’s fall from grace, then his philosophical speculations on the essence or rational concept of 
human and divine freedom would be groundless, purely fanciful (“Freedom and Causality in Schelling.” 
p.167-68).” This objection requires a close association of knowing and being to work as forcefully as 
Bracken wants. 
380 Schelling may not have emphasized this point, but the conclusion of the Stuttgart Seminars suggests that 
he saw the philosophical theory advanced there as less than final. Particularly, by ending a philosophical 
argument by discussing a religious idea of a final judgment, he clearly made philosophy and incomplete 
project. 
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project. Maesschalk offers a necessary counterpoint to the critique represented by 
Bracken: 
Schelling tâche de se frayer un chemin entre la réduction anthropologique de 
l'expérience religieuse (Lessing) et sa réduction esthétique (Schleiermacher). Ces deux 
écueils rendent la lecture de Schelling malaisée. Mais on doit se garder d'en privilégier 
un aux dépens de l'autre, car alors on manque toute l'originalité de l'entreprise 
schellingienne. De plus, ces écueils peuvent prendre différentes figures, changer de 
domaine et se nuancer. Schelling avait d'abord identifié le criticisme et le dogmatisme, 
il parlera ensuite de la philosophie transcendantale et de la philosophie de la nature, 
puis de l'idéalisme et du réalisme. Dans la Philosophie de la Révélation, il nommera le 
rationalisme et le piétisme. Si on refuse d'entrer dans cette tension interne, 
l'interprétation échoue fatalement sur l'un des écueils [“Philosophie et Mythologie dans 
la Dernière Philosophie de Schelling.” p.186]. 
 
Maesschalk’s point does not dismiss the core of Bracken’s critique, though it exposes a 
short-coming in how that critique is formulated. Schelling’s limited comparative focus as 
his goal is finding the fundamental experience of mythological consciousness.381 
Schelling’s lectures on mythology show just how decidedly his mature thought was 
Christian.382 Of course, an individual neither can nor should be asked to abandon their 
religious identity; this shortcoming indicates a professional need for further work rather 
than a personal failing or a collapse of Schelling’s positive philosophy. The singular 
perspective, and resulting a priori absolute proclamations, of a religious worldview 
cannot constitute a positive philosophy in which negative philosophy is checked by 
historical development of human thought. A positive philosophy requires multiple 
                                                 
381 Maesschalk. “Philosophie et Mythologie dans la Dernière Philosophie de Schelling.” p.190. 
382 Rather than note the internal limitations of Schelling’s engagement with Christian doctrine (O’Meara 
notes “Schelling treats at length only two specifically Christian doctrines: the Trinity and the Son as Christ 
(“Christianity is the Future of Paganism,” p.226)), this study suggests that the finality Schelling attributed 
to philosophy of the Christian revelation is its primary shortcoming. Sedlar notes that Schelling’s lectures 
on the philosophy of mythology “sought to incorporate all the civilizations of the world into a single, 
comprehensive philosophical system. But here also Schelling’s Indian studies evidently were cursory, 
guided by the purpose of furnishing material for his preconceived historical framework (India in the Mind 
of Germany. p.219).” Sedlar is correct that Schelling’s schematic (history as comprised of pre-Christian and 
Christian eras) contributed to his limited interest in actual engagement with Indian sources in his lectures 
(ibid. p.220). 
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perspectives that reliably resist reduction into a single view. Schelling’s Christian 
interpretation of mythology proves problematic based on his own motivation to develop a 
philosophy of mythology.383 Nevertheless, the multiple voices needed are only possible if 
various traditions articulate their equivalent of the positive philosophy fully. Schelling’s 
failure illustrates that a positive philosophy of religion exceeds the scope of any 
individual’s work. The following, brief concluding chapter will look to the concrete 
manifestation of the abstract effort to define religion and philosophy. The theoretical and 
abstract philosophical inquiries of the previous chapters can help to address a practical 
issue that is easily overlooked. 
The problems of the philosophy of mythology, especially clear in the context of the 
positive philosophy, help to reveal a potential direction for the contemporary philosophy 
of religion. Rather than seek a specific doctrinal conclusion, the field should maintain the 
“positive” critique of philosophy as a primary goal. The discipline, as will be discussed 
briefly in the concluding chapter, can labor after creating an academic space rather than a 
specific doctrine. Since philosophy, on this view, cannot be a completed construction, it 
must not be confused with any particular religious perspective. A “positive” philosophy 
of religion allows new perspective on the professional practice of philosophy, as old 
perceptions of the discipline’s place in the academy rest on the assumption that 
philosophy can claim status as an independent science of science. While not a definitive 
                                                 
383 His uncritical adoption of the Christian tradition is evidently a problem when one considers Schelling’s 
mature understanding of God: “Without becoming too entangled in this terminology, which can be a pitfall 
for an understanding of Schelling, we can say that God is source, he is pure act, actus purus, pure that and 
in no way what. We must ask not what God is, but we must comprehend that, Dass, God is and this Dass 
rejects any what which is not pure will. God is the source of all being and, therefore, he is in himself 
Nichts, no thing, the absence of all that is and, thus, the source of all that is. God is freedom (Kluback. 
“Political Dimension of Schelling’s Lecture: ‘On the Source of Eternal Truth’.” p.170).” 
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conception of the field, it nonetheless removes the field from the mutual determination 
amongst meta-interpretations suggested here. Thus, the field can only be realized by 
turning from pure theory to a practical question of how various views can coexist and 
beneficially interact without losing their differences.  
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CONCLUSION: 
The Division of Faculties and 
the Role of Philosophy of Religion 
 
 
 
The introduction argued that, by focusing on the abstract speculation of German 
Idealism, this study could criticize a problematic assumption that affects several current 
problems facing pluralistic secular societies. Specifically, this study attempted to address 
the problematic legacy of the Enlightenment conception of philosophy as a universal, 
rational, and a priori science.384 These problems—conflict between fundamentalists and 
secularists, disputes over ideological values promoted by state education, legal protection 
of religious minorities—demand critical attention; the philosophy of religion can and 
should help to provide a framework that guides such efforts. The inability to provide a 
fully satisfying alternative through Schelling’s promising late philosophy of religion calls 
this initial move to philosophical abstraction into question. The move to focus on an 
abstract core of otherwise diverse problems, ultimately, seems to reveal only that the 
Enlightenment view merely amplified an unavoidable problem. 
Schelling’s positive philosophy offers significant resources for the contemporary 
philosophy of religion, but it does not provide a theoretical lens that can avoid the 
problems which this study sought to circumvent. Abstract limitations and contradictions 
are hardly surprising in a sprawling theoretical edifice; they provide much of the 
motivation for subsequent interpreters to engage such constructs as living systems. 
                                                 
384 Such views are not often explicitly held and defended, though they do not need to be for the criticisms 
offered here to be valid. While many scholars consider this view of philosophy to have been abandoned, it 
nevertheless exerts a pronounced influence, as the brief consideration of Rorty’s schematic of modern 
philosophy demonstrates. 
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However, Schelling’s Christian interpretation of mythology and revelation largely repeats 
the very problem he tried to redress. Even while reestablishing the vitality of religious 
thought apart from philosophy, the abstract nature of his system led him to elevate a 
single perspective over others as the meta-interpretive view. His late philosophy reveals 
the difficulty of creating a robust dialogue between various philosophical and religious 
interpretations of human experience that maintains each perspective’s unique integrity. 
This conclusion offers a brief argument—as a rough sketch of a subsequent 
project—that the inadequacy of “positive” theory does not signal a strict and full failure. 
Rather, Schelling’s failure merely signals that the theoretical framing of these issues can 
account only for one part of the philosophy of religion. What proves theoretically 
unworkable should be addressed instead as a hybrid issue; the theoretical divisions of 
philosophy, theology, and religion are both theoretical and practical institutional concerns 
that can only be addressed effectively when considered in an interdisciplinary regimen. 
Rather than conclude that Schelling failed to develop a sufficient philosophy of religion, 
the following will suggest that his theory can serve as a starting point from which to 
investigate the relation of such abstract theory to the institutional context of philosophy 
and religious studies. This will lead beyond the seeming dead-end of the preceding and 
allow for a better, fuller exploration of the full promise of the positive philosophy. 
 
I. Schelling’s Ideal University: Practical Implication of a Theoretical Question. 
 
As the previous chapter argued, Schelling ultimately confused the positive 
philosophy with his personal religious views. This created an internal problem for his 
philosophy of religion; the philosophical conception of religion that attempts to 
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“objectively” demarcate the subject serves just as easily as a tool to advance personal 
bias. Schelling provided an important tool for addressing this tendency toward theoretical 
abstraction when he addressed philosophy as a profession tied to a specific institutional 
position. Universities embody the abstractions discussed above and connect scholars with 
a wide range of religious, cultural, and ideological convictions. The multitude of modern 
universities may manifest divergent pedagogical assumptions, but they all are specific 
and concrete entities that center on abstract ideas.385 The abstract divisions drawn 
between theology, religious thought, and philosophy contribute to the idea of the 
university as both an ideal and real entity. 
As Schelling contributed to scholarly attempts to define the purpose and structure of 
the ideal university, this study provides a basis for subsequent explorations of the various 
ways that universities have attempted to embody the abstract divisions explored above. 
This era proves uniquely important for such concerns as many scholars working in 
German universities—Schelling, Kant, Schiller, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, and others—
profoundly shaped the self-conception of various academic disciplines, the idea of the 
university as an institution, and both the State and the individual understanding of the 
goals of education. Most of these scholars took a more grandiose view of philosophy than 
is currently fashionable,386 though their views remain influential and relevant. A brief 
                                                 
385 Even for-profit education betrays abstract ideas at their root about what society is, what holds 
fundamental value, and the best way to obtain that desired social order. 
386 “The story of the birth of the ‘modern university’ is intimately connected to the development of 
German—particularly Prussian, Protestant—institutions. Granting the complex antecedents behind all 
historical beginnings, few would nonetheless gainsay that it was most notably in post-revolutionary Prussia, 
beginning with the dramatic founding of the University of Berlin in 1810, that the modern university first 
appeared on the historical stage (Howard. Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German 
University. p.4.).” Köhnke emphasizes the significance that the subsequent era had for narrowing the 
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account of Schelling’s conception of the university will point to a more practically 
minded redrawing of this study’s problematic and an initial step toward a comparative 
study of this era’s the important works on this topic. 
A. The University as Philosophy Embodied: Schelling’s 1803 On University 
Studies and 1821 On the Nature of Philosophy as a Science both define the nature of 
philosophy relative to the fundamental purpose of universities and offer a bridge between 
the abstract definition of philosophy and religion and the manifestation of that 
distinction. In On University Studies, Schelling depicted philosophy as peacefully uniting 
and directing the otherwise disparate sciences. In this view, the university embodies 
philosophy’s abstract reflections and any limitations of its autonomous functioning come 
from external political and commercial impositions; philosophy constitutes “the soul and 
life”387 of the university. This conviction shapes the relationship of the faculties by 
prioritizing philosophy as the only discipline capable of supplying a meta-context in 
which the other sciences can form a meaningful whole. In this sense, his work inverts 
scholastic conceptions that place theology in the center of the university and rejects 
modern views that emphasize professional preparation as the end of education. 
Three points follow directly from the placing of philosophy at the center of 
educational institutions, even though they were not Schelling’s focus. First: philosophy 
needs university structure as much as it is needed by that structure; the metaphor of a 
body and a soul may imply the superiority of the soul, but only by drawing attention to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Idealists’ grandiose conception of philosophy: “The epoch of modern philosophy—and that means the 
epoch in which it became within the university a mere ‘branch of learning’, a learned discipline beside 
others, and itself abandoned all claim to be in any respect anything more—dates from March 1852 
(Köhnke. The Rise of Neo-Kantianism. p.79).” 
387 Schelling. On University Studies. p.60. 
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their mutual dependence. Second: while assuming the autonomy of philosophy, this view 
indicates that the discipline serves a political role; while the field may not be 
characterized by an immediate material end, it has a role to serve in its social context. 
Third: this view makes it necessary to awkwardly distinguish academic practice from 
philosophy itself; specific professors and courses that are dedicated to philosophy cannot 
be identical with the over-arching spirit and life of the university and the sciences. This 
tension constitutes a major problem for the text. Presumably, this inter-determination of 
the university and philosophy fuels an ongoing negotiation of the boundaries and roles of 
philosophy, though Schelling did not note this implication. 
Schelling showed little interest in these consequences in either of the two major 
sections of On University Studies. The first six lectures outline the discipline of 
philosophy and its task within the university while the remaining lectures survey the 
multiple sciences which philosophy unifies. The first half of the text criticizes the view 
that the university serves only as an institution of professional training, a view that 
Schelling dismissed as an act of resignation. He insisted that the sciences have both 
professional applications and a higher calling,388 and that they form an organic whole: 
It is the idea of an intrinsically unconditional knowledge, one and entire—the 
primordial knowledge, which in the phenomenal world exists only in separate branches, 
no longer as one single great tree of knowledge. As the knowledge of all knowledge, it 
must be based on the same assumption as every individual science [On University 
Studies. p.9]. 
 
Regardless of their diverse forms, the sciences all share a single unified origin. Engaging 
a particular discipline involves relating what is particular in it to the original whole. Even 
                                                 
388 Schelling. On University Studies. p.6-8. 
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if philosophy adopts the self-characterization of “an island of certainty,” it cannot be an 
isolated territory as Kant’s metaphor suggested: it is tied to the a posteriori and uncertain 
seas.389 Nevertheless, this conception allows for only one meta-interpretive standpoint. 
Schelling defended this philosophical characterization of university studies from 
those who argue that knowledge is incomplete unless applied. This challenge remains 
central to contemporary universities that must consider economic realities; such views 
simply marginalize the goals of the humanities and moral development in order to prize 
marketability of skills. As philosophy serves both scientific and moral aims, it creates 
tension with the political interest in moral training and economic interest in vocational 
training: 
everyone knows that [universities] are instruments of the state and must be what the 
state intended them to be. […] Incontestably, the state has the authority to suppress 
the universities or to transform them into industrial training schools; however, it 
cannot intend the universities to be real scientific institutions without desiring to 
further the life of ideas and the freest scientific development [On University Studies. 
pp.22-23]. 
 
This perceived tension rests on the misperception that distinct fields are merely means, 
rather than each an end in itself.390 Once the opposition of knowledge and action—which 
Schelling argued reflects an underestimation of the value of knowledge391—is rejected, 
the university cannot be limited to the transmission of professional knowledge and simple 
service to the state (or a transnational marketplace).392 This defense of university studies, 
however, also erodes the isolation of philosophy as an abstract pure science. 
                                                 
389 See Chapter one, §I.B; the island metaphor was introduced in the first Critique [A235-6, B294-5]. 
390 Schelling. On University Studies. p.25. 
391 Schelling. On University Studies. p.10-14. 
392 Philosophy, representing these abstract goals, faces charges of endangering religion, the state, and the 
other sciences. The fault, in such conflicts, lies with a state or religion threatened by philosophy which 
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Schelling insisted that to demand utility alone from the sciences would illustrate a 
misunderstanding of how ideas inform and direct human society.393 Outside the 
university, philosophical ideas are adopted and argued daily, even when lacking the 
disciplined formulations of the professionals. In the sixth lecture, Schelling explained the 
relation of philosophy-as-curricular subject, and philosophy-as-absolute-knowledge: 
What can be, if not learned, at least practiced at school is the technical aspect of 
philosophy, what is generally called dialectics. Without the art of dialectics there is no 
scientific philosophy. Its very goal—which is to represent the all as unity and to do this 
in forms which are originally reflective but which nonetheless express primordial 
knowledge—proves this. This relation between speculation and reflection is the basis of 
all dialectics [On University Studies. p.61]. 
 
It is reasonable to demand that the truth have quantifiable practical benefit, a view that 
follows the seemingly “sound common sense [that] wants the truth in hard cash.”394 
Nevertheless, training in dialectics ideally leads to philosophy in its absolute sense, which 
has immense though unquantifiable social value. Schelling’s view—philosophy 
constitutes the soul of the university—points beyond the discipline to its own ideal; this is 
a problem for a field that must unite an actual institution rather than an ideal institution. 
Schelling anticipated the demands that the positive philosophy would place on 
philosophical faculties, but his abstract interest in unifying all academic perspectives 
ignored the full distinctness of these divergent perspectives. The remaining lectures 
survey the multiple sciences that philosophy unifies within the university. Schelling 
briefly glosses issues involved in the study of Theology, History and Jurisprudence, 
                                                                                                                                                 
“follows its own inherent principles and can give little concern to whether everything devised by mankind 
agrees with it (Schelling. On University Studies. p.51).” The true danger lies in the tendency to allow 
common knowledge to judge absolute knowledge, leading to intellectual authority being replaced by 
“moral principles” which aim only for the useful (Schelling. On University Studies. p.52-5). 
393 Schelling. On University Studies. p.56. 
394 Schelling. On University Studies. p.62. 
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Natural Science, Physics and Chemistry, Medicine and Organic Nature, and the science 
of Art. He divided the sciences into major branches that reflect his idealist philosophy: 
the objective counterpoint of the absolute point of indifference (theology); the objective 
counterpoint of the real aspect of the absolute (science of nature and organism); and the 
objective counterpoint of the ideal aspect of the absolute (history and jurisprudence).395 
Philosophy unifies these sciences that are otherwise divided between moral, religious, 
and poetic oppositions.396 Philosophy is the force without which each field would exist on 
its own in isolation.397 
On University Studies hints at, but cannot deliver, an account of philosophy as both 
institutionally embodied and, ultimately, a “positive” science that Schelling came to see 
as philosophy’s proper form. The promise is evident through the assertion of a holistic 
connection of sciences and the conception of philosophy as inherently educational. This 
conception of philosophy as the “soul” of the university demonstrates that any 
discipline’s self-understanding places demands on other faculties and implies social and 
political consequences, a corollary that deserves further consideration. The failure shows 
in Schelling’s commitment to an abstract pure philosophy unaffected by the institution in 
which it is embodied. He did not fully appreciate the need to curb meta-interpretive 
claims so as to make room for competing theories. 
                                                 
395 Schelling. On University Studies. p.78-9. 
396 “In philosophy, nature and God, science and art, religion and poetry are linked with one another from 
the beginning. When philosophy has overcome its internal oppositions, it meets no external oppositions 
save those that may be produced by empiricism or a shallow dilettantism, as formless as it is frivolous 
(Schelling. On University Studies. p.75).” 
397 One such example: “Empiricism has no knowledge of the original sources from which everything 
returns. […] To discover this essence of matter and to show how the particular things are produced by it are 
exclusively philosophical tasks (On University Studies. p.125).” 
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B. Philosophy as One voice among Many: In the later On the Nature of Philosophy 
as Science, Schelling offered a view of academic disciplines that more fully serves the 
goals of the “positive philosophy” rather than simply lionize philosophy as the chief 
science. Schelling abandoned the simple characterization of science as unified and 
instead envisioned science as an organic system, a difference evident in his point of 
departure: 
The idea or the endeavour of finding a system of human knowledge, or, put differently 
and more appropriately, of contemplating human knowledge within a system, within a 
form of coexistence, presupposes, of course, that originally and of itself it does not exist 
in a system, hence that it is an άσύστατον [asystaton]—something whose elements do 
not coexist, but rather something that is in inner conflict [“On the Nature of Philosophy 
as a Science.” p.210].398 
 
The earlier organic metaphor—of a tree and its branches—has been abandoned and 
profound changes follow for the perception of philosophy, both as a pursuit and a 
professional discipline. A system that is asserted to bring order to conflict cannot be 
characterized as a priori; likewise the unity that maintains such an unsuppressed tension 
renders any static understanding of the field and makes claims to autonomy and authority 
impossible. 
The asystaton of human knowledge only comes into focus after various systems have 
been developed. Philosophy is not simply a response to, or an advancement of, these 
systems; it is a second order science. Philosophy and the proper idea of a system only can 
become clear once the conflict of systems is itself evident.399 This conflict must remain 
unresolved, just as individual organs must remain distinct yet united in the whole for 
complex life. The various systems: 
                                                 
398 In German Idealist Philosophy. Ed. Rüdiger Bubner. London: Penguin Books. 1997. 
399 Schelling. “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science.” p. 212. 
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are supposed to coexist, like the different systems of one organism, and in this 
coexistence they are supposed to produce a perspective that goes beyond the individual 
systems, a healthy perspective which gives pleasure to man, the same way as in a 
healthy human body all differences between the organs and functions blend into one 
inseparable life whose feeling is well-being [“On the Nature of Philosophy as a 
Science.” p.213]. 
 
Philosophy no longer can be understood as a modern inversion of the scholastic view of 
theology as the science of science: philosophy is unable to reduce the other sciences to a 
single meaning.400 From the perspective of positive philosophy, conflicting academic 
systems are essential for the proper articulation and functioning of human knowledge. 
Not only does this mean that philosophy cannot function independently of multiple 
distinct and independent sciences, it means that it can never presume to give a final 
interpretation of the other sciences: it always must remain one view among others. 
In this later work, Schelling tied the abstract speculation of philosophy even more 
strongly and intentionally to the context of the university. This is a point where 
Schelling’s views matured since the 1803 lectures, where modern sciences were 
conceived as a singular entity viewed solely in philosophical terms; the university that 
this view takes as a model likewise saw in philosophy a unifying and integrative force.401 
The positive philosophy no longer allows the opposition between branches of science to 
be seen as singular. Instead, the chaos and discord of various disciplines that cannot be 
harmonized in a single ideal end has become the model of human knowledge. This means 
that philosophy, as the systematizing perspective, cannot exist independently: the field is 
                                                 
400 As, in broad terms, Hugh of St. Victor’s Didascalicon, Bonaventure’s Reduction of the Arts to Theology, 
and Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy ibn Yaqzan all argued. 
401 Schelling. On University Studies. p.66-9. 
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possible only where multiple systems are articulated and maintained as distinct as the 
tension between sciences is the very cause of philosophy itself.402 
The tension between various sciences no longer originates from external forces such 
as government censure or religious pressure; the nature of science and human knowledge 
itself creates these tensions.403 The philosophy that follows from this view must 
emphasize philosophy as a meta-science far more than the view presented in On 
University Studies; other sciences and disciplines are definable, while philosophy is 
indefinable as it is both nothing and everything:404 
Here, then, what prevents most people from even taking up philosophy must be pointed 
out. It is the idea of dealing with a demonstrative science, which at the very beginning 
proceeds from one piece of knowledge in order to reach another piece of knowledge, 
and another from that one, etc. Philosophy, however, is not a demonstrative science. 
Philosophy is, to put it straightforwardly, a free act of the spirit [On the Nature of 
Philosophy as Science. p.227]. 
 
Schelling insisted that no position can be final, but he underestimated the variety of meta-
scientific perspectives and the effect that multiple such positions have on university 
structures.405 His view of philosophy certainly makes it a candidate to renegotiate the 
current disciplinary boundaries embodied by modern universities, though theology has 
traditionally served a similar function and in many ways both have been replaced in 
contemporary universities by economic value. Reason, faith, and material prosperity each 
legitimately demand different priorities and goals out of university studies. 
                                                 
402 Schelling. “On the Nature of Philosophy as Science.” p. 238. 
403 “Proceeding through everything and not being anything, namely not being anything such that it could 
not also be something else—this is the requirement (On the Nature of Philosophy as Science. p.215).” 
404 Schelling. On the Nature of Philosophy as Science. p.217. 
405 He ultimately settles on defining the “complete concept” of philosophy as “absolute freedom (On the 
Nature of Philosophy as Science. p.220).” If this freedom is attributed solely to philosophy faculties, this 
view remains close to his 1803 On University Studies. However, if this is understood as a challenge to 
philosophy to accept its reliance on other fields, Schelling’s late conception of the philosophical discipline 
more clearly incorporates the reality of university structures into his conception of the discipline. 
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This development hints at the inseparability of the abstract definition of philosophy 
and related disciplines and specific institutional manifestations of these ideas. The two 
different views that Schelling articulated regarding the nature of philosophy suggest that 
the idea of the university is certainly flexible. The goal of philosophical studies, 
according to Schelling’s mature thought, will strike many as overly ambitious as it seeks 
to utilize public institutions in the search for personal meaning and harmony. In secular 
society, the pursuit of the individual to achieve harmony with ultimate reality seems 
decidedly private rather than a political or corporate concern. Clearly the later essay 
offers even less practical advice for the management of universities than On University 
Studies as Schelling ignored issues of how to shape educational systems in order to serve 
these ideas. Nevertheless, the essay illustrates one way in which Schelling’s late positive 
philosophy can help frame the role that philosophy plays in contemporary society and the 
tension it creates with religious theory. 
At present, it is only a secondary concern whether either of Schelling’s accounts of 
philosophy as a professional discipline are convincing. Such concerns can be more 
fruitfully addressed once a comparative study of his views of philosophy as a science and 
those of his contemporaries has been properly framed; the remaining section will sketch 
some of the ground that must be covered in order to provide this. What is most important 
at present is to note that both accounts, despite significant differences, make it necessary 
to view philosophy as a profession rather than a purely abstract pursuit. The political 
excitement that fueled many philosophers between the Napoleonic wars and the 1848 
Spring of Nations led to particularly politically-conscious philosophy; the continuing 
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problems faced in trying to define the nature of philosophy, religion, and society provide 
motivation to reconsider the frameworks developed in those years. 
 
II. Limiting Abstract Theory in Reframing the Problem. 
 
The medieval university, despite the rejection of scholasticism, provided the 
immediate model for modern universities. Though philosophy seems unable to claim, 
legitimately, a truly central role in the contemporary university, in the early modern 
period it could support such a claim; the move away from medieval structures of power 
was accompanied by internal power shifts between university faculties: 
Politically, the demands of absolutist state-building placed a premium on competent 
statesmen and lawyers, boosting the prestige and importance of the faculty of law, often 
at the expense of theology. Intellectually, currents of the French Enlightenment and 
English Deism had made their presence felt in German academic life. […] As the 
century progressed, the philosophical faculty’s expanding scope and distinction 
increasingly posed a threat to the status of theology [Howard. Protestant Theology and 
the Making of the Modern German University. p.46-47]. 
 
The modern university self-consciously formed as both part of and apart from the state 
and the religious ecclesiology. This shaped the conception of philosophical inquiry and 
its academic appearance: 
The ascent of the philosophical faculty constitutes another consequential development 
of the era. Whereas previously this faculty had been regarded largely as preparatory, it 
increasingly—if slowly and only at a few universities—became a semi-autonomous 
enterprise, the harbinger of a new type of enquiry that sought not simply to prepare 
students for further studies and professional skills, but to increase the domain of 
knowledge through research and publication and to instruct students how to do the same 
[Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German University. p.81]. 
 
This context reveals the true meaning of early modern rhetoric advocating the freedom of 
philosophy that led to the mischaracterization of medieval thought. However, while the 
history of the modern university provides important context, it falsely suggests that a 
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university must select either a religious or a philosophical faculty as its center—the very 
schematic that this study has identified as a pressing problem. 
The philosophy of religion must take this topic—the division of faculties—as a 
central concern since the field covers two distinct perspectives that can neither be isolated 
nor unified. This challenge is heightened by the fact that each field rivals the other for a 
place of prominence within universities and, as Leo Strauss insisted, they cannot be 
synthesized: 
No one can be both a philosopher and a theologian or, for that matter, a third which is 
beyond the conflict between philosophy and theology, or a synthesis of both. But every 
one of us can be and ought to be either the one or the other, the philosopher open to the 
challenge of theology or the theologian open to the challenge of philosophy [Strauss. 
“The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy.” p.111]. 
 
Strauss addressed this abstractly, leading him to reassert philosophy’s character as a way 
of life rather than simply as a professional faculty; this demonstrates the intractability of 
the abstract problem as an individual cannot function in two roles at the same time and in 
the same manner. The philosophy of religion cannot function if it focuses on an 
individual and abstract position. The university—the context in which these abstractions 
take on more determinate forms—provides an essential milieu for such a hybrid 
perspective. It is a unique institution that functions abstractly as one entity but practically 
as various entities accomplishing several functions at the same time. 
A. German Philosophy and the Idea of the University: Rather than follow Strauss’s 
abstract approach, the German Idealist era allows the abstract issue to be addressed in 
such a way that emphasizes its concrete implications as well. The German academic 
culture of the early nineteenth century was fascinated with the French Revolution and the 
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reforms brought about through the Napoleonic Wars; the social theories of modern 
philosophers, it appeared, were guiding the creation of a more liberal society. This 
conviction led members of the intelligentsia to offer their own accounts of how the 
university should express and cultivate the high ideals of a liberal society. Kant’s Conflict 
of the Faculties, Schleiermacher’s Brief Outline of the Study of Theology, and Schiller’s 
On the Aesthetic Education of Man all illustrate this attempt to apply abstract argument to 
political and cultural ends. These texts serve as a starting point to trace the full scope of 
the “idea of the university” that further contextualizes Schelling’s work and makes it 
possible to utilize it as a basis for exploring the nature of philosophy and religious 
thought. 
A comparative study of those works will provide the foundation needed to enumerate, 
frame, and address the contemporary ideological challenges facing universities and 
institutions of higher education. This will help to distinguish the interests of universities 
from mere economic concerns, though it must not overshadow the importance of such 
market forces. A further survey of sources beyond those associated with the founding of 
the University of Berlin—Newman’s The Idea of a University, Dewey’s Democracy and 
Education, Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences as just a few examples—will allow 
further exploration of the foundational ideas of a university as well as how ideals have 
changed over time. Contemporary structures and institutional arrangements maintain and 
cultivate a sense of tradition that can seem like (and is often invoked as) an absolute 
authority; in actuality these traditions have been shaped and are maintained through 
constant negotiation. More effective deliberation regarding the structure and role of 
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universities starts with understanding the full scope of abstract projects that the university 
has been used to serve. 
Schelling’s On University Studies provided only one schematization of the purpose of 
public education; by studying his work in the context of alternate conceptions, it will be 
possible to mark the strengths and limits of purely theoretical approaches to this issue. 
For example, the Romantic ideal of education that Schiller developed shows just how 
thoroughly humanities education constitutes a political concern, a tension that 
pedagogical theories must continues to face. He argued that society must be repaired and 
edified as in order to continue operating for the individual’s perfection: 
Every individual human being, one may say, carries with him, potentially and 
prescriptively, an ideal man, the archetype of a human being, and it is his life’s task to 
be, through all his changing manifestations, in harmony with the unchanging unity of 
this ideal. This archetype which is to be discerned more or less clearly in every 
individual, is represented by the state, the objective and, as it were, canonical form in 
which all the diversity of individual subjects strive to unite [Aesthetical Education of 
Man. p.93]. 
 
The text is marked by a faith in the compatibility of individual fulfillment and social 
harmony. Schiller conceived of the external challenge besetting education not as 
governmental interference, but as the un-centralized general corruption of civilization. 
Still, while the moral development of humanity is served best in a community, 
cooperation can hinder that development: 
Civilization, far from setting us free, in fact creates some new need with every new 
power it develops in us. The fetters of the physical tighten ever more alarmingly, so that 
fear of losing what we have stifles even the most burning impulse toward improvement, 
and the maxim of passive obedience passes for the supreme wisdom of life [Aesthetical 
Education of Man. p.97]. 
 
This view, like Schelling’s, understands education as serving a vital social and political 
need that cannot be reduced to its “market value.” Like Schelling, Schiller considered 
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Enlightenment reason alone to be insufficient for the needs of modern individuals and 
society.406 Schiller focused largely on the internal efforts of an individual, a perspective 
that adds a needed counterpoint to works that approach the university primarily as a 
social institution. 
These different views, together, help to indicate the scope of theoretical issues that 
must be outlined in order to effectively meet the challenges facing contemporary 
universities. The era offers additional explorations and conceptualizations of the 
university, with Kant offering the most immediately interesting for this study; The 
Conflict of the Faculties presented the philosophy faculty as collecting the humanities 
studies in opposition to the more practically minded theology, law, and medicine 
faculties. These three higher faculties are connected intimately to the state, an association 
that gives them authority that the lower faculty of philosophy (which is responsible to, 
and exercises, no external authority) lacks. Higher faculties are censured by received 
authorities, but they also have a clear prerogative to direct others. Philosophy, as Kant 
understood, has no such authority though it exercises implicit authority as the pure 
science that can criticize the other professions from an external standpoint. This 
distinction highlights the tension within public education, both that between public 
responsibility and humanistic values as well as that between different faculties. Few 
emphasize this inherent tension of universities’ ideal functioning as well as Kant. 
                                                 
406 The Eight Letter, specifically, notes reason’s reliance on a good will: “Reason has accomplished all that 
she can accomplish by discovering the law and establishing it. Its execution demands a resolute will and 
ardor of feeling. If truth is to be victorious in her conflict with forces, she must herself first become a force 
and appoint some drive to be her champions in the realm of phenomena; for drives are the only motive 
forces in the sensible world (Schiller. Aesthetical Education of Man. p.106).” 
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The fundamental conflicts within the university are those between theoretical and 
practical goals as well as the two faculties—philosophy and theology—that historically 
claim to be the central or highest sciences. Schleiermacher’s Brief Outline of the Study of 
Theology is a foundational text in the modern understanding of theology that proves 
especially useful in that it demonstrates the mutual influence of philosophy and modern 
theology in delineating each of their boundaries. Additionally, Humboldt’s philosophy of 
education deserves attention as his work as the Minister of Education had a remarkable 
influence on German education and beyond. His most relevant work, the posthumously 
published The Sphere and Duties of Government, connects the abstract theory of 
Enlightenment ideals with specific attention to the practical concerns of maintaining such 
a society. These works can help clarify the direct influence that this era has exercised 
over higher education in the last two centuries. 
B. Contextualizing and Challenging Abstract Ideals: The idea of the university 
matters as institutions of higher education need external authorities to accept their 
importance and capacity to meet social needs. Universities offer little in the way of 
tangible products and thus must demonstrate their value through more abstract 
philosophical promises; outside perceptions of this promise provide a counterpoint to the 
grandiose claims of philosophers. Political and popular criticisms of state education, as 
well as public arguments regarding the economic value of a college education, can be 
used to bring greater clarity to a central problem; American education reform, 
specifically, has always wrestled with the competing claims that education serves 
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humanist ends, or corporate and economic ends.407 The practical question, like the 
abstract problem, lacks any simple resolution. Part of this failing is due to the problematic 
pull in philosophical studies toward “pure” theory. Likewise, the practical problems 
allow no singular solution as needs and resources change too significantly to allow one 
system to continually satisfy the needs of higher education. The practical and the 
theoretical distinctions must be considered together as neither is sufficient by itself. 
The abstract arguments of scholars and the political criticism of public education 
must be contextualized; such rhetoric easily can become disconnected from the actual 
customs and pedagogical practices of universities. The sociology of knowledge—as 
developed by Durkheim, Mannheim, and others—offers models for tracing the influence 
of abstract ideas on concrete institutions; the fact that these scholars traced institutions’ 
practical roles in the development of theory makes their work an invaluable check against 
abstract bias. Such scholarship will provide a vital counterpoint to the historic and 
contemporary attempts to outline how a university should be structured; the actual 
functioning of educational institutions provides a standpoint from which the abstract 
claims of various faculties can be questioned. Likewise, available information on course 
offerings and departmental enrollment data can provide an “empirical” base against 
which to interpret the ideals espoused by various abstract academic disciplines. 
Through these different sources, it will be possible to trace the various perspectives 
that have shaped the modern university. These ideas, and the problems they address, will 
continue to shape contemporary university education. The texts and debates of the early 
                                                 
407 See Dewey, Democracy and Education, esp. chapters 22 and 23. 
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nineteenth century formed contemporary education structures and they have been under-
utilized for addressing the various troubles besetting universities in the twenty-first 
century. This study has laid significant groundwork for understanding the purpose behind 
academic organizational schemas and can help in preserving academic traditions by 
suitably adapting to the needs of the contemporary world. The different conceptions of 
the fundamental conflicts facing education show that scholars have already developed a 
cohesive body of literature ready to contribute to contemporary work. The various 
contributions surveyed here outline how the final problematic addressed in this study can 
be reformulated as part of a new study that builds on the abstract foundation already 
explored. 
As befitting of institutions which claim to embody the entirety of human arts and 
sciences, universities face any number of internal and external conflicts. Universities 
embody rarefied abstractions that otherwise seem impossible to define within ordinary 
experience, and thus represent the most explicit assumptions regarding the nature of 
scientific knowledge and its place in contemporary culture. When these concerns are 
ignored, the higher functions that the university has been constructed to meet are 
neglected. Unfortunately, any attempt to characterize, delineate, or explore the interplay 
between abstract theory and concrete institutional choices would require multiple lengthy 
studies impossible at present. These concluding thoughts can only provide a brief sketch 
of how this irresolvable theoretical problem can be turned into a tool rather than a dead 
end. 
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The specific promise of Schelling’s positive philosophy lies with its emphasis on 
contingent experience that pushes philosophy away from a self-understanding as an a 
priori and necessary universal science toward a multi-perspectival intellectual culture. 
However, as evidenced by Schelling’s philosophy of mythology, efforts to deliver on this 
promise too easily repeat the problematic subsumption of other perspectives within 
philosophy. While Schelling’s critique of modern philosophy engaged contingent 
experience, it did not prevent him from presenting philosophy as a singular controlling 
perspective. This is evident in his idea of the university, compared to the State: 
In the [realm of the Ideas], the absolute is the power from which all things flow, the 
monarch; the Ideas represent not the nobility of the people—for these two notions have 
no reality except as opposites of each other—but the entire body of free citizens; the 
individual material things are the slaves and bondsmen. There is a similar hierarchy in 
the sciences. Philosophy lives only in the Ideas; it leaves dealing with particular real 
things to physicists, astronomers, etc. [On University Studies. p.55]. 
 
Any attempt to develop a multi-perspectival perspective along these lines will merely 
work as a mask for the problematic autonomy philosophy has claimed in the modern era. 
Repeating this aspect of what he criticized in Hegelianism, Schelling betrayed the 
seeming impossibility of a theory centered on the mutual determination of different arch-
sciences. The fundamental problem of his late thought lies in the confusion of the specific 
assumptions of one tradition with a comprehensive positive philosophy, suggesting the 
positive philosophy can operate only as an ideal. Yet by explicitly attending to the 
university as the context of philosophy, one can address the seeming dead end of theory 
which Schelling’s late thought exposed. Schelling’s ability to be both within and without 
the modern assumptions under critical consideration rests on a vacillation inherent to the 
problem itself: the demarcation of philosophy and religious thought is both an abstract 
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and an institutional debate. The failure of his abstract attempt to demarcate an alternative  
philosophy of religion, as well as a brief survey of possible resources for further refining 
such an attempt, point toward a renewed articulation of the initial problematic that will be 
addressed in a further study. That renewed work is grounded in understanding how 
Schelling’s philosophy of religion fell short of its own goals while nonetheless clarifying 
what a philosophy of religion ought to accomplish. 
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